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SUMMARY
The Thesis is an investigation into the 
relationship between market structure and profitability.
First, existing oligopoly and entry-threat theories are 
examined and found not to provide a plausible basis for a 
durable structure-profitability link. Then an alternative 
model is set up, based on bargaining concepts. This model is 
successfully tested with data on UK manufacturing industries 
from five Censuses of Production between 1954 and 1973. Market 
power is found to be responsible for durable monopoly profits.
Finally, an analysis is undertaken, following Salter, 
of rates of change of some dimensions of market performance, 
and the implications outlined for policy and economic welfare 
of these and the previous results.
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0. Introduction and Summary
This Thesis is concerned with identifying the 
effects that the structure of markets have on the economic 
performance of firms. It is presented in four Parts, each 
including two or more chapters. In Part I, the existing 
theoretical underpinnings of the structure-performance 
relationship are surveyed and evaluated. From this critique, 
in Part II, is developed a 'Hew Synthesis' —  a theoretical 
approach to the modelling of market behaviour which provides,
I argue, both a plausible rationale for the interpretation of 
observed structure-performance characteristics, and a better 
chance of more precisely specifying empirically such relation­
ships .
These claims are put to the test in Part III, in 
which the new model is estimated with data on UK manufacturing 
industries, and the results compared with those of other 
studies of the same phenomena.
Part IV elucidates some extensions and implications, 
in two chapters. In the first of these, the dynamic 
performance of the UK manufacturing sector is examined, building 
on the work of Salter. In the second chapter, I outline some 
of the implications for economic welfare and policy of the 
results of the Thesis.
As well, there are three Appendices. The first 
reproduces a recently published paper that contains evidence, 
relevant to the assumptions used in the traditional specification
of structure-performance models, on the nature and extent of 
'short-term' (quarterly) fluctuations in labour productivity 
as employment varies. Appendix B generalizes somewhat the 
model of the pricing process put forward in Chapter II.3, and 
Appendix C gives definitions of all the variables used in the 
Thesis, sources of data, and Tables showing the actual values 
of the more interesting calculated series.
In what follows, I attempt to summarize, in point 
form, my analysis and results, with the exception of the 
final chapter, IV.2, in which the implications for welfare and 
policy are sketched out in a fairly speculative and cryptic 
manner which should not require any further summarizing.
1. Although, in empirical work ch the structure- 
profitability relationship, estimating equations are typically 
only casually connected with economic theory, there does, in 
fact, exist two quite sophisticated and distinct bodies of 
relevant theorizing.
2. First, there are the models of oligopolistic pricing 
pricing when each firm's decisions are perceived to have an 
effect on other firms in the same market. In this tradition, 
profits earned by an industry depend on the member firms' 
success in co-ordinating towards setting the industry-profit 
maximizing (monopoly) price, and this is supposed to depend
on the numbers of firms, basically because, the fewer the
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profits earned by an industry depend on the member firms' 
success in co-ordinating towards setting the industry-profit 
maximizing (monopoly) price, and this is supposed to depend
on the numbers of firms, basically because, the fewer the
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firms the less incentive each has to 'chisel' on a price 
agreement, as the price-elasticity of demand of each seller 
becomes a larger fraction of the total market elasticity.
Thus, oligopoly models predict a relationship between industry 
structure, reflected in some measure of the size distribution 
of firms in an industry, and profitability.
3. Such models do not provide a plausible rationale for 
a durable structure-profits relation. If the industry's 
product is homogeneous, it should not be difficult for firms 
to achieve a consensus on price, given that it is manifestly
in their joint interest to do so. Apart from explicit collusion, 
there are a number of methods, such as price leadership by one 
firm, whereby this can be done. If each firm produces a 
differentiated, or heterogeneous product, the problem of 
interdependency with a few rivals fades away -- each seller 
essentially is competing with all other sellers for the 
customer's money, so co-ordination is infeasible, and firms 
will set price more-or-less independently.
4. The second class of theoretical models has price­
setting constrained by the threat of entry into a market by 
new competitors, should unusually high profits be therein 
observed. Curiously, and disturbingly, this literature assumes 
away the oligopoly problem of co-ordination between existing 
firms by positing a monopolist or price-leader. Entry-threat 
models come in two variants:
45. Models of 'smooth' entry -- industries with no 
economies of scale —  have all supracompetitive profits 
eventually eliminated by new entrants, with existing firms 
having only some power to influence the adjustment path along 
which such entry takes place. These models do not yield very 
surprising or interesting results.
6. Models of 'lumpy' entry give existing firms some 
power to permanently set price above the competitive level if 
production cannot efficiently take place below some minimum 
scale of output, so that any firm entering at such a scale may 
add so much to industry capacity that the market is 'flooded' 
market-clearing price falls to a level that is unprofitable 
for all sellers. Within this approach, scale economies and 
the industry elasticity of demand determine profits; other 
structure variables, such as the size distribution of firms, 
do not matter.
7. in any case, all the entry-threat modelling is 
crucially weakened by the implausibility of its basic 
assumption that it is the price presently charged by existing 
firms that is taken by potential competitors as an indication 
of what would happen after entry takes place. Of all the 
instruments available to firms, price is surely one of the 
most flexible —  there is no reason why a firm should not 
quickly change its price, should it find it advantageous to 
do so. Thus, existing firms need only to threaten to lower 
their price, should entry occur, to indefinitely deter such
an action. To make credible such a threat, they need only 
have sufficient capacity on hand, or be able to add capacity 
more quickly than outsiders can, so that they could meet the 
additional demand generated by a lower, post-entry price.
8. In summary; neither oligopoly nor entry-threat 
theories generate any reasonable rationale to expect to find 
any firms not charging a monopolistic profit-maximizing price; 
in particular, they do not establish a durable a priori 
relationship between differences in market structure and 
variations in profitability.
9. However, if we therefore put aside the traditional 
models, we are faced with another problem —  estimated price 
elasticities of demand are too low to be consistent with 
monopolistic behaviour, when this is interpreted, in orthodox 
fashion, to be the choice of a profit-maximizing price and 
quantity from a fixed demand curve.
10. The key, I suggest, to resolving this paradox is to 
question the fundamental notion of a 'demand curve' as a locus 
of price-quantity combinations on which the seller unilaterally 
chooses his preferred position —  that is, to question (a) 
whether price is, in fact, the important instrument whereby 
firms affect their sales, and (b) whether sellers freely choose 
the price at which they sell.
-  J  -
11. There is, indeed, evidence that price is not an
important marketing instrument -- that firms typically increase 
their sales not by moving down the demand curve, but by pushing 
it out; by developing new products, 'opening up' new markets, 
establishing customer 'goodwill', strengthening distribution 
networks, and so on. Firms cannot sell any quantity they 
choose at the going price; they must devote resources to achieve 
and maintain a share of the market.
(12. Note that the implicit assumption that selling output
is a trivial matter of adjusting price underpins both the 
oligopoly and the entry-threat 'problems' -- in oligopoly 
models because any firm, by slightly shading its price, can 
greatly increase its market share at the expense of its rivals, 
and in the entry-threat context since any new firm supposedly 
can instantly and costlessly sell whatever quantity it wishes 
upon entering a market).
13. How, then, is price constrained, if not by its
effect on demand? I propose that price and output are best 
(in a general analysis) viewed as being separately determined. 
Output, is set, for individual firms, by their success in the 
marketing activities mentioned above, and for all firms by 
shifts in the composition and magnitude of aggregate demand. ' 
These factors are not analysed further here.
Price is seen to have primarily a distributive,
rather than allocative, function, and to elucidate and identify 
empirically the factors that determine the distribution of
7income in markets is the main aim of this Thesis.
14. I propose that the distribution of the gains from 
exchange is most usefully perceived as a bargaining process 
between sellers and buyers.
15. The outcome of the bargaining process (the price 
charged) is determined by the relative power of each party, 
defined as the costs one party can impose on the other by not 
trading.
16. Market power is shown to depend (a) on the 'territory' 
owned by sellers and buyers; conceived as the 'distance', in 
product characteristic space, that a trading partner would need 
to travel to reach the next best alternative, should the 
exchange not be consummated, and (b) on the price at which that 
alternative is traded.
17. A firm's territory is determined by such factors as 
its ownership of patents, its knowledge of special techniques, 
its reputation for reliability, its control over supply and 
distribution networks, the skill of its managers, and locational 
advantages. Such factors cannot be dissipated by new entry or 
oligopolistic price chiselling —  they are property rights held 
by the firm, often with legal title attached, but in any case 
under the firm's control. Therefore, they provide the basis 
for a concept of market power as a durable phenomenon.
818. The price of the next-best alternative -- the price 
charged at the 'border' of a firm's territory —  depends on 
the market power of the firms found there. There exists in 
the economy large numbers of small or 'fringe' firms selling 
products which are in some degree substitutable for those 
offered by larger firms with substantial market power. These 
fringe firms are too small to possess sufficient market power 
to justify, alone, a price that would keep them in business. 
Their prices are therefore set at levels which reflect the 
opportunity cost of self-employed entrepreneurs -- the risk- 
adjusted wage they can earn by working for someone. This 
opportunity cost is thus determined by factors such as the 
real wage, and society's attitudes to risk, which are formed 
outside the market-power system, and so are exogenous to it. 
Accordingly, the presence of a competitive fringe sector 
provides an ultimate constraint on the prices that can be 
charged by firms with significant market power, so that our 
model can easily be made determinate (whereas oligopoly models 
in which all prices are endogenous, are more difficult to 
squeeze stable solutions from).
19. The bargaining process is not, however, mediated by 
market power alone. Notions of empathy and fairness may qualify 
the exercise of brute market forces. This is particularly 
likely to be so in what I call the explicit bargaining situation, 
of firms trading with other firms in uniquely negotiated deals.
9In these cases, networks of trading partners, relying 
substantially on trust and custom, develop, and soften the 
division of the gains from exchange when the market powers of 
buyers and sellers differ.
20. Even in the situation of firms selling to final 
consumers, or large firms selling to (or buying from) many 
small firms, in which the value of each trade is too low to 
make it worthwhile to customize each, empathy and fairness may 
still play a part in what might be called a process of implicit 
bargaining. However, we expect that selling at a 'take-it-or- 
leave-it' price will still be more profitable than negotiating 
explicitly with other firms.
21. These theoretical considerations lead to the 
specification of a model of profitability as a function of 
market structure factors. This model is tested against data 
on 51 UK manufacturing industries averaged over five Census 
of Production years -- 1954, 1958, 1963, 1968, and 1973.
(22. A feature of the estimating equation is the
definition of profitability as the ratio of profits actually 
earned in an industry to the profits that would be earned by 
all the resources committed to that industry were these 
deployed instead in the competitive, or fringe, sector of 
the economy. It is suggested that this variable, called 
'Surplus', will be a better measure of profitability than either 
of those used in previous work, since one of the latter —  the
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profit margin on sales -- ignores the capital input (and 
attaches a spurious significance to the stage of production 
at which an industry operates), and the other -- the rate of 
return on capital stock —  allows no markup on the throughout 
of variable factors such as labour and materials.)
23. Estimation of the model is a success. The goodness 
of fit is quite satisfactory, and most coefficients show 
comfortably significant t-statistics. Features of the result 
are:
(a) Surplus outperforms the profit margin on sales as a 
dependent variable.
(b) Seller concentration is not a significant regressor, 
but the average size of plant is.
(c) Buyer market power factors are important. In particular, 
it is more profitable to sell to consumers than to other 
firms, as expected, and the 'piggyback' effect dominates 
the countervailing power of higher market concentration 
of buying industries in their reselling markets -- some 
of the monopoly profits buyers earn in their own selling 
activities are passed back down to their suppliers.
24. We also support the hypothesis that market power is 
a durable phenomenon —  industries earning higher than average
profits at the beginning of the sample period revealed no 
tendency to have these profits competed away by the end of 
the period.
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25. These results are compared with those of other studies of 
the UK manufacturing sector. The apparently substantial 
improvement achieved over the earlier work is probably due to:
(a) The use of the Surplus dependent variable.
(b) The incorporation of buyer-power factors.
(c) The reduction in cyclical 'noise' through the use of 
data averaged over five Census years.
We may note that, looked at as a whole, the previous work also 
finds little evidence of seller concentration having a 
significant influence on profits.
26. Although market power appears to account for a good 
deal of variation, across industries, in profitability, no 
relationship could be discerned between such power and changes 
in profitability over time. Over the period 1958-73, changes 
in industry prices matched very closely changes in the 
opportunity costs of the labour, materials, and capital per 
unit of output.
27. It seems that the effect of plant size on profitability 
cannot be attributed to economies of scale across industries, 
although particular industries that did increase their scale of 
plant between 1958 and 1973 by more than the norm, apparently 
did so because of associated cost savings.
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PART I: A CRITIQUE OF THE RECEIVED THEORY 
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
1. Introduction
Although some of the work to be surveyed in this 
Part was carried out over a century ago, the search for 
general theoretical propositions in the field of industrial 
organization can be placed within the now familiar structure- 
conduct-performance paradigm of Mason (1949) and Bain (1959). 
Structural, or slow-changing factors, such as market concen­
tration, demand elasticities, scale economies, and degree of 
openness to international trade, determine firms' behaviour 
or conduct —  advertising programs, price-setting policies, 
attempts to collude and to lobby, expenditure on research and 
development -- with results that can be measured by various 
interesting performance variables, such as profitability, 
rate of technological advance, propensity to minimize costs 
in the short run, and macroeconomic concerns about inflation 
and the level of employment.
Of these measures of performance, and their 
relationship, through conduct, with structure, it is the 
first—  profitability —  that has received by far the most 
theoretical and empirical attention in the industrial organ­
isation literature (cf. Weiss' survey (1971)). This emphasis, 
which probably has its roots in the relative analytical 
tractability and empirical accessibility of the structure-
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development -- with results that can be measured by various 
interesting performance variables, such as profitability, 
rate of technological advance, propensity to minimize costs 
in the short run, and macroeconomic concerns about inflation 
and the level of employment.
Of these measures of performance, and their 
relationship, through conduct, with structure, it is the 
first—  profitability —  that has received by far the most 
theoretical and empirical attention in the industrial organ­
isation literature (cf. Weiss' survey (1971)). This emphasis, 
which probably has its roots in the relative analytical 
tractability and empirical accessibility of the structure-
profits relation, has meant that, of the two great themes 
of economics —  the distribution of income and efficiency —  
industrial organization has predominantly concerned itself 
with the former. The question typically asked is 'Does the 
existence of certain structural characteristics in an 
industry allow its member firms to make more money than the 
norm?'
Of course, the implication for allocative 
inefficiency of a divergence between price and cost has not 
been ignored, and will not be here (Chapter IV.1), and I will 
also devote some attention to the behaviour of costs 
(Chapter IV.1) and to macroeconomic questions (Chapter IV.2), 
but in the core of the thesis —  this and Parts II and III —  
we will be concerned with Distribution; that is, with the 
existence of a stable structure-profits relationship.
A search for the 'theory' of the structure-profits 
link is not necessarily straightforward. In the empirical 
econometric literature, one often comes across sentences of 
the sort —  'economic theory tells us to include variables 
X, Y, and Z in our regression equation'1 —  but such claims 
have never, until the recent Warwick work (returned to in 
Chapter 1.2) been supported by an explicit exposition of this 
'theory', or even, in most cases, references to where such an 
exposition can be found.
- M  -
Indeed, many industrial organization economists 
might be prepared to admit, with Weiss, that
"Work on the parameters of the concentration 
profits relationship has been woefully free 
of theory" (1971, p. 374).
that is, that the theory doesn't actually exist.
Nevertheless, there is, indeed, a quite rich body 
of industrial economics theorizing, the practitioners of 
which, as we shall see, have settled in one or the other of 
two non-communicating camps, which are, however, built on 
the same traditional territory, borrowed from orthodox 
microeconomics and General Equilibrium theory.
This common ground is the fundamental concept of 
an 'industry' or 'market', defined by the existence of a 
'demand curve' —  a downward-sloping locus of points in the 
price-quantity place, showing for each quantity of output of 
an industry the price at which all that output will be sold —  
the market clearing price.
The demand curve is a concept so familiar to 
economists that we hardly think to question it. But consider 
its implications as used:
1) The industry sells a homogeneous good —  the 
product of all firms can be aggregated, and 
is sold at a common price;
- n  -
L‘) Price is an effective and customary
instrument to alter sales —  within the 
limits of the curve there exists a price 
that will sell each quantity;
3) There is no contact with consumers, who
are an undifferentiated mass of price-takers;
4) The demand curve is invariant to the actions 
of existing firms.
In the next two chapters, I will attempt to argue 
that these implications are unrealistic as general propo­
sitions, and that their weaknesses crucially undermine the 
validity of the theories built on the foundation of the 
demand curve concept.
The demand curve serves as a taxonomic device to 
divide all the firms in an economy into two subsets —  those 
within and those outside of a particular industry. We can 
make the promised division of industrial organization 
theorizing into two camps according to the assumptions made 
about the relative importance of the two subsets.
First, beginning with Cournot (1963), there are 
the oligopoly theorists who attend to the problems of the 
subset of firms behind the demand curve, and ignore the 
others. These will be considered in Chapter 1.2.
- ] 7 -
Second, we have a younger literature on the threat 
of entry, which does concern itself with the actions of 
firms outside an industry, but assumes away any internal 
oligopoly problems by postulating a monopolist or dominant 
firm already in place. This we look at in Chapter 1.3.
The division of firms into the two sets is quite 
arbitrary -- there are no inherent differences assumed 
between firms inside and outside a market, only in whether 
or not they collude with each other. Accordingly, the 
split of theorizing into two camps is also quite arbitrary, 
as will be seen, and seems to have arisen solely out of the 
analytical problems involved in formal model-building under 
more general assumptions.
Finally, Chapter 1.4 summarizes the arguments of 
Part I, and also lists five qualifications to the generality 
of these arguments.
I.2 Oligopoly Theory
In a recent survey, Phillips claims that there is a 
'paucity of theory' to support the hypothesis that industry 
profitability is a function of market concentration (1976, 
p. 241), but gives rather a long list of exceptions (as many 
as seven distinct theories or ’quasi-theories') and fails to 
mention the compact but cohesive body of work, beginning 
with Cournot in 1838, and culminating, to date, in the 
tightly specified models of Cowling and Waterson (1976) and 
VJaterson (1976), which do attempt to set out a formal basis 
for the structure-profitability hypothesis.
In this literature, the standard microeconomic 
analyses of perfect competition and perfect monopoly are 
accepted as polar cases, delimiting the lower and upper 
bounds of industry profits. The problem is to explain the 
observed continuum of profit rates between these bounds, and 
the key to so doing is to note that behind each demand curve 
we typically find a sizeable proportion, perhaps a majority, 
of output produced by a few —  say, less than ten —  firms. 
This is not monopoly, but it may plausibly be considered not 
a good approximation to the 'atoms' of perfect competition, 
either. This situation is called 'oligopoly'.
With such numbers, it becomes likely that firms 
are interdependent —  that what one firm does will signific­
antly affect the others —  and Cournot's contribution was to
19
build a model incorporating interdependence along with an 
assumption about firms' reaction to it. His result was 
that the margin of price over cost depends on the number of 
firms (Cowling and Waterson, 1974, p. 3), but in getting to 
this, he made the assumption that firms actually assumed no 
reaction by their rivals to any change in their own output. 
Cowling and Waterson have generalized the Cournot model to 
allow for non-zero expected reaction (or 'conjectural 
variation', as it is known), as well as differences in cost 
curves among firms, and arrive at the following equation to 
explain the ratio of profits (tt) to total revenues (R) :
tt/R = - |(1+A) • • • (l.D *
where n is the industry price elasticity of demand, H is 
the Herfindahl measure of market structure
H = £(Xi/X)2 ... (1.2) ,
and 1+A is the conjectural variation of total industry 
output X, in response to a unit increase in a particular 
firm's output, X^.
The Cournot solution (A = 0) is a special case of 
(1.1); in general, industry profitability will be greater 
or less than the Cournot value according to whether A is 
greater or less than zero; that is, whether each firm 
expects the others to match or to accommodate its change in
output.
In sharp contrast to the vague or non-existent 
appeals to 'theory' endemic in the empirical industrial 
organization literature, The Cowling-Waterson equation gives 
a remarkably tight specification of the structure-profits 
relation, with even the intercept term constrained a priori 
to be zero . indeed, the specification is almost uncomfortably 
tight —  as we shall see in Chapter III.3, data problems 
force some rather strong assumptions before (1.1) can be 
estimated.
There are other oligopoly pricing models (cf. 
Silberston, 1970, for a survey), making other assumptions 
about the nature of conjectural variations, and thus 
reaching results which differ in detail; but since all the 
models share the basic assumption that somehow it is not 
possible for firms to collude perfectly (that is, to charge 
the price that a monopolist would charge) and get the 
result that the ability to get close to the monopoly price is 
a function of the number of firms (more generally, of some 
index weighting the number of firms by their relative size, 
such as the Herfindahl), I shall not here survey the 
literature, and will take the Cowling-Waterson expression 
(1.1), with its convenient specificity, as representative of 
the results that can be achieved by the oligopoly price­
setting approach.
In our appraisal of the oligopoly pricing model, we 
shall first look directly at the empirical plausibility of the 
profit rates implied by (1.1), given reasonable values of the 
structural parameters.
Note, first, that formula (1.1) does not do badly 
in replicating average profit/sales ratios. The mean value 
of the Herfindahl for UK manufacturing industries is 
probably about 0.12.^ Deaton's values for price elasticities 
for the manufacturing industries in his sample average to 
-0.53 (1975, pp. 60-61). If we take an intermediate value of 
X, say 0.5, and plug these numbers into (1.1), we get a 
figure for the 'average' tt/ R  of about 0.3. While this is 
rather greater than the actual manufacturing average tt/ R  of 
around 0.2, it is not drastically out of line -- alternative 
assumptions about X or about a downward bias in the elasti­
city estimates will easily bring (1.1) down to 0.2.
However, although it is quite possible that 
oligopoly models can be developed which yield reasonable tt/ R  
ratios, I will argue next that they should not be; that 
models built on assumptions implying that factors limiting 
the ability of oligopolists to collude are the factors 
limiting industry profitability are fundamentally misconceived.
- 21 -
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I will suggest that, if one wishes to make the least 
unreasonable general assumption possible (that is, the 
assumption that, although not true without exception, is 
widely out of line for the fewest possible number of industries), 
one should go to the other extreme and assume that the price 
collusion problem is insignificant, either because price 
collusion is easy or because it is unnecessary.
Consider first the easiness of colluding. Within 
the orthodox industry-demand curve paradigm, it is essential 
that reaching a collusive agreement on price not be easy. For 
if it is, the oligopolists will presumably agree to set price 
at the joint-profit maximizing level —  the price a monopolist 
would charge. But, most empirical evidence implies that this 
monopolistic price is indeterminate, since most industry price 
elasticities are absolutely less than one. All of Deaton's 
estimates for UK manufacturing industries are less than one 
(loc. cit.) and similar results come out of studies for the 
US and Canada (Houthakker and Taylor (1970), Hassan, Johnson, 
and Green (1977). These elasticity estimates may be biased 
towards zero by failure to control for quality change or 
inadequate allowance for lagged responses of quantity 
demanded to price changes. But the bias we would have to 
impute in order to make the data consistent with the observed 
average profits/revenue ratio of about 0.2 under monopoly 
conditions is implausibly large. Substituting the monopoly
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values of H and X (1 and 0, respectively) into equation (1.1) 
shows that an elasticity of -5 is needed to generate the 
average ratio of profits to revenue. Thus, it is crucial that 
co-ordination be imperfect.
However, the evidence does not, in my interpretation, 
support this. Even without explicit collusion, which is, 
anyway, not illegal in the UK, there seem to be a number of 
effective ways in which the big firms in an industry can allow 
a co-ordinated industry price to emerge, as Scherer's survey 
illustrates (1970, Chapter 6). The acceptance of one of the 
firms in an industry (usually the biggest) by the others as 
a 'price leader', whose price changes the other firms reliably 
follow, is perhaps the most important co-ordinating device. 
Scherer's list of examples (p. 167) —  cigarettes, steel, 
aluminum, farm machinery, synthetic fibres, metal cans, and 
automobiles —  accounts for about 15 per cent of US industrial 
added value, and is not intended to be exhaustive.
Really, it is not very surprising that oligopolistic 
firms should be able to come up with ways to avoid frittering 
away profits by unnecessary price competition, given that it 
is manifestly in their interest to do so. Economists may have 
been mislead by their own difficulties in formally modelling 
price formation into assuming that firms find it just as hard 
to actually do it.
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The illusory modelling problem stems from the demand 
curve assumptions. It is not that the oligopolists are 
supposed to have any difficulty in knowing what the joint 
profit-maximizing price is, as might reasonably be thought an 
important real-world problem. On the contrary, demand and 
cost curves are typically assumed to be known and fixed. The 
problem is really not with price at all. It is with quantity; 
with market shares. Under the conditions of the one-market 
demand curve, any firm slightly undercutting its rivals' price 
can sell as much output as it wishes (within the limit of total 
industry demand). This extreme price responsiveness of market 
share gives each member of a cartel or collusive agreement an 
incentive to try and cheat his colleagues by price-chiselling. 
All the oligopoly models can be seen as attempts to formulate 
assumptions about rivals' reactions which imply a stable 
distribution of market shares, to counter the inherent 
slipperiness of the oligopoly situation as it is initially 
set up. That these models predict a higher price as the 
number of firms diminishes is just due to the smaller 
incentive to cut price as a firm's market share increases 
(that is, as a firm's demand curve becomes less elastic), 
rather than to a concrete accretion of market power as firms 
become bigger.
Is, then, sharing the market really a basic 
problem limiting collusive success (given the evidence of 
Scherer, cited above, that the process of achieving price
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co-ordination does not seem generally to be too difficult)? 
Such information that is available suggests that it is not. 
From a recent survey to which 205 'medium to large' UK 
companies responded, Atkin and Skinner concluded that
"pricing is an area of marketing which is 
totally neglected. Pricing as a marketing 
tool is rarely practised" (1975, ii).
Only 17 per cent of their respondents reported price to be 
'vital' in overall marketing strategy (p. 74). To be 
consistent with the orthodox oligopoly model, 100 per cent 
should have so replied. Porter, in a study which builds on 
both the normative management science and positive industrial 
organization approaches, contrasts the economists' 
preoccupation with problems of interdependence with the 
Business Schools' propensity to focus almost exclusively on 
the individual firm in its solitary quest for 'excellence' 
(1976, p. 70). Since the livelihood of Business Schools 
depends rather more than that of economics faculties on the 
realism of their analyses of the corporate economy, it may 
not be to unreasonable to suppose that the former group are 
the more likely to be on the right track.
On reflection, I do not find this conclusion too 
hard to take. I would suggest that 'marketing' —  the 
improving or defending of market share —  is typically far 
from a trivial matter of adjusting price, even when there is
■
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a relatively high substitutability between the products of 
different firms in the same industry (as, for example, in 
all the dominant firm-pricing industries cited by Scherer, 
above). There are many extremely difficult problems to be 
overcome —  formulating a promotional and advertising 
strategy, establishing and maintaining distributive, wholesale 
and retail outlets, building up goodwill and a reputation for 
reliability, maintaining supplies of output, financing 
expansion —  by a successful marketing operation, even when 
'the price is right'.
To draw together the argument so far: in industries 
producing what may be regarded as relatively standardized 
products, price co-ordination should not present great problems, 
and, indeed, does not seem to do so. I expect that it is most 
reasonable, in modelling industrial behaviour, to assume that 
firms in such markets are able to arrive at a price structure 
which best serves their interests as a group. Such co-ordin­
ation does not founder on the problem of assigning market 
shares because prices are not typically a major marketing 
instrument. Market shares, given the price structure, are 
what firms do compete on, using all the instruments 
mentioned above, and others, too, no doubt. Price competition 
is a negative-sum game for the industry group, and so is not
indulged in; market share competition by other means is zero-
4sum, and therefore permissible.
.u. Mima i
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An 'economic' objection to this argument would be 
that firms have an incentive, analogous to the price­
chiselling incentive, to each buy for themselves an 
increase in market share by purchasing more of the inputs 
that affect it. Certainly, there is evidence that oligo­
polistic industries do spend more on advertising than would 
a monopolist (Cable 1972). However, I suggest that most of 
the market-share-determining activities -- building goodwill, 
sales networks, maintaining production, and so on —  should 
be seen fundamentally not as purchased inputs in elastic 
supply (though to a degree they can be bought, through the 
services, say, of management consultants), but rather as the 
basic fixed factors of business enterprise; namely, its 
entrepreneurial and organizational skills.
If we do not adopt this point of view, it becomes 
very difficult to rationalize the persistent differences in 
market shares of different firms observed in so many 
industries. Is it really plausible that General Motors 
outsells Ford or Chrysler year after year simply because it 
happens to purchase more market share-augmenting inputs than 
its rivals; or is it more reasonable for the economist to 
simply assume that General Motors is just better at selling 
automobiles than the others, and leave it at that.
I have considered the situation when collusion or
co-ordination on price is easy. There are, however, many 
markets in which the necessary assumption of standardized
products cannot be maintained; in particular, capital goods 
industries, in which production runs tend to be small and 
products varied to suit the needs of particular customers, 
and those consumer industries, in particular in the service 
sector, in which the costs of transporting the product and/or 
the consumer are a significant aspect in the product 
specification.
In these cases, products are so multidimensional 
that agreement, especially non-collusive agreement —  on a 
price structure may readily be admitted a hopelessly difficult 
task. But, of course, in such a situation, price co-ordination 
will typically be unnecessary —  each seller's particular 
characteristics will dominate most of his market area and it will 
only be at the 'boundary' of his territory (a concept to be more 
fully explored in the next Part) that he finds himself in 
competition, in the traditional sense of marketing close 
substitutes, with other firms in the industry.
This sort of market is more akin to the 'monopo­
listic competition' and 'imperfect competition' regimes first 
analysed by Chamberlin (1933) and Joan Robinson (1933) than 
to orthodox oligopoly.
Naturally, in this case, market sharing is not a 
major problem as firms are only at their interfaces competing 
for the same customers.5 Instead, firm's marketing efforts 
will be directed towards shifting out the demand curve within
their turf - - to diverting consumer expenditure towards them at 
the expense of all other uses for the money. The impact of 
such marketing behaviour will be too diffusely spread 
amongst other firms in other industries to induce any sort 
of retaliatory response.
That this situation of firms conducting their 
business, particularly with respect to 'short run' decision­
making on such variables as prices, largely independently of 
other firms in the same industry is a quite common feature 
of market behaviour is supported by one of the more striking 
results from the Atkin and Skinner survey. There, a remark­
able ignorance about the industry price structure is 
suggested by the snail proportion of respondents (7 per cent) 
who thought that their prices are 'lower than average', 
compared with 41 per cent who put them 'higher than average' 
(op. cit., p. 68). Though it is arithmetically possible, 
given sufficient difference between the median and the mean, 
that these replies are consistent with generally accurate 
perceptions of the price structure, the large difference in 
the percentages does not make such-a situation seem very 
likely.
To another question (p. 64), more than half the 
respondents reported that the 'percentage by which highest 
competitive price exceeds lowest' is greater than 10. Of 
course, the use of the undefined term 'competitive' prevents
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any precise conclusions being drawn from the figures, but it 
may be reasonable to infer from the answers to these two 
questions that (a) in most industries there is not a unique 
price, and (b) many firms in such industries do not even 
know accurately the prices charged by their 'competitors', 
presumably because it is not worth devoting resources to 
finding out.
We can muster more direct evidence on the plausi­
bility of the homogeneous good assumption. Stigler and 
Kindahl assembled and analysed a large amount of data on 
prices actually paid by buyers, and concluded that 'The 
Unique Price ... is a myth. Differences among prices paid 
or received are almost universal' (1970, p. 88). Kravis 
and Lipsey (1971), in a study of OECD country trade in 
manufactured metal products (which made up 46 per cent of 
total OECD exports in 1963) found that 'rarely were any two 
items identical in the degree required by prevailing price 
collection methods' because of the 'enormous variety of 
conditions attached to a sale, other than those usually 
subsumed under the heading of price' (p. 15). These 
'conditions' included discounting, credit terms, delivery 
time, and additional services. Other evidence that 
'industries' do not in general produce homogeneous goods 
comes from the existence of 'intra-industry trade' —  the 
situation in which an economy imports and exports the 'same'
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product simultaneously. Grubel and Lloyd(1975) measured a 
good deal of intra-industry trade in the European Common 
Market at the 3-digit industry level, and found, in a case 
study of Australian data, that the phenomenon persists at 
the 7-digit level of disaggregation. In an industry 
producing a homogeneous product, of course, we would observe 
imports or exports, but not both.
Thus, there are good grounds for taking product 
heterogeneity to be the general case, though industries 
undoubtedly differ in the degree to which their member firms 
depart from offering a standardized product.
To sum up the argument of the chapter to this point : 
in industries selling relatively standardized products, limits 
on the ability to collude on price do not seem to be acceptable 
as the factor limiting profitability —  a number of instruments, 
such as price leadership, exist and appear typically to deal 
well with the co-ordination problem. In markets in which 
product characteristics are more highly differentiated, the 
collusion problem becomes irrelevant —  firms are just not 
interdependent enough for it to matter.
However, it is not now possible to sweep aside 
market structure analysis, and simply assume 'as if' monopoly 
price setting at the industry level in the standardised 
product case, and firm by firm when products are differentiated,
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at least while still building upon the traditional demand- 
curve assumption.
This is because the assumption of monopoly pricing 
also leads to results that jar strikingly with the empirical 
evidence. Vie have already noted the consensus from demand 
studies that estimated industry price elasticities imply that 
profits are not being maximized by equating marginal revenue 
to marginal cost. Nor can this be reasonably explained away 
by attacking the maximization assumption —  inelastic demand 
at current prices implies that profits can unambiguously be 
increased by raising the price; something that even the most 
stolid of 'satisficers' must eventually become aware of and 
act on.
In the non-standardized product case, a more 
appropriate elasticity is that facing individual firms; here 
there is less evidence (because of the difficulties of getting 
hold of time-series data at the firm level), but in a study 
of 107 brands from 16 product classes in 8 western European 
countries, for which availability of price data permitted the 
estimation of 43 brand-price elasticities, Lambin found long- 
run price elasticities for which the mean was 1.813, well 
below the value of five, noted above, needed to be consistent 
with observed profit margins (1976, p. 103).
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How can these discrepancies be explained? Again, I 
suggest that the problem arises from the too-unquestioning 
carryover of the demand curve concept from microeconomics; in 
this case, the third and fourth of the assumptions listed in 
Section 1, namely that firms sell to an undifferentiated mass 
of price-taking customerrs, and that the curve is invariant 
to actions taken within the industry.
Assumption (3) is most readily questioned in the 
context of firms selling intermediate goods to other firms. 
Since, at least, Galbraith's (1952) development of the 
concept of 'countervailing power', or buyer market power 
(cf. Scherer, 1970, Chapter 9, for a survey), it has been 
accepted as reasonable to suppose that greater market power 
on the buyers' side of the market will allow these buyers to 
purchase at a lower price, analogously to sellers' market 
power enabling them to charge a higher price. However, 
there is another possibility; in a given industry which 
purchases, processes and then resells, greater market power 
will allow it to sell at a higher price, and some of the 
resulting additional profits may be passed on to suppliers. 
Waterson, (1976) in fact, develops a model due to Cournot 
with just this 'piggyback' property, in which buyer market 
power is unambiguously beneficial to intermediate sellers.
Whatever the net effect of buyer power (which will 
be empirically examined in Chapter III.2), it seems reasonable 
to propose that when exchange takes place between small
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numbers of sellers and buyers, so that each transaction is 
'lumpy' (of significant value to both parties) the terms of 
such transactions, involving not just price, but, as well, 
all the other dimensions of product heterogeneity mentioned 
above (delivery dates, service guarantees, payment terms, 
and so on), will be settled by bargaining between buyer and 
seller, rather than via the impersonal mediation of the 
'market'.
At issue in the bargaining process, and settled 
according to the relative power of the parties, is the 
division of the gains from trade —  the profits earned by 
each party. The actual quantity traded may not enter into 
the process at all, or at least only in an 'all or nothing' 
sense, as when a manufacturer invites a number of firms to 
tender to supply a given quantity of some material input, 
with the quantity fixed in proportion to an already decided 
level of the manufacturer's final output.
The bargaining situation does provide, then, one 
reasonable rationale for a constraint on the profit-making 
opportunities of a concentrated selling industry. But in 
the cases of industries selling to small firms or to 
consumers without market power, when it would be too 
expensive to haggle over each individual transaction, the 
problem of inconsistency between demand elasticities and 
observed profitability remains.
The key to resolving this may lie in extending
the 'bargaining' concept beyond its usual application to the 
resolution of conflict between a pair of agents (or of the 
representatives of two groups of agents, as in the unionized 
wage determination process), which might be called explicit 
bargaining, to what I call implicit bargaining —  the 
situation in which the usual bargaining parameters of threats 
and fairness act to mediate the price determination process, 
even in a market in which a monopolist sells to thousands or 
millions of (to him) indistinguishable and unknown customers, 
with whom he may have no formal contact at all, apart from 
the actual transaction of the sale.
The notion of implicit bargaining is important to 
the model developed in Part II, and is analysed more fully 
there: to avoid repetition, I will not now anticipate this
discussion. We should, however, note the implication of the 
concept for this Critique; if implicit or explicit bargaining 
determines price setting, then the price-taking assumption 
(3) must go. For what the latter implies is that the selling 
firms are able to move freely up and down their demand curves 
with no customer reaction other than the passive response of 
changing the quantity purchased. Under the bargaining 
regimen, in contrast, we may observe (for example) a firm 
putting up its price with little effect on sales following, 
say, an increase in its raw materials prices, but we would
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not conclude that the firm had been irrational in not raising 
its price before the materials cost increase, given the 
observed inelasticity, as the seller might simply not be 
permitted, by the constraints of the bargaining situation, 
to raise its price without some justification accepted by 
both parties.
There has been criticism of the domination of price 
theory by the demand curve since the studies on 'full' cost 
and 'cost-plus' pricing (Hall and Hitch, Andrews), though the 
evidence put forward has not typically been uncritically 
accepted by 'marginalists' (cf. the debate between Lester and 
Machlup). Silberston (1970) surveys this literature. Of 
Atkin and Skinners' respondents, 51 per cent reported that 
they priced by adding a percentage to costs, 39 per cent by 
fixing the required gross profit margin on selling price 
(essentially a full-cost procedure) and 21 per cent used some 
other, non-cost related, method.**
While thus observing prevalence of some sort of 
cost-plus pricing gives us no information about the 
determination of the size of the markup, and how this may 
differ across firms and over time, possibly in response to 
demand factors, the numbers do, I feel, at least put the 
burden of proof on those who would continue to build on the 
simple supply-demand model to demonstrate empirically the
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consistency of the 'marginal revenue = marginal cost' 
predictions with the cost-plus vocabulary predominantly 
employed by businessmen when they describe their pricing 
procedures. This, to my knowledge, has not been done.^
Equally, it is reasonable to make a positive, 
attempt, as I do in the next Part, to build a theoretical 
pricing model in which cost factors enter with some independence 
of demand curve considerations. Indeed, such an attempt is 
certainly necessary, if the margin of price over costs is to 
be explained by something more interesting and useful than 
recourse to 'rules of thumb' or 'common practice'.
We turn now to the fourth and last of the demand 
curve postulates; the assumption that the curve is invariant 
to whatever actions are taken by existing firms within it.
We have already noted that firms can deliberately use 
expenditure on advertising to shift the curve outwards; 
however, this represents a fairly straightforward extension 
of the simple price-quantity profit maximizing model —  it 
presents no fundamental problems to these models as they 
are presently built.
Much more troublesome is the suggestion, which has 
been made in the 'threat of new entry' literature, that the 
pricing decisions of existing firms influence the rate at 
which outside firms decide to enter an industry, and thus
shift the demand curve faced by the original industry member. 
Extending the oligopoly analysis to potential firms may be 
possible, in principle, but, in fact, appears to present 
analytical difficulties that have so far prevented the 
generalization from being successfully achieved.
Thus, we find two quite distinct bodies of industrial 
organization theorizing; one, the oligopoly pricing models 
considered in this chapter, which ignore other than presently 
operating firms, and second, the entry-limiting price work 
which, as will be noted in the next chapter, reduces its 
analytical problem to manageable proportions only by assuming 
away all oligopolistic co-ordination problems amongst existing 
firms. The two theories give two independent predictions of 
what price will be charged by a particular industry which will, 
in general, differ —  surely, an unsatisfactory state of 
affairs, but one which does not seem to have concerned 
empirical researchers, who typically sprinkle their 
regression equations with variables pertaining, some to 
oligopolistic co-ordination, others to entry barriers; and 
bless the specification with a call to 'The Theory', as 
though an all-encompassing theoretical framework did, in fact, 
exist.
An exception is the work of Cowling and Waterson 
(1976). These authors draw on the results of Spence (1974,
1977) in whose model excess capacity is the entry-limiting
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instrument, which leaves the pricing decision to be made 
independently of long-run (demand curve-shifting) consider­
ation. Accepting this model (on which more will be said in 
the next chapter) would justify the limited scope of 
oligopolistic co-ordination models, and imply that empirical 
testing should exclude entry-limiting variables from the 
regression equation —  this Cowling and Waterson, rather 
boldly, do.
Of course, from the point of view of this thesis, 
in which it has already been argued that oligopolistic 
ability to co-ordinate is not, in general, the factor 
constraining price, and in which, in the next chapter, 
qualified approval will be given of the Spence model, it must 
be concluded that 'inconsistency of the two bodies of theories 
is a non-problem, not because one theory dominates the other, 
but because neither provides an acceptable formulation of the 
price setting process. To follow these criticisms with more 
substantive suggestions is the task undertaken in Part II.
An empirical regularity which may be awkward for 
oligopoly theory is the relationship that has been observed, 
mainly in the Business School literature, between the 
profitability and market share of individual firms. In a 
study of 620 'businesses’ of. 57 North American corporations 
for the years 1970-72, Buzzellet. al. found that ’a difference
W * »  H b riU M i Jt> 3-
40
of 10 percentage points in market share is accompanied by a 
difference of about 5 points in pretax ROI [rate of return 
on investment]’ (1975, p. 97). Delcombe and Bruzelius (1977) 
found a similar relation for 18 ’product centres' of a 
multinational engineering company. Dalton and Levin (1977, 
p. 34), using US data, found that 'profit rates rise with 
market share' (though only when the four-firm concentration 
ratio was greater than 45 per cent in a firm's industry).
Miller claims that the relationship cannot be 
explained as being due to market power within the framework 
of oligopoly theories, since these have the feature that the 
'increased profitability of concentrated industries is due to 
higher prices, which are received by the small firms as well 
as the large ones' (1978, p. 476). Mancke suggests that the 
observed relationship could just be due to luck (1974). This 
point of view is attacked by Caves et. al. (1977), who refer 
to Gale's (1972, p. 413) suggestion that a larger market 
share may be expected to yield high profitability within 
oligopolies by:
1) giving a product differentiation advantage;
2) allowing firms to participate in an 
oligopolistic group;
3) increasing firms' bargaining power in this 
situation;
4) allowing economies of scale.
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All of these rationalizations are awkward. Product differ­
entiation seems, indeed, to be an important factor —  Buzzel 
et. al. discovered that businesses with more than 40 per 
cent of their market were judged to have markedly higher 
product quality, and slightly higher prices, than the rest —  
but, as I have argued above, this takes us away from the 
oligopoly situation where in a homogeneous product makes it 
necessary for firms to co-ordinate their actions.
The participation argument is not convincing —  in 
oligopoly theories, with price the only marketing instrument, 
all any firm need do to 'participate' in an oligopoly is to 
set its price according to the assumed decision rule. Nor is 
it clear why larger firms should have more bargaining power 
in the oligopoly situation.
Indeed, the opposite may be more likely if, as 
Miller suggests (1978, p. 476) the 'leading firm in a 
concentrated industry frequently has to restrict production 
to maintain the price, leaving it with higher overhead costs 
per unit of production. The smaller firms, operating under 
this price umbrella, may be able to ensure capacity operation 
simply by shading price to the extent necessary, a strategy 
which would bring about a collapse of the price structure if 
predicted by one of the leading firms'.
As for economies of scale, oligopoly models do not 
tell us why some firms will succeed in capturing them while 
others remain small.
A reasonable explanation for the correlation 
between market share and profitability may be that both 
variables are influenced by the distribution of the fixed 
factors of business enterprise —  the basic effectiveness 
of entrepreneurs and organizations. I suggested earlier in 
the chapter that such factors, as reflected in differences 
in marketing skills, may account for the inter-firm 
distribution of market shares, and it seems plausible that 
organizations that are able at marketing may also tend to 
be good at producing. As well, a low-cost producer, 
especially when such factors as favourable location, or 
ownership of important patents contribute to its cost 
advantage, may find it profitable to sell over a wider 
market area than will its less favoured rivals.
While inter-firm differences in costs can be 
squeezed into the oligopoly framework, it seems hardly 
worthwhile doing so, since their thrust is towards 
recognizing the heterogeneity of firms and products, and 
away from the slippery interdependencies underlying the 
oligopoly problem.
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Powerful empirical support for these arguments that 
we should move away from considering market power as an 
industry level phenomenon is given, for a US sample of 245 
large corporations, by the results of Shepherd (1976), who 
found that when market share and industry concentration 
variables are included together in a regression explaining 
the rate of return on equity, the former variable is strongly 
significant, and the latter very insignificant (Table 1, p. 40). 
When just industry concentration is used as a regressor, it is 
quite significant (Table 2, p. 47), which suggests that it acts 




I.3 Conduct and Structure in the Long Run (the Entry Threat) 
As we noted in the previous chapter, another strand 
of industrial organization theorizing, concerned with the 
likelihood of new firms entering an industry, and with the 
proper response to the entry threat by the firms already in 
place behind the demand curve, has developed independently of 
the oligopoly pricing models, which take as given the number 
of firms.
Interest in modelling this situation was, initially 
at least (that is, before mathematicizing set in) nourished 
by the traditional and deuply felt belief in the strength of 
the forces of competition as an ultimate constraint on the 
exercise of monopoly power. Scherer writes that
"It is (the) entry phenomenon, more than long- 
run substitution between different products, 
which prompted J. M. Clark, Sir Roy Harrod,
P.W.S. Andrews, and others, to insist that the 
long-run demand curves confronting monopolists 
and oligopolistic groups tend to be highly 
elastic, approaching the horizontal" (1970,
pp. 200-21) .
That is, monopoly profits are a short run, transitory 
phenomenon. This doctrine has, of course, powerful laissez- 
faire implications, although the possibility remains of the 
competitive forces working sufficiently slowly to justify 
some public intervention to hurry along the process.
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Formal modelling has proceeded along two paths, 
depending on whether entry is 'smooth' or 'lumpy'. When the 
long-run average cost curve is horizontal, so that firms can 
enter efficiently at any scale (the smooth case), the 
modeller's problem is basically just to explain why monopoly 
profits are not wiped out instantly. This is done by 
introducing some sort of friction into the entry process, 
which slows down entry, and by giving interest to the story 
by assuming that the existing firms have some control over 
the friction. The usual assumption made is that the rate of 
entry is a function of the excess of price (p) over some 
normal or competitive level (p) (Gaskins (1971) , Pashigian 
(1968), Lee (1975), Quandt and Howrey (1968)), and the usual 
result is that it is optimal for the existing firms to follow 
some trajectory in adjusting price from p to p. Some twists 
have been added; for example Jacquemin and Thisse (1972) allow 
the existing firms some power to mould market structure, 
Gaskins suggests expenditures to change the barriers, and 
Kamien and Schwartz (1971) and de Bondt (1976) introduce 
uncertainty, but the problem solved remains the same —  
essentially to determine the most profitable way for existing 
firms to delay the inevitable competing away of all their 
monopoly profits.
Even if its assumptions were valid (and below it 
will be argued that they are not) I would find it difficult 
to argue that the dynamic limit pricing literature has
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contributed insights that are sufficiently surprising or 
useful to justify the quite substantial resources of 
mathematical ability and journal pages that have been 
conyitted to it.
Of more interest are the^models in which, due to 
some indivisibility such as a minimum efficient scale of 
production, entry is likely to take place either at some 
lumpy rate large enough to affect the demand curve facing 
existing firms, or not at all. This situation was studied 
first by Bain (1956) and Sylos (1962), and their work 
synthesized and extended by Modigliani (1958) in a famous 
paper. These are comparative static models, yielding a 
price, to be charged indefinitely, which will optimally 
forestall entry. In a survey paper, Bhagwati reports that
"The premium that can be charged, consistent 
with the prevention of entry, varies directly 
with the minimum scale of the entrant's plant, 
and inversely with both the size of the total 
market and price elasticity of industry demand," 
(1970, pp. 306-7).
These conclusions, though not surprising,are 
certainly more interesting, and lead to more empirically 
testable hypotheses, than those of the dynamic limit pricing 
theorists.
However, both groups of models share two basic 
assumptions, one restrictive, the other unrealistic, which, 
in my opinion, must be considered seriously to limit their
usefulness.
47
The restrictive assumption is that there is no 
co-ordination problem for the existing firms —  either there 
is just a monopolist, or there is a price leader to take the 
decision on the correct response to the entry threat. As 
Stigler puts it, this solves the oligopoly problem (the sole 
concern of the models discussed in the previous section) by 
'murder' (1968, p. 21). Of course, from the point of view 
being put forv/ard here, such an assumption should not matter 
too much —  if, as argued above, a limited ability to 
co-ordinate price setting is not a plausible factor 
constraining profits in the absence of potential entrants, 
it is not likely to be much more of a problem when potential 
entrants are to be considered.
Nevertheless, it is a disturbing characteristic of 
the whole field of industrial economics theorizing that two 
such blithely independent paths should have been followed 
with so little concern for their inconsistency.
Of substantive importance is the second basic 
assumption made in the entry literature; namely that it is 
the excess of price or profits (p) above 'normal' or 
'competitive' price (p) that induces entry.
This assumption appears in, and, indeed, is 
fundamental to, all the entry threat models, with the 
exception, returned to below, of Spence's work.
The rationale of the assumption is that an excess 
of p over p is a signal, in fact the only signal, received 
by potential entrants concerning the profitability of being 
in an industry. It is assumed that
"The entrant is likely to read the current price 
policies of established firms as some sort of a 
'statement of future intentions' regarding their 
policies after his entry has occurred," (Bain 
1956, p. 95? quoted by Scherer, 1970, p. 229).
I find this unconvincing, for two reasons. First, 
of all the important variables determining the profitability 
of an industry, price is possibly the least permanent.
Prices may be changed overnight, whereas other factors, such 
as the rate of technological advance, the efficiency of 
management, the rate of growth of the market, and some 
government policies, change only over years or decades. That 
is, of all the information that a potential entrant will 
amass concerning current conditions in an industry (and any 
firm contemplating a sizeable investment will, of course, 
commit resources to finding out a great deal about its 
prospective rate of return) that on current price is likely 
to be amongst the least valuable.
What is important, at least in the oligopoly 
context, is what will happen to price after entry occurs, and 
since price is an exceptionally flexible variable, there need 
to be no connection between the pre- and post-entry prices
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that would be set by the existing firms. These firms need 
only threaten to lower price after entry, and thus eliminate 
monopoly profits, if they desire to prevent entry. If their 
cost competitiveness, and/or financial reserves, and/or 
control over marketing outlets, dominate those of the 
potential rival, the threat will be effective; if not, entry 
will occur, but in neither case is there any reason for the 
firms not to 'make hay while the sun shines', and charge 
what the market will bear in the short run.
We may go further, and suggest that, if anything, 
a price closer to p than might be supported by existing 
market conditions will encourage the ultimate act of entry —  
takeover —  since the firm charging such a price would be 
valued lower on the stock market than the potential earning 
power of its assets justifies. Kuehn (1975, p. 15) reports 
that more than 43 per cent of all UK public companies 
existing sometime during the period 1957-69 were taken over 
during that period; thus we can believe that the threat of a 
takeover bid is significant.
The one empirical study of which I am aware looking 
directly at the relationship between entry and profits found 
that
"Large-firm entry is not associated with 
relatively high profit levels. On the 
contrary, those industries that experienced 
the largest number of entries have the lowest 
profitability, as measured by the price-cost 
margin," (Zimmerman and Honeycutt, 1977, p. 73).
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Scherer, after citing the passage from Bain 
reproduced above, notes that he finds it 'not entirely 
convincing, given the role bluff, counterbluff, and 
irrational response play in deterrence' (1970, p. 229), yet 
only one of the papers referred to in this section attempts 
to justify the assumption that current price will be read as 
a reliable indicator of post-entry price. Pashigian (1968) 
points out that if the 'monopolist's' threat to lower the 
post-entry price is to be credible
'he must be prepared to produce the larger 
output required to meet demand at the limit 
price with a plant primarily designed for 
efficient production of the smaller monopoly 
output ... In contrast, the entrant is able 
to design a plant for the optimum rate of 
output, with a cost advantage over the 
monopolist. 'These are formidable diffi­
culties, which will not often be overcome'
(1968, p. 166).
These 'formidable' difficulties in fact quickly dissipate 
when the alternative of deliberately carrying excess 
capacity in order to make credible a threat to lower the 
post-entry price is formally examined. Spence (1974, 1977) 
has analysed in some detail a model in which excess capacity, 
not price, is the entry-limiting instrument. The excess 
capacity strategy has the property, which surely must be 
considered quite devastating, that it dominates the use of a 
limit price, as Waterson has observed:
'For fixed costs are no higher than under a 
static limit pricing policy yet output is at 
a more profitable level,' (1976, p. 91).
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since the limit-pricer must also carry the 'excess' capacity 
to meet the extra demand that his lower price generates, yet 
he never reaps the profits of a higher price enjoyed by the 
industry which deliberately uses excess capacity as a 
strategy.
Spence's excess capacity hypothesis undoubtedly 
generates a richer and more realistic model that can be put 
forward using the assumption that price is the proper entry 
limiting instrument. However, he may have fallen into the 
same trap that caught the earlier literature, namely of 
assuming that things are more difficult than they really are, 
in order to build an interesting model of the optimal 
responses to the assumed constraint. I have suggested that 
there is no plausible reason why current price will be taken 
as an indicator of future price, but, similarly, should it 
not also be asked why future output need be proxied by 
current capacity? Surely existing firms, with their greater 
experience and contacts in their industry, will be able to 
add new capacity at least as quickly as any newcomer can 
manage? If so, then, again, only the threat of post-entry 
action need be made to forestall the would-be predator on 
the industry's monopoly profits 1—  there is no need actually 
to carry excess capacity, and even Spence's model becomes
irrelevant.
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In fact, it is indeed true that industry has 
typically a margin of spare capacity on hand. Calculations 
of the ratio of actual to 'full capacity' output rates for 
14 UK manufacturing industries over the period 1964-73 
average to 0.967 (Appendix A). Taking the average 
of Deaton's (1975) industry price elasticities of about 
-0.5 as representative, we could conclude that, typically, 
the existing firms in an industry have the capacity to lower 
price by around 7 per cent, and still meet the added demand, 
even without allowing for the additional capacity brought in 
by a new entrant. Since such a price reduction would mean 
a substantial reduction in profit margins, probably to below 
'competitive' levels (the average margin of price over costs 
in UK industry over the period 1954-73 was 20 per cent), it 
seems safe to suppose that sufficient capacity is on hand to 
give credibility to an excess-capacity stragegy.
However, I would suggest that the presence of this 
margin of unproduced output serves not as a defence to keep 
at bay potential rivals, since, as noted above, extant firms 
are likely to be at least as quick off the mark in adding to 
their capital stock as any outsiders, should the occasion 
arise, but rather as an offensive weapon, in the battle 
between existing firms for market shares. In this struggle, 
which is, I suggested in the previous section, likely to be 
the only acceptable area in which oligopolistic rivalry can
5.1
take an active form, the ability to consolidate any gains 
made in market penetration will depend on the firm being able 
to supply promptly the additional demand; therefore any firm 
with hopes of increasing market share will keep on hand a 
suitable margin of spare capacity.
Thus, we find that, although the entry-limiting 
literature has developed independently of, and is, indeed, 
inconsistent with, the oligopoly pricing models, its relevance 
is also limited by the ubiquitous 'demand curve' assumption; 
that is, the postulate that there exists a unique industry 
price, the setting of which is the prime decision problem as 
each firm's price determines its market share and so its 
profits. I have argued that, on the contrary, price-setting 
is not the major problem -- in the oligopoly situation because 
it is so clearly not in the firms' interests to compete on 
price, and in the entry-preventing strategy case because 
current price, being quite freely variable, need not be used 
as an instrument to threaten potential rivals —  and that it 
is selling output that is the problem. Maintaining or 
improving market share does not, I believe, depend uniquely 
on price, as the orthodox literature almost invariably assumes. 
Indeed, given the sort of elasticities that have been estimated, 
price-cutting would seem generally to be a very unprofitable 
means towards 'buying' an increase in sales. Rather, firms 
will devote sizeable, and relatively permanent, flows of
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resources in the form of marketing and advertising expenditures, 
new product development, expansion into wholesaling or retailing, 
and holding excess capacity, towards increasing their profits at 
a given price, by increasing sales.
This non-triviality (in contrast to the demand curve 
assumption that quantity is simply 'set' by the price chosen) of 
actually clearing the market, means too that 'large scale' entry, 
even if the elasticities were not such that any sizeable increase 
in industry capacity would ruin everyone, is not really a 
sensible concept (except as a takeover bid for an existing firm), 
as it will just not usually be possible to 'enter' a market 
suddenly on a large scale -- it takes much time, resources and 
entrepreneurial flair, to build up a market share.
In summary, I have argued in this section that 'lumpy' 
or large-scale entry that adds to the capacity of an industry 
is not likely to be an active constraint on the pricing policies 
of existing firms. If the potential firms have no cost 
advantage over the current operators, then the threat of 
lowering price and adding capacity will be a sufficient 
deterrent. If the newcomers do possess some cost, or other 
marketing advantage, then they will enter anyway, and drive 
out the least efficient of the old capacity, the owners of 
which then may as well enjoy such short-term profits as they 
can glean.
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A very common method of entering an industry on a 
large scale is to take over some existing firm's assets; 
however, none of the papers surveyed in this section have 
made the effort to analyse the takeover phenomenon.
The literature on smooth, or small-scale entry 
(that is, entry when there are not significant economies of 
scale) assumes an elastic supply of entrepreneurs ready to 
squeeze under an industry's demand curve at the least sign of 
'excess' profits being earned, and then grinds out its results 
by looking at the implications of existing firms being given 
some breathing space by the presence of frictions, which slow 
down but do not prevent, the achievement of the eventual zero- 
profit equilibrium. Again, we find all depending on the 
definition of an industry demand curve allowing market shares 
to be freely varied simply by the adjustment of price. In 
fact, getting under a demand curve is not in general the 
trivial exercise that is tacitly assumed in the Marshallian/ 
Walrasian tradition of microeconomics and industrial organ­
ization, when all that the newcomer need do is set up shop 
in the 'market place', and leave his offers-to-sell with the 
auctioneer, who will arrange the actual transaction. In 
reality, in almost all industries, firms do their own selling, 
in an environment characterized by a great deal of uncertainty. 
Then, the advantages held by existing firms, especially large 
ones, of established (perhaps even vertically integrated)
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networks of wholesale and retail outlets, of reputations based 
on past performance, and of 'goodwill' of existing clients, 
whose special needs are known and accommodated, are likely to 
be such that the absence of economies of scale of production is 
far from a sufficient condition for small firms to be able to 
enter an industry and compete away its excess profits.
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I.4 Summary and Qualifications
On surveying industrial organization theory we have 
found it divided into two camps; models of oligopoly pricing 
and models of entry-limiting pricing. The two groups of 
models are both concerned to explain the same performance 
variable —  the level of prices relative to costs —  but they 
have developed quite independently, and, indeed, conflict in 
their initial postulates. The oligopoly models ignore the 
possibility of new firms being attracted to an industry; the 
entry-limiting work assumes away the oligopolistic co-ordin­
ation problem by dealing only with monopolists or dominant 
firms as representatives of the existing industry membership.
However, it was argued that this inconsistency, 
though a quite disturbing immanent feature of the literature, 
is not of substantive importance, since neither group of 
models paints a realistic or useful picture of the industrial 
price determination process.
In both cases, it was found that the models' 
inadequacies can be traced to shortcomings in the underlying 
demand-curve postulates.
In the oligopoly models, firms have no market power 
per se, but as a group in an industry their profits are limited
by difficulties of colluding, which are proportional to the 
number of firms involved in collusive agreements. I suggested
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that this confidence in collusive difficulties is misplaced -- 
even when explicit collusion is not possible (because, for 
example, it is illegal), effective co-ordination on price is 
either easy, through such procedures as recognition of a price 
leader, or unnecessary; in industries in which the firms sell 
products that are sharply differentiated (for example due to 
the location of the seller mattering) they will not be effect­
ively in competition with each other over most of their market, 
and so will not need to co-ordinate their prices.
The implication of this is that it is best to assume 
that oligopoly prices do not differ from the prices that would 
be charged by a monopolist. Accepting this brings us to a 
further difficulty —  the overwhelming tendency for estimated 
industry price elasticities to be too low to be consistent 
with the existence of a monopolistic profit-maximizing price.
To deal with this anomaly, it was suggested that the typical 
assumption of a demand curve as a locus of points in the price- 
quantity plane from which the monopolist is free to choose 
unilaterally that one that best suits his profit-maximizing 
ends should be questioned. In fact, it is more plausible to 
suppose that sellers typically find themselves in a situation 
in which movements of price and quantity are on the agenda of 
a bargaining process, either explicitly, when the selling firm 
is selling to another firm, or implicitly, when firms sell to 
'atomistic' consumers, but are constrained by considerations
I
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such as possibility of entry, of fairness, and of public 
policy action on behalf of the consumers, in their freedom 
to move along the demand curve.
divided onto two sub-groups models considering the case of 
'smooth' entry, when, in the absence of economies of scale, 
new firms enter an industry at any rate of operation, and 
'lumpy' entry, in which an assumed minimum efficient scale 
of operations simplifies the entry decision to a discrete 
in-or-out action.
have no genuine market power —  it is just a question of time 
before any excess of profits above costs are eliminated by the 
entry of new firms who squeeze inwards the demand curve faced 
by the existing firms, who are assumed, however, to have some 
power to influence the frictions that slow the inevitable 
decay of their profits. The optimal calibration of these 
frictions is just what is analysed in the models of smooth 
entry. I do not find persuasive the implication of this 
work that all monopoly profits are transitory, to be 
competed away eventually; but, in any case, it is a propo­
sition which may be tested empirically, and this I do in
The literature on entry-limiting pricing is itself
In the former case, existing firms are assumed to
Part III.
The basic problem, I believe, with these models, as 
well as with the oligopoly literature, is that in neither case 
is are firms, however large they are relative to the industry, 
supposed to possess any real market power, in the sense of an 
actual income-earning property right that goes with being big. 
Excess profits are either the fragile outcome of collusive 
agreements with other firms, or a purely transitory benefit, 
eventually to be inexorably competed away by a flood entry of 
small firms. It will be the task of the next two Parts to 
attempt to develop and test a model which builds on a concept 
of market power as a concrete and durable phenomenon.
When technical conditions in an industry are such 
that, to be able to produce at a cost that is competitive with 
existing firms, an entrant must be prepared to set up at or 
above a certain minimum scale of output, the existing firms 
can supposedly permanently forestall entry by choosing their 
price to reflect a judicious balancing of minimum efficient 
scale and demand elasticity.
Two relatively minor objections to the lumpy entry 
models are (1) in many industries actual minimum efficient 
scale and elasticity of demand are such that entry would 
always flood the market —  the extra capacity would result 
in the industry's total output being unsaleable except at a 
loss, and (2) the actual business of setting up on a sizeable
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scale is not the trivial matter that is implied by the demand- 
curve assumption, by which price alone is sufficient to 
generate any desired level of sales (within the overall 
constraints of the industry demand curve). In fact, selling 
output involves many more decisions and resources than just 
getting the price right.
The difficulties in actually selling output are also 
important in obviating the self-imposed problem in oligopoly 
models of colluding on market share which make the incentive 
to cheat so destructive of price-co-ordinating agreements. 
However, the major problem with the entry-prevention literature 
is its assumption that current price is the effective entry- 
limiting instrument, because potential firms read current 
pricing policies as reliable indicators of post-entry profita­
bility. As price is one of the most flexible of variables, 
this does not seem a reasonable assumption. Why should 
existing firms not charge whatever price they can get in the 
short run, and just threaten to lower it to the no-excess 
profits level should any new firm dare enter? All that is 
needed to make credible this threat is sufficient excess 
capacity to meet the added demand should they lower prices; 
this, however, is no added burden, since any industry keeping 
current prices down to forestall entry would have to carry 
the same capacity in any case.
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This line of argument can be carried further, to 
criticize even the assumption of a need to carry excess 
capacity to furnish an anti-entry weapon -- so long as 
existing firms can add to capacity as fast as new firms can 
invest in the same sort of plant, the threat alone to do so 
should suffice.
Finally, I should note several qualifications to 
the style and generality of the argument that has been 
developed in this critique:
(1) Parts of the analysis have been conducted in 
terms of polar cases -- 'substitutable' versus 
'differentiated' products, 'smooth' and 'lumpy' 
entry. This has allowed us to highlight the 
qualitative differences between these extremes 
of structure and conduct; in reality, of course, 
many, perhaps most situations cannot be 
clearly placed at one or other pole, so that 
actual behaviour will often be a mixture of the 
extreme behaviour patterns discussed above.
(2) There is an important class of situations in 
which firms selling similar products do not 
find co-ordinating price easy. This is when 
sales orders are won through sealed-bid 
tenders, and explicit price collusion is
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illegal. Then, the 'one-off' nature of the 
buyer's requirements, especially when 
transactions are of intermediate and capital 
goods, may make it difficult for price- 
leadership or other non-collusive price 
co-ordinating devices, to develop, and the 
threat of criminal prosecution may make 
explicit conniving unattractive. As a 
response to this, a sort of market-sharing 
may develop; not necessarily in the sense 
of splitting up a given quantity of sales, 
but rather by assigning areas of the market 
(often through quite conventional devices 
such as patents and licensing) to individual 
firms, within which they are more or less 
free to set their own price. Scherer (1970, 
Chapter 6) discusses these matters, with some 
examples from US industrial experience.
(3) I have found the roots of most of the problems 
of industrial organization theory to lie in 
the fundamental demand curve postulates on 
which all the models are built. I intend no 
implication that these criticisms of simple 
price-quantity locuses carry over to the 
field of microeconomics from which the curve
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was borrowed. In microeconomics —  the study 
of the economic behaviour of individual 
agents —  the simple demand curve concept has 
proven to be of great power, allowing the 
technical development of the marginal analysis 
and its elucidation of the most fundamental 
economic-efficiency concept of opportunity costs 
It is only when the analysis is extended to 
interdependent agents that the fluidity of the 
assumption of price-elastic demand becomes the 
embarrassment that leads to the strawmen of over- 
difficult collusion and over-easy entry that 
have so misled the industrial theorists and the 
empiricists and policy-makers who have followed 
them.
(4) Throughout the chapter I have been rather loose 
about the performance variable that is to be 
explained, referring sometimes to 'profitability 
and at others to the 'margin of price over cost' 
without defining these variables and evaluating 
their appropriateness. In fact, although the 
matter has not often been discussed explicitly, 
there is not a consensus on just what is 
determined by industry structure, and the matter 
is important; however I will postpone my
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discussion of it until Chapter II. 5, when it 
will be raised in the context of my own efforts 
to justify a new formulation of the dependent 
variable in the structure-performance relation.
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II Attempting a New Synthesis 
1. Introduction
If the previous chapter's criticisms of the 
received industrial organization theories be accepted, then 
little remains of them of use to the substantive part of 
this thesis. In this chapter, I attempt to put together a 
theory of industrial pricing behaviour that is both usefully 
realistic and internally consistent. I call this an attempt 
at a 'synthesis', because most of the elements of the new 
theory have respectable antecedents in the economics 
literature. They have not, however, to my knowledge been 
assembled and tested as the market structure-performance 
model; to do so is the job of this and the following chapter.
The main problem set us by the arguments of Part I 
is to come up with a concept of market power as a convincingly 
durable profit-making force, in contrast to the fragility of 
oligopolistic collusion, and the temporary, perhaps even 
negative, benefits of entry-delaying pricing. Two other 
important features of the model should be in ability to deal 
at once with actual and 'potential' competition, in contrast 
to the schism that exists between orthodox oligopoly and 
entry-threat modelling, and consistency with the observed 
price-inelasticity that seems to characterize most industrial
markets.
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The theory is developed as follows. In 
Chapter II.2, a concept of market power as a property right 
possessed in varying degree by all firms above a certain 
size is defined and supported. In Chapter II.3 it is 
proposed that the mechanism whereby market power is mediated 
into pricing performance is better viewed as a process of 
explicit and implicit bargaining, rather than as the more 
usual notion of seller price-making in markets. Chapter II.4 
summarizes the preceding arguments, and Chapter II.5 examines 
the implications of this theory for the proper specification 
of the profitability variable to be explained by the 
structure-performance hypothesis.
11.2 The Property Right of Market Power
In this Chapter I propose and try to justify an 
acceptable definition of market power, as follows:
"The market power of one p<vfq vis-à-vis 
another is the costs it can impose on the 
other pqrfy by not trading with it."
This definition is quite general —  it allows differences in 
a firm's market power between different trading partners, and 
it allows buyers and sellers to have power.
Under the typical oligopoly model assumptions, 
such market power is non-existent —  the firms in an 
industry sell a homogeneous product so that a buyer is 
indifferent between (suffers no costs in) trading with one
firm rather than another.
In fact, though, the list of product character­
istics that matter to traders is in general quite lengthy 
including such things as reliability, availability of 
servicing, delivery dates, credit terms, 'image', and many 
other factors as well as the more obvious physical 
dimensions of products, and I believe that, given that 
each firm is itself a unique collection of individuals, 
physical plant, operating procedures and traditions, we 
should best assume that complete concordance on all the 
' relevant product characteristics is a (most unusual) 
special case, rather than the generality.
This heterogeneity means that the typical firm is 
not competing on equal terms with all other firms producing 
the 'same1 product, but rather offers, in addition to the 
characteristics in common (i.e., that it is selling or 
buying 'cars' or 'typewriters' or 'machine tools' or 
'haircuts') its own unique bundle of attributes that are of 
value, in varying degree, to its trading partners. The 
consequences of this were recognized at least as long ago 
as Marshall, who wrote:
"When we are considering an individual producer, 
we must couple his supply curve —  not with the 
general demand curve for his commodity in a wide 
market, but —  with the particular demand curve 
of his own special market ..." (Principles, 
p. 458n, quoted in Richardson, 1960, p. 63).
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Much later, Kaldor (1935) suggested the concept 
of 'scale' of products, with closeness on the scale a 
function of the cross-elasticity of demand between two 
products. In the same decade, Joan Robinson (1933) and 
Edward Chamberlin (1933) came out with their famous books on 
'imperfect' or 'monopolistic' competition, which developed 
in some detail the implications of the assumption of 
generally heterogeneous, or differentiated products.
Recognition of heterogeneity does not, however, 
imply at once the market power concept —  in the Robinson- 
Chamberlin world, free entry leads to the competing away of 
all profits —  their main result was that the resulting 
equilibrium was one of general excess capacity, so that the 
unregulated market economy, though inefficient, was not 
necessarily unfair. This conclusion follows from considering 
only equally small firms; Robinson and Chamberlin did not 
consider, as we shall do here, the implications of hetero­
geneity for the profitability of size of firm, and thus for 
the incentives for firms to attempt to grow relative to their 
industry's market.
A particular dimension of product heterogeneity, 
which, once observed as a commonplace factor in the real 
world can hardly further be ignored, is of the physical 
location of firms in the economy. Interesting models
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exploring some implications of locational heterogeneity of 
firms selling otherwise identical products have been analysed, 
first by Hotelling (1929) and Smithies (1941), and recently 
for example, by Greenhut and Greenhut (1975) and Eaton and 
Lipsey (1975). These models provide an analytical tradition 
within which some of my own simple mathematical modelling in 
Section II.3 proceeds. Lancaster (1966) developed the natural 
generalization of the notion of geographical differences into 
n-dimensional differences between firms in 'product space', 
distinguishing each seller according to the n-dimensional 
bundle characteristics of its products.
In what follows, I shall adopt the product-space 
analogy, and examine its implications for the concept of 
market power defined at the head of the section.
To fix ideas, suppose a market for a product in 
which the customers are distributed along a line, as in the 
classic location models, and consider a particular firm 
owning all the sales outlets in a certain segment of the line. 
This segment we call the firms' market 'territory'. At the 
edges or borders of the territory the product can be 
purchased from other 'fringe' sellers at price p. Customers 
within the territory incur transport costs, a function of 
their distance from the nearest border. The firm's market 
power over customer i is then p + d^, where d^ is i's 
distance from the border, and we assume, for simplicity, that
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transport costs are proportional to distance, and units are 
chosen so that there is a cost of 1 of travelling 1 unit of 
distance.
The concepts of territory and distance generalize 
quite readily to other differentiated dimensions of products. 
Firms, being heterogeneous, produce products which differ 
from those of other firms: these differences will suit the 
special needs of a subset of buyers (buyers being also, of 
course, heterogeneous), who would therefore suffer a loss of. 
utility if they were forced to purchase the product from 
another firm; this loss is a function of the 'distance' in 
product-characteristic space of the nearest substitute from 
the preferred firm's product.
A most important, though neglected, source of 
differences between firms does not spring from differences 
in the objective qualities of products, however subtly 
measured, but rather from the nature of the exchange process 
itself. The general infeasibility of the purely anonymous 
exchange regimens assumed in the oligopoly literature means 
that networks of buyers and sellers grow up. To break these 
networks, which are discussed more fully in the next section, 
where their implications for price-setting are examined, 
imposes costs on both buyers and sellers —  the costs of 
searching out in an uncertain world reliable new trading
partners.
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Thus, the possession of some territory or market 
power may be seen as commonplace, for all but those firms 
selling or buying unusually homogeneous products in auction 
markets, which, in the nature of things, are not often 
observed past the primary processing stage of industrial 
production.
This notion of territory is not, I hope, particu­
larly surprising or controversial. It does not in itself 
apparently contain any 'power-leading-to-profits' connotations. 
But these, indeed, are immediately implied by the concept. To 
show this, consider again the simple product line analogy. If 
a firm owning as its selling territory a segment of a given 
length takes over an adjacent segment of the same length, it 
is true that the average distance from the border of customers 
within the territory increases. This result can easily be 
shown mathematically, and we can appreciate it intuitively by 
observing that customers nearer the borders of the old terri­
tories that have disappeared as the result of the merger must 
now travel further, to one of the two remaining borders, to 
purchase from the fringe.
That is, market power, as defined here, increases 
as the size of the firm increases; this is the basis of the 
link between structure and profits that is worked through in 
the next chapter.
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The reader familiar with the spatial competition 
literature, to which some references were made above, may 
wonder why some such concept of market power does not come 
out of these models, given their similarity in the use of the 
concept of location and distance. The reason is the spatial 
competition approach has remained fundamentally faithful to 
the assumptions of oligopoly theory; it considers firms' (most 
often, duopolists, because of the analytical problems involved 
in further generalization), reactions to their supposed inter­
dependency. It just adds choice of location to choice of price 
as a competing instrument, which leads, typically, to results 
such as Hotelling's famous 'minimum differentiation' principle 
(cf. Eaton and Lipsey, 1975), predicting that the two duopolists 
will crowd as close together as possible on the market line.
In my view, the assumptions of these models must face 
the same sort of criticism that was brought, in the previous 
chapter, to bear on the traditional oligopoly theories; namely, 
that they suppose too much smoothness in the wrong places. In 
the oligopoly work, market shares were assumed, wrongly, I 
argued, to be elastically responsive to price, with no 
recognition of the problems of 'marketing' that seem, in fact, 
to preoccupy the lives of the oligopolists (businessmen) 
themselves. The spatial competition modellers have added to 
market-share price responsiveness the assumption that firms 
can freely locate anyway they choose in product space, a 
postulate that seems to me at least equally unrealistic, for 
the following reasons:
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First, much product space territory is owned legally, 
through such devices as licensing, patents, and government 
regulation at all levels.
Second, even without legal restrictions, the actual 
heterogeneity of firms, based on the quality of their share of 
the economy's ultimately rather fixed managerial and entrepre­
neurial skills, and in the characteristics developed in their 
own right, by organizations implies that rivals are often 
simply not capable of encroaching on each other's territory.
To exemplify this by the familiar automobile industry analogy; 
there is nothing in law preventing Ford and Chrysler from 
producing a car as popular as General Motor's Chevrolet, but 
they are just not good enough to do it.
Third, the 'networks' built up by a continuity of 
trading experience between firms, cannot, by their very 
nature, be appropriated by a newcomer. They disappear as the 
trading linkage is broken.
Thus, legal and customary limitations, and the 
very nature of business enterprise, all go to make the 
possession of market power, as defined here, a quite secure 
property right. The jittery location games played by rival 
firms in the spatial competition literature are not typical
of the real world.
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What of the collusive price-setting problem?
Scherer writes;
"When products are heterogeneously differentiated, 
the terms of rivalry become multidimensional, and 
the co-ordination problem grows in complexity by 
leaps and bounds" (1970, p. 187).
Scherer apparently has in mind a collection of rather 
different products being sold together in the same market, as 
in the non-differentiated oligopoly situation. But what 
heterogeneity means, in effect, is that firms are not competing 
in the same 'market'. Customers who find most attractive a 
particular bundle of characteristics offered by one firm are 
'distanced' from other sellers, so that the latter could alter 
their prices, within limits, without inducing most of the first 
firm's clientele to move —  the distance between characteristics, 
reinforced by the inertia of existing trading networks means 
that feasible (non-loss making) price cuts may just not be 
attractive enough to tempt most customers to change.
Only customers at the border between two price­
setting firms will be indifferent enough to be fickle, and it 
is where firms meet that we do find price wars and other forms 
of rivalry. But we should note (a) that the bigger firms 
become, the smaller will be the border territory relative to 
the indisputed interior (in a circle, for example, area goes 
up as the square of circumference), and (b) it is precisely
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at the border that products are not differentiated, so 
co-ordination on price, where it is needed, may not be too 
difficult to achieve, given our arguments in Chapter 1.2.
This, I hope, deals with the oligopoly problem.
Firms controlling substantial slices of market territory will 
not be particularly concerned with, and certainly not obsessed 
by, as in the oligopolistic co-ordination literature, the 
prices charged by other sizeable firms. Those prices may set 
constraints on a firm's actions, but there is no reason not to 
believe that, within limits, the market power of a firm, as 
defined here, can affect price.
What of the threat of new firms entering? The 
arguments of Chapter 1.3 against large scale entry, as in the 
Bain-Sylos-Modigliani models, being a plausible danger still 
apply. Given the difficulties, in the real world, of actually 
achieving a significant market share, the process itself of 
entering on a large scale of sales will generally be a non­
trivial problem, and, in any case, given the apparently low 
industry demand elasticities usually observed, such entry, 
once achieved, might just result in swamping the market­
wiping away everyone's (including the new entrant's) profits.
In addition, to the extent that the market power of 
existing firms is 'owned' by them through law, contracts, and 
custom, as suggested in this chapter, then there may simply be
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just not enough available territory for a new firm to set up in, 
except by taking over the market power of an existing firm or 
f irms.
The act of takeover can be consummated either by the 
quite common method of actually purchasing the assets of an 
existing firm (including a sum for the firm's market power, 
conventionally termed a 'goodwill' payment), or by entering 
the market with a superior bundle of product characteristics 
and/or the capability of producing a non-dominating bundle at 
a lower cost than existing firms can manage. In either case, 
there is no reason for existing firms not to charge the price 
that their market power can support, so long as they are in 
operation. Indeed, I have suggested that charging less than 
this price could encourage financial takeover bids, by 
undervaluing the firm's earning power on the stock market.
And since a superior firm will enter anyway, the doomed 
operators might as well make what profits they can, in the 
short run.
A rider to this is that there may often be an 
additional long-term return to adding to one's market power —  
for example, through adding to holdings of patents and 
licensing agreements, and by becoming big enough to exploit 
economies of scale in lobbying with government for protective 
legislation and regulation —  if this gives existing firms a 
weapon to block or make more difficult the innovation by other
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firms of superior products or lower cost technologies at a 
rate that would reduce the value of the industry's current 
stock of capital and property rights.
A situation in which we may expect to observe new 
but not necessarily superio'r firms entering occurs when the 
total market is growing, due, say, to changes in tastes or 
increases in per capita incomes. The growth of a market 
generates new property rights (such as newly profitable 
locations) which can be appropriated by whoever is quickest 
to spot them. Even in this situation, however, existing firms 
may have an advantage, based, for example, on better market 
information, or claims of precedence in the allocation of new 
licenses, or the exploitation of economies of scale (a case 
analysed theoretically by Eaton and Lipsey, 1976) , over 
newcomers. If so, we would expect to see a link between growth 
in aggregate demand and increases in market concentration; 
something that is certainly consistent with the evidence for 
the UK (see, for example, Hannah, 1976) that this century's 
overall upward drift in industrial concentration was halted or 
even reversed in the generally depressed period of the 1920s 
and 1930s.
What of small-scale or 'smooth' entry, and, in 
general, the relationship between large and small firms 
selling products with some substitutability? The reader may
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have been worried by the lack of justification for the, 
implicitly exogenous, 'fringe' price, p, used in the 
definition of market power. In the next few paragraphs I 
try to make good this neglect in answering these questions.
It is proposed that in most if not all markets
there exists a number of small firms whose margin of price 
over costs is set not by their market power but by conditions 
of demand and supply of entrepreneurs or small businessmen.
These are operators whose territory is so small that a price 
determined by market power alone would not sufficiently 
compensate them for the risks and alternative wage or salary 
income foregone to keep them in business. In these small 
firms price will be set to give the owners an income equal to 
what they would earn as someone else's employees, adjusted for 
risk and for the psychic rewards of doing business on one's 
own account. Equilibrium in the small firm sector is maintained 
by small variations around this price, reflecting changes in 
product market conditions, inducing the required entry and exit 
of operators.
Thus we have a sector of the economy selling goods at 
prices that are not determined by market power considerations, 
and so can be taken as exogenous to our analysis of price-setting 
where market power is significant. These are the 'fringe' firms 
selling at the exogenous price denoted as p above.
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Of course, the performance in aggregate of large 
firms affects, through the level of the real wage in the 
economy, and also, perhaps, its macroeconomic stability, 
conditions of supply and demand for small businessmen. But, 
with possible exceptions such as mining and car making, 
individual industries do not contribute enough to the aggregate 
to make the assumption of an exogenous p faced in each market 
an unreasonable simplification.
In many industries, the fringe firms are engaged in 
producing products quite similar to the output of larger firms. 
However, even in industries where the exploitation of sizeable 
economies of scale has made small scale production uneconomic, 
we may still find small firms doing business as importers from 
foreign suppliers of the product. When this does not occur 
(because, for example, domestic large producers have gained 
control over imports) we have to go to the industry making the 
nearest substitute product to find our fringe. Such a move 
implies, naturally, that the 'distance' component of big firms' 
market power will be larger than when they face a fringe on their 
own doorsteps.
We can note that the relationship between firms with 
market power and small fringe firms is likely to be unbalanced. 
Firstly, small firms will usually find it difficult to 
profitably enter the territory of market-power firms, even when
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the property rights of the latter are not firmly enough held 
to rule out such an advance. This is because an invader will 
find itself surrounded by the product characteristics of the 
larger firm, which need only reduce price sufficiently in 
these neighbouring activities (supporting this with its 
profits on the market power remaining in its other territories) 
to prevent the interloper from being able to sell at a profit.
On the other side, fringe firms are never secure from 
depredations, as it may often pay the larger firm to lose money 
on price-cutting at its border, in order to force the adjacent 
fringe out of business and then add its territory to the large 
firm's market power property. Even without engaging in price 
wars, the fact that the market power is worth something to the 
larger firm and nothing to the fringe operator provides a 
motive for agreement on a takeover that benefits both, at the 
expense of customers.
Thus, it is easy to understand the relentless 
tendency to increasing market concentration that has indeed 
been observed in the oldest of industrial economies —  Great 
Britain. The process may have limits, however -- to the 
extent that owner-controlled small firms have a comparative 
advantage in small scale, specialized production, and are, 
perhaps, readier to undertake risky projects such as new 
product and process innovation, large firms will often find
11» '«1
it preferable to let the fringe carry on.
The implication of this analysis that there is a 
force, stemming from different values being placed by large 
and small firms on the latter's market power, which pushes 
up concentration in the economy, is not present, oddly 
enough, in the orthodox oligopoly models. In these theories, 
market price is determined by market structure (measured, for 
example, by the Herfindahl index) to which most individual 
firms contribute rather little. That is, there is a free­
rider problem —  if there are any costs to expansion, such as 
needing to engage in price wars to force rival firms to sell 
out, each firm has an incentive to let the other firms go 
ahead and build up the industry's concentration, and just sit 
back and enjoy the resulting rise in everyone's price. There 
is no strong market power reason for a firm to wish to be 
bigger.
In this chapter I have tried to deal with two of 
the three major problems, noted in the introduction to the 
chapter, that in the previous chapter were found to weaken 
received industrial organization theorizing.
First, and most important, a definition of market 
power has been proposed, and justified in terms of firms' 
'territory' in product space, which provides the basis for 




Second, the uncomfortable dichotomy between 
oligopoly and entry-threat models has disappeared. Indeed, 
we can now see that the basic idea of the entry problem is 
mis-stated. To a given firm all other firms are only 
potential entrants, in the obvious sense that none of them 
are at present making the trades that the given firm is 
undertaking. And looked at in this way, the distinction 
between rivalry removed in time (entry-threat) and in space 
(oligopoly) disappears. 'Distance', in our product space can 
be dated, with no increase in analytical compilation. Thus, 
for example, the fringe operators in a market need not 
actually exist; it is sufficient that they would be prepared 
to set up shop, should a demand for their services arise, for 
the fringe price to constrain market-power firms' price­
setting. (Of course, p would be higher, the longer it takes 
new fringe firms to set up shop —  future prices will be 
discounted at some interest rate).
The third problem, of inconsistency of the 
fundamental market assumptions, given the unpersuasiveness 
of orthodox oligopolistic co-ordination and entry threat as 
constraints on price, with typically observed market demand 
elasticities, is dealt with in the next chapter.
Finally, it should be noted that, although our 
discussion of market power has so far concentrated on the 
market power of sellers, the concept applies equally to buyers,
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who can also impose costs on their trading partners by 
forcing them to look elsewhere for custom. This is surely 
a natural extension of the concept —  if both parties gain 
from trade, then both parties lose by not tradinc —  and will 
also be important in our analysis of the price-setting process 
in Chapter II.3.
85
II.3 The Price-Setting Process
Most economic analysis, of both capitalist and 
socialist economies, has sought to explain the allocation 
of resources by means of one of the two mechanisms of 
centralized, fiat, planning, or decentralized impersonal 
markets. It may be, however, that both these systems of 
analysis are too extreme to provide a realistic basis for a 
description of those economies, both 'command' and 'market', 
in which the division of labour has proceeded far enough for 
the co-ordination of productive activity to be a non-trivial 
matter. There is a broad middle ground of what Richardson 
(1971, 1972) calls 'piecemeal planning'.
Richardson proposes that, although there are some 
goods which are sufficiently standardised so that producers 
can rely on the law of large numbers to smooth out demand 
fluctuations and can produce to stock (that is, produce for 
the market) without much contact with their customers, most 
demands for goods are sufficiently varied and varying that 
purely speculative production would be prohibitively wasteful 
and inefficient. For the same reason, pure centralized 
administrative fiat would also fail —  the planning authority 
would be quite unable to collect and process the enormous 
quantity of specialized information needed to co-ordinate all 
production activities.
In fact, industrial societies develop myriad networks
of subsidiaries, trading agreements, sub-contracting, marketing 
associations, licensing, and so on, which lower the risks 
involved in undertaking heterogeneous transactions, and which 
follow patterns of custom and goodwill that are not greatly 
influenced by market forces, or by the edicts of planners.
This seems to be so not just with respect to sales of 
intermediate goods between manufacturers, but also with 
relations between manufacturers and their wholesalers and 
retailers.
The network system is a natural consequence of the 
product differentiation that I argued in Chapter 1.2 to be 
the norm in industrial economies. Richardson's concept has 
important implications for the way we should look at the 
setting of prices in an economy such as the UK. If they are 
predominantly neither the result of obedience to governmental 
directives, nor of submission to the impersonal authority of 
the market, then price-quantity contracts must be settled by 
direct agreement between the concerned agents themselves.
That is, most prices (including, of course, many wage rates) 
are settled by bargaining between the interested parties.
Next, in this chapter, we will consider the 
situation that is conventionally brought to mind by the notion 
of bargaining, namely; a one-to-one confrontation between two 
agents; typically, two firms. This I call explicit bargaining.
Then the analysis will be extended to cover the 
case of a firm trading with a large number of customers, 
resulting in some standardization of product and price, so 
that the firm does not engage in direct negotiation with any 
of its trading partners. This is the situation covered in 
the orthodox firm-selling-in-a-market analysis, but I will 
suggest that even here we find important, if usually 
unstated and subtle, elements of the bargaining process, which 
will be called implicit bargaining.
There have been many bargaining models built, but 
the differences between them tend to be of rather second-order 
magnitude of importance, Laidler and Parkin (1975) note the 
conclusion of survey by De Menil of a number of bargaining 
models, that they share in common
"Prediction of maximization of the gains from 
trade and a sharing of those gains in proprotion 
to the relative marginal disutility that each 
party could and would, but never does, inflict 
upon the other" (p. 757).
The 'marginal disutility that each party could ... inflict 
upon the other' is, of course, effectively the same as the 
concept of market power defined in the previous chapter, 
which thus fits neatly into a bargaining analysis framework.
We shall consider only successful and efficient 
trades; that is, it will be assumed that each trader finds 
the party offering the bundle of product characteristics
____
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most suited to his needs, and sucessfully closes a deal with 
that party. This seems reasonable enough, at least as an 
equilibrium situation. In fact, deals are constantly falling 
through in the real world, but we can look upon such failures 
as information-generating search processes, which do not 
preclude from being efficient the trades that eventually are 
consummated ('maximizing the gains from trade'). In any case, 
the census data on which the model will, in the next chapter 
be tested, measure only the results of successful trading —  
deals that fall through do not result in the generation of 
industrial output.
Assume, first, two firms exchanging a given quantity 
of a good. The assumption of fixed quantity is often 
defensible even in a market framework as a reasonable 
simplification when the good is an intermediate input, 
amongst many others, making a small contribution to a process 
of further adding-value, so that its price could have only a 
small effect on the total costs of the final product, and so 
on the demand for the latter.
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However, more fundamentally, the assumption will be 
seen to be consistent with one of the major thrusts of this 
thesis, namely that price and quantity setting are most 
realistically and usefully seen to be separate processes —  
price being arrived at through the endogenous bargaining 
procedures to be analysed below, and quantity traded being 
rather insensitive to generally observed ranges of price
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fluctuations, but determined overwhelmingly by factors such 
as aggregate demand, tastes, and technology, which are 
exogenous, or nearly so, to individual firms.
Suppose that the good has k dimensions of interest 
to buyers, but that k-1 of these are fixed (e.g., by government 
regulations) and only the kth dimension differs between sellers. 
The restriction to one dimensional variation will be maintained 
in the present analysis, which is simple and intuitively 
accessible in consequence. The analysis could be generalized 
to k-dimensional variation, but, I conjecture, this.would not 
alter the substance of the results. Therefore, I prefer the 
simplest option in the trade-off between generality and 
complexity.
The particular selling firm being considered owns 
a segment of length 2M (that is, has sole selling rights over) 
on the line on which is measured the kth dimension. For 
simplicity, and without loss of generality, we will consider 
just the right-hand half of the segment, and will set the 
bisection point to be the origin.
Suppose that the market is initially in equilibrium, 
with all buyers purchasing the good with the most preferred 
k-dimension value, given the other k-1, and that contract 
re-negotiation time has come up for buyer i, who has been 
purchasing the good with k-characteristic value itk , from our
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selling firm, is thus within the seller's segment, a 
distance M - itk from the border, as shown on Figure 1.
At the border, fringe sellers, as defined and 
discussed above, offer the good with k-characteristic M at 
a price p.
A firm's market power was defined in the previous 
section as the costs it could impose on its partner by not 
trading with it. In this model, these costs are, for both 
buyer and seller, the cost of going to the boundary, M and 
of trading there at p. The buyer has to go to the boundary 
and purchase from the fringe since all points between itk and 
M are owned by the selling firm; the seller must travel to 
the boundary, and join the fringe in selling at p, given a) 
our assumption of initial equilibrium, so that all customers 
who wish to purchase between uk and M are already doing so, 
and b) the assumption of inelastic demand.
However, although the distance to be travelled is 
the same for buyer and seller, the costs of the trip to the 
boundary will not in general be so. For the buyer, there are 
the transaction costs of setting up a new trading arrange­
ment —  of re-establishing a network -- plus the loss of






utility in not getting the most preferred k-characteristics, 
which will depend on the particular consumption technology 
of the buyer; that is, the cost of substituting values other 
than itu in the uses to which buyer i puts the good.
The seller will also incur some transaction costs 
by not trading with i, and may,as well, suffer by having to 
sell a k-characteristic M that is more costly to produce than
was m..
1
We should enumerate some of these costs more 
concretely. Most obviously, location in geographical space 
can generate market power to travel to the border to buy or 
sell involves costs of transporting the good to where it is 
needed; from the production point to the border for the 
seller, and from the border back to the original trading 
location for the buyer.
Then there are the basic differences that distinguish 
all firms and consumers to some degree -- the differences, 
noted above, in entrepreneurial skill, in organizational 
effectiveness, in the past development of firms, that generate 
comparative advantages in carrying out some activities rather 
than others; and the differences in tastes and needs of 
consumers. Given that the result of successful trading (which 
we have assumed initially) is that traders are linked to 
partners most suited to their particular production capabilities 
and consumption requirements, then a breakdown in the bargaining 
process will impose costs on both parties.
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A third source of market power is the ownership of 
patents and licensing agreements. By their nature, these 
seem j be sellers' rights rather than buyers', and so their 
presence may result in asymmetry between the magnitude of 
seller and buyer market power.
It will be useful to distinguish between potential 
and realized market power. Potential market power is the 
power that each trader brings with him to the bargaining 
situation; for the seller it is the cost, or loss in utility, 
incurred by the buyer in purchasing a less desirable bundle 
of characteristics from the fringe, and the price, p, of 
buying from the fringe; for the buyer, it is the costs, if 
any, born by the seller if he is forced to trade at the fringe, 
less the price received by so doing.
Realized market power is the after-trade market 
power —  the costs of going to the fringe, given the price, p^ , 
at which trade between seller and buyer i has been taking 
place. Let us call the realized market power of the seller F , 
and of the buyer F^. Then the realized market powers of each 
party —  the cost each can impose on the other by not trading
1 pi —  are
Fs = P ~ Pi + f. (M--m. ) b 1
Fb = Pi " P + f (Fi-m.)S 1
9 3
where f, and f aive the costs incurred by buyer and seller b s J
respectively in travelling to the border as functions of the 
distance from the border. For example, the seller can impose 
the costs of buying at p, plus foregone utility minus pi 
saved.
distribution of realized market power, or gains from trading 
at a certain price, is achieved. Just to see what happens, 
let us suppose that realized market powers are equated. That 
is
— ----i--o-------—  (II.4)
That is, if gains from trade are shared equally, price is set
by adding a margin to the fringe price equal to half the 
difference between the travelling cost part of potential 
seller and buyer market power, or at half the difference 
between seller and buyer potential power.
The bargaining process sets price so that a certain
p " Pi + f ^ (M-p k ) = pi - p + f s (M-itk) (II.3)
which reduces to
p. = p + f. (M-m.) - f (M-m.) *i b l s l
Generally, if realized gains are distributed
according to F = OF. , s b (II.5) ,
where 0 is any positive number, price is given by
fbp i = P + se + i (II.6)
94
This reduces to (II.4) when 0 = 1 ,  and is greater or less 
than (II.4) as 0 is smaller or larger than one.
Equation (II.6) can be generalized easily to 
the case when sellers and buyers face different fringe prices 
Ps and p^. Then the potential market powers are pg + f^ and
p^ + f and realized price satisfies
Pi
Ps + 6Pb 
6 + 1 e + i
(II.7)
Note that there is no reason why p^ in these formulae should 
exceed p. We should, however, impose a lower bound constraint 
on p, namely
p.^ > ci + (p - c) (II.8)
where c and c^ are the unit production costs of fringe firms 
and seller i. If potential market powers are such that 
bargaining would not yield a price that satisfied (II.8), the 
average entrepreneur would choose to go out of business 
rather than trade, since p - c is, by assumption, that return 
which just balances the risks and rewards of entrepreneurship 
against the opportunity cost of being self-employed.
If f, is less than 0f , p. will be less than p, so b s *i c
long as i's costs of production are less than those of the 
fringe. f^ could even be negative -- seller i's product 
inherently less desirable than the product available from the
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fringe firms. This may often happen when large firms introduce 
large scale mass assembly or continuous process techniques, at 
a cost of a loss in quality or variety, but with substantial 
savings in direct production costs over the small scale methods 
available to the fringe firms.
We should have some discussion of the distribution 
parameter 0, since it is the formal analysis of the exact 
division of the gains from trade that preoccupies the bargaining 
theory literature. However, there are some signs of ennui 
developing in the profession with respect to further analysis 
of this 'problem'. We have already noted Laidler and Parkin's 
report (1975) of De Menil's findings of basic similarity in 
results of a number of bargaining models, and Vanderkamp writes 
of 'this addition to the long list of well-meaning bargaining 
theories', in a review (1975, p.1348) of a paper by J. Johnston.
I would agree that, judging by the lack of variety 
of useful and distinctive results generated, the bargaining 
problem has been over-analysed theoretically. In deals 
between firms, much or most of the variation in 0 is probably 
accountable for by differences in the cunning and persuasive­
ness of the businessmen concerned, and these differences, I 
would propose, fall into the category of those basic resources 
of entrepreneurial skills which are not in elastic supply, and 
so, as argued in Chapter 1.2, do not need to be explained in 
economists' price-setting models set up to explain differences 
in average behaviour.**
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Nevertheless, we can make some testable 
conjectures about factors determining 0 that are of 
relevance to our analysis. First, it may be true that the 
ability of a small firm to realize in full its market power 
when it is trading with a much larger partner is limited by 
the plausible threat that the larger firm may be able to 
make, given its larger financial resources, to set up its 
own operation to produce the small firm's product, or to 
trade with the fringe, at a loss if need be, until the small 
firm is forced out of business.
Secondly, 0 may be a function of the difference 
between f^ and fg, such that the effect on price of 
substantial differences is reduced -- the exercise of market 
power is restrained. This is because businessmen are not, in 
general, indifferent to each other's well-being. There may 
be instances when rival firms selling the same good take 
pleasure in each other's misfortunes, but I expect that the 
typical relationship between trading partners being discussed 
here, involving as it does networks of co-operation and 
co-ordination between the parties, generates significant 
empathy between those concerned, so that, after a point, at 
least, the pleasure received from a dollar gained is diluted 
if that dollar comes from the profits of the trading partner.
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This hypothesis would seem almost trivially obvious 
to someone accustomed to analysing economic behaviour from a 
Marxist point of view, to which the cohesiveness, and 
consequent tendency to empathetic behaviour, of the capitalist 
class is almost a datum.
A factor reinforcing empathy as a constraint on the 
exercise of market power (though not one that a Marxist would 
wish to call on) is the concept of fairness. Even if 
businessmen are less honourable than their critics, it is 
unreasonable to expect them to be totally unmoved by the 
ideas of morality and natural justice that play some role in 
the lives of other citizens —  'right' as well as 'might' will 
matter in the bargaining process, and may include a notion of 
a 'fair' rate of profit, to earn much more than which is felt 
to be unseemly.
To the extent that ideas of fairness are important, 
the distribution parameter 0 will also depend on the seller's 
margin of price over costs. Thus, we may observe exegenous 
increases in costs being passed on in higher prices with no 
loss in sales. This does not imply, as would the orthodox 
monopoly analysis, that the seller was being irrational in 
not putting up price before the cost increase, to take 
advantage of the demand inelasticity, since, in the bargaining 
situation, neither party is free to unilaterally set price;
m
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they must agree jointly on the proper price, according to their 
respective potential market power, and to their ideas of 
fairness and the goodwill they feel for each other.
I have tried generalizing the analysis of explicit 
price bargaining to permit some elasticity of demand. 
Unfortunately, even with the simplest assumption about the 
demand curve (that it is linear), it does not seem possible 
to arrive at a concise, readily interpretable expression for 
price, which turns out to be one of the roots of a quadratic 
equation. However, I do not consider the ability to be neatly 
modelled in mathematics a sine qua non of a respectable 
analytical problem. Any mathematical model too simple to 
exactly depict reality, and the proper question is just how 
far it is useful to go with them. When it leads to surprising 
and significant predictions not available from verbal analysis 
mathematicizing is justified, and before devoting one's own 
resources to building mathematical models, the researcher should 
solve first, informally, a decision model trading off the time 
and effort involved with the prior probability assigned to the 
importance of the results.
Just such a preliminary decision model seems to have 
been lacking from most of the theoretical work in Industrial 
Organization, otherwise we would not have such a large corpus 
of oligopoly, entry-limiting pricing, and bargaining models,
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each adding so little to what was obvious, or known already, 
and often built on assumptions chosen for analytical 
tractability rather than realism, to the consequent detriment 
of the degree of usefulness of the results.
In the present case of demand elasticity, I 
conjecture that a fully worked through algebraic analysis (or 
a comprehensive arithmetic simulation exercise) would just 
confirm my intuitive prediction that the presence of some 
elasticity will lower the price relative to the inelastic- 
demand price, since the seller will find it profitable to 
concede some quantity discounts in order to increase total 
revenues, at least so long as there is sufficient supply 
elasticity to make the increased sales worthwhile. Some 
results are given in Appendix B.
So far in the chapter, we have built up a model of 
price-setting as the result of explicit bargaining between 
firms. The distributive role of prices has been concentrated 
on —  indeed, in the formal analysis, there was assumed to be 
no allocative problem at all (demand assumed inelastic) —  
through the vertical linkage between buyer and seller. In so 
focusing the analysis, I have drawn on the arguments of the 
previous chapter that the allocative bias, taken over from 
microeconomics, or of previous industrial economics theorizing 
is misleading, and that the traditional concern with problems
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of oligopolistic co-ordination, or_horizontal linkages 
between firms is implausible as a major constraint upon 
profitability. This model will, I hope, be useful in 
interpreting the evidence on structure and performance in 
intermediate goods market presented in the next Part.
However, our analysis of industrial price-setting 
is certainly still incomplete. Explicit, one-to-one,bargaining 
is a process to which considerable managerial resources must be 
devoted by both parties. Yet many industrial firms sell not 
in large, lumpy, orders to other manufacturers, but directly, 
or through distributors and retailers, to thousands or millions 
of final consumers. In such markets, matching products to 
individual requirements, as well as haggling over the terms of 
each transaction, is uneconomically expensive, relative to the 
average value of sales per customer. Sellers will offer a 
standardized product, at a take-it-or-leave-it price. Indeed, 
a movement towards mass production, and mass consumption has 
often been seen as the key feature in the transition from a 
'traditional' to a 'modern' industrial economy, as Scitovsky, 
for example, notes ( 1951) .
In analysing price-setting in consumer goods markets 
(or markets in which customers are sufficiently numerous firms 
buying small quantities), we will again use our concept of 
market power as the basic building block, and will eventually
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argue that elements, though they be 'implicit', of the 
bargaining process may usually be relevant to the process 
mediating market power into price.
The difference that matters between firm-firm and 
firm-consumer price setting is that, in the latter situation, 
with a unique price offered to all customers, each buyer's 
sanction that can be applied to the seller is limited to 
anonymously leaving the market and buying from the fringe.
Even if a determined customer were able to fight his or her 
way through to head office to bargain with the selling firm's 
management, no concession could be negotiated, since a lower 
price offered to one customer would have to be offered to all 
(if not, favoured customers would be able to make a quick 
profit by re-selling to the others). In Hirschman's (1970) 
increasingly well-known paradigm, private or small firm buyers 
lose the 'voice' option that is available to important 
customers; they can only 'exit'. And even if re-selling can 
somehow be ruled out, the threat of exit posed by single 
consumers will not usually be significant —  the selling firm 
should be able to find another consumer to sell to at low cost.
We may examine price-setting in consumer goods 
markets formally with a simple model.
Suppose, as before, a seller owning a segment of 
half-length M of a linear market bordered by a fringe selling 
at p, that each consumer's demand for the good is perfectly
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inelastic, and that, in particular, at a distance (M - i t k ) from 
the border there is a unit demand. The only difference from 
the bargaining set-up is that the unit of sales is now split 
between a number of 'ith' consumers —  too many to negotiate 
with individually, so that price-setting is now the sole 
responsibility of the seller.
Clearly, price can be set at any level up to p|,
where
p^ = p + f^M-iru) (II.9),
the price at which customers are just ready to move to the 
border to trade. The seller can appropriate all of the fruits 
of his market power, barring only a sufficient residue to 
dissuade his customers from transferring their custom to the 
fringe.
This analysis applies symmetrically to the case of 
atomistic sellers facing buyers with market power, such as is 
often found in markets for farm produce, when concentrated 
'agribusiness' food processors buy at auction prices from 
individual farmers.
In both situations, the only way that the small 
traders can improve their situation is by themselves combining 
and trading as a single unit. Then they can threaten, by 
withdrawing altogether their custom or output, to impose costs 
on the large firm, which is likely to find it not possible to
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place elsewhere such a quantity of sales or purchases without 
incurring significant additional expenses. Farmers, whose 
objectives are fairly simple -- to sell for the highest 
possible prices a rather small number of different products -- 
have often been able to do this, through marketing boards, 
but consumers, who are usually involved in purchasing a great 
variety of goods according to very different tastes and 
incomes, have not generally been successful in coalescing 
against industry.
In consumer goods market, customers may often not be 
evenly distributed throughout product characteristic space.
This is most obviously so in the geographic dimension, in 
which there are concentrations of consumers in towns and cities, 
separated by more sparsely populated suburban and rural areas, 
but we may also find modalities, based, for example, on class, 
or income, or ethnic differentials, in other dimensions of the 
product space.
When a firm with market power can distinguish such 
groupings, it will find it profitable to differentiate its 
price. Thus, for example, if there were, in addition to the 
mass of consumers (M-itk) from the border treated above, another 
group distanced (M-m^+1), the price that can be charged to the 
latter consumers is upper bounded by pV such that
P'l = p + f (M-nu+1) (II.10)
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Such price discrimination is stable, so long as 
the actual prices charged are at least a little below their 
upper bounds given by (II.9) and (II.10), since then, given 
the difference in distances in product space, none of the 
(M-nu) group will be able to profitably resell to the 
customers further away from the boundary paying the higher 
price.
Will, in fact, the seller usually price as close 
to p| and p? as is possible without driving away customers?
I think not. The forces of empathy and notions of fairness 
may be expected to play a part in dealings between firms and 
consumers, and between big and small firms, as they do 
between firms of comparable economic power. Businessmen are 
citizens, and not usually especially wicked ones —  their 
desire for personal advancement and their ideas of reasonable 
behaviour may differ in degree from those of their customers, 
but not generally so much as to nullify the common bonds of 
citizenship and society. Reinforcing morality, too, is the 
fact that in a non-feudal society all but the richest managers 
and entrepreneurs have to rub along, day to day, in the society 
of their consumers, and may find it irksome to be reviled and 
ostracized for their business rapacity, especially, if like 
most decision-makers, they do not personally own the capital 
they are deploying, and thus do not receive in full the profits
it earns.
Small businessmen in particular often live among 
and know personally some of their customers and so will be 
prone to succumb to peer group pressures not to be overgreedy.
There are additional reasons why it may benefit 
firms not always to charge literally what the market will bear. 
Given the uncertainty of the business environment, it may be 
worthwhile to buy a capital stock of customer loyalty with 
restrained pricing policies. Government may from time to time 
step in on behalf of consumers and place controls on firms and 
industries that it feels have been pricing, or acting otherwise, 
unfairly towards consumers. Importers may be encouraged by 
unusually high profits to devote resources towards establishing 
a large-scale presence in the industry.
Thus we have, when firms sell to atomistic consumers, 
a situation in which, even though there may be no direct contact 
between price-setters and customers, sanctions may be brought to 
bear on the latters' behalf, and ideas of fairness may qualify 
the actions of both parties, just as in the case of explicit, 
firm-to-firm bargaining analysed previously. We may call this 
implicit bargaining. However, despite the characteristics in 
common to the two sorts of bargaining, we should still expect 
firms selling to firms to make less money than firms selling 
to atomistic consumers, since firm buyers, due to the greater 
importance their purchases have relative to the selling firm's 
total market, can impose a greater no-trade threat than can 
individual, uncoordinated consumers.
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In summary, we can write that the price charged 
under conditions of implicit bargaining is:
p^ = p + yf^fM-nu), 0 <y<l (II.11),
for the market segment distanced (M-itk) from the border.
When y = 1, we have the same situation as when 0 = 0 in (II.6) - 
all the gains from trade appropriated by the seller; otherwise 
the two expressions differ.
I will not be concerned to try to determine, more 
precisely than was done above, the value to be taken by y. It 
surely will differ in different economies and industries 
according to their history, social structure, system of 
government, and other factors. It may be conjectured that 
empathy will be more strongly felt by smaller firms, and by 
those which are owned and controlled in the country in which 
business is being transacted, due to differences in the 
strength of the link between managers and their customers' 
social environment. Thus, for example, there have been some 
instances in recent years of British firms, not noted for being 
outstandingly greedy in the home market, being accused of badly 
exploiting their customers and workforce in their foreign 
subsidiary operations, especially in South Africa —  an economy 
with notably weak links of empathy between employing and 
(manually) employed classes.
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We can easily find out if these models (if models 
be not too grand a term) of industrial price-setting have 
the property that profitability is an increasing function of 
firm size. For suppose that a firm doubles the length of its 
market segment from M to 2M. Its market power over the new 
customers will be the same as its previous market power with 
respect to the original customers, and so too will be the 
distribution of prices charged. However, the firm's market 
power over the original customers has now increased, as they 
are now all distanced an additional M from the border.
In the implicit bargaining equation (II.11), this 
results unambiguously in an increase in the price charged the 
original customers, and so an increase in profitability. In 
the explicit bargaining case of (II.6), we cannot, in 
principle, rule out f increasing more than f^ , so that price 
falls.
This would occur if the selling firm's size become
such that the supply of alternative customers outside its
current market began to dry up. However, we should probably
regard this possibility as a curiosum, to be observed rarely,
if at all. This is because of differences in the f and f,s b
functions; f^ is likely to be a more steeply increasing 
function of (M-itk), for two reasons. First, product 
characteristics may often be less costly to alter in
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production than in consumption. It will be of no concern to 
a car manufacturer whether he paints a car blue or red, but to 
the customer, the difference in colours may mean a lot. In 
the geographic dimension of product space, the unit cost of 
moving goods to the border may be less for the seller, who 
can benefit from economies of of consignment size (since he 
is already shipping to just before the border, where his 
territory ends) not accessible to buyers.
Secondly, sellers are more likely to be able to turn 
to a quite different market to trade in than are buyers. For 
example, a buyer of machine tools does not have much alternative 
to using machine tools in his production process -- he is rather 
locked in to buying goods from the machine tool industry. 
Manufacturers in the latter industry, on the other hand, sell 
their product to many industries, and so are locked in to none.
A similar story can be told for many capital goods, 
intermediate inputs such as packaging and transportation, and 
industrial materials -- they all have a number of alternative 
uses, in each of which they are significantly more appropriate 
than is the nearest substitute.
This implies that the market power of a particular 
buyer depends largely on the distance of the seller from 
alternative markets, which does not increase when its size in
the buyer's market increases.
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These justifications for expecting average price 
received, or profitability, to increase with increases in the 
seller's size in no way conflict with the suggestion made 
earlier that the seller's market power could be negative, if 
the product of the fringe firms were inherently more desirable. 
For, although for a particular value of (M-nu) f^ might be 
negative, we should still expect it to increase as M increases 
in the very act of expansion the selling firm will be taking 
over or driving out of business the fringe firms whose product 
was more attractive.
A factor which probably affects the buyer's market 
power more than the seller's is the size of the transaction 
between the two. For the seller, the bigger the transaction, 
the more difficult it will be to dispose of it elsewhere. A 
small sale may be placed easily enough given the natural 
turnover of customers from other sellers, and the growth, if 
any, in the total market, but to make a large sale, the firm 
will have to disrupt existing trading arrangements between 
other firms, to lure away some other seller's custom —  this 
will not usually be accomplished without costs.
On the other hand, a roving buyer is welcomed by the 
other sellers, who are eager to increase their sales (although 
a really large order may run into some difficulties, at least 
in the short run, depending on the supply elasticity of the 
industry) and is not likely to upset other buyers.
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These arguments suggest that it is the size of buyer 
rather than seller that predominantly determines the former's 
market power in a transaction. If we measure the buyer's size 
as the amount of territory he owns in his selling market, we 
should modify (II.6) to
f (Ms - m.) - efiM1)
p. = p + — ------- ------- ---- (11.12),
6 + 1
S iwhere M is the length of the seller's market segment, and M 
is the segment of buyer i, in the market in which he resells 
(after processing) the product.
However, we should not expect this measure of buyer 
market power to necessarily be inversely correlated with p .^
This is because the buyer's power will also, in general, be 
used in his own selling market to raise the price there 
received, and some of the resulting profits may be passed back 
to suppliers, for reasons of empathy, fairness, or simple fear 
that these suppliers might otherwise be tempted to integrate 
forward into the next stage of processing. This 'piggyback' 
effect of intermediate sellers gaining from the market power 
of final market sellers, may well outweigh the countervailing 
power effect, so that f becomes a negative function of M1 in
(11.12) .
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II.4 Summary of Chapters II.2 and II.3
In the preceding two chapters I have attempted to 
provide a model of industrial price-setting with market power 
that is realistic, testable, and that meets the objections to 
previous work that surfaced in the critical survey of Part I. 
The three most important of these criticisms were (1) the 
fragility of market power as therein conceived, (2) the 
inconsistent dichotomy between oligopoly and entry-threat 
models, and (3) the inconsistency, given arguments against 
oligopolistic co-ordination problems being an effective 
constraint on price, of observed industry price elasticities 
with price setting in the orthodox market framework.
The proposition that a good model should build on a 
concept of market power as a durable force is not uncontro- 
versial —  we noted the laissez-faire school of thought which 
does believe that any firm's market power is transitory, 
eventually to be competed away, and which underpins the 
literature on small-scale entry. Therefore, we will be 
concerned to reinforce whatever plausibility the concept has, 
as developed in Chapter II.2, with explicit empirical tests in 
Part III of the thesis.
Market power was defined as the costs one firm or 
consumer can impose on another by not trading with it. The 
basis of such power is suggested to be differences in the 
characteristics of products, which give some attractiveness
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to the continuation of existing trading partnerships, given 
that partners were appropriately matched in the first place. 
Three sources of market power were distinguished: 1) search 
costs, due to uncertainty, of dealing with new trading 
partners, 2) differences in product characteristics that are 
legally owned by firms, through patents, licensing and so on,
3) differences in basic (i.e., nonpurchasable) qualities of 
businessmen and organizations that give all firms comparative 
and some absolute advantages over one another.
The first and third of these are inherently durable; 
the second is given durability by the legal system reinforcing 
contracts and patents, and by all sorts of governmental 
licensing arrangements. Thus, although in my illustrative 
formal modelling I draw on concepts from the literature on 
location theory, I certainly do not believe that the 'problem' 
posed by these models —  of where rival firms will choose to 
locate in characteristic space -- is well put. If market power 
is a durable property right, firms are simply not free to set 
up where ever they wish in characteristic space; unless they 
possess a superior product or technique, new firms must buy 
their way into an industry, with the approval of existing 
operators.
Market power is determined not just by the distance, 
in product characteristic space, to the boundary of a firm's 
market territory, but by the prices there charged for the
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nearest substitutes to the firm's product. Here we distinguish 
two cases —  1) other firms with market power at the border, and 
2) 'small' firms at the border.
In the first instance we have the oligopoly problem 
of co-ordinating to achieve the best possible price -- a problem 
which, it was argued in Part I, should not be too difficult for 
the parties concerned to solve. This is especially so when we 
drop the one-market assumption of orthodox models; it is only 
the proportion of output traded at and near the border on which 
an agreement on price need be reached, and this is made 
relatively easy by the similarity, ipso facto, of competing 
products at the border, and by the probable characteristic that 
these border interfaces are generally between pairs of firms —  
we do not have an n-firm oligopoly problem.
Thus, borders between firms with market power should 
not be relevant to price setting and structure. However, firms 
also have borders, at some distance, with 'small' firms. By 
'small' I mean firms whose product territory is not large enough 
to generate for them sufficient market power to alone force a 
price high enough to make them want to stay in business. For 
this sector of firms, prices will be set to balance the supply 
and demand of entrepreneurial capital and labour, which is 
determined, exogenously to any market-power firm, no matter how 
big, by the structure of attitudes towards risk-taking in the 
economy, and the income that entrepreneurs can earn in 
alternative (i.e., not self-employed) occupations. Therefore,
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the presence of small border, or 'fringe', firms sets an 
exogenous constraint on the price-setting power of firms with 
significant market power.
The preceding two paragraphs have important and 
potentially testable implications for the relationship between 
structure and profitability. First, the traditional market 
structure variables —  concentration ratios, Herfindahl 
indices -- motivated as they are by the postulate of a unique 
price determined by the ease of colluding, may, at best, be 
rather weakly_ related empirically to profitability, because 
they ignore differences in the absolute size of firms. In our 
model, an industry of ten small firms would, ceteris paribus, 
earn a lower rate of return on its resources than an industry 
of ten big firms with the same concentration ratio or 
Herfindahl, since the former group, being nearer in size to 
fringe firms, should also tend to be closer in 'distance' to 
them, as well. This is because the likelihood of a small 
businessman being able to command the financial and managerial 
resources to set up in competition (either as producer or 
importer) with an industry is greater, the smaller the scale 
of firms in that industry.
Second, in the model of this Thesis, firms of 
different size in the same industry will, in general, charge 
different prices and make different profits. Under the 
oligopoly model assumptions, there is a unique industry price
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charged by all firms, big or small. We have already noted the
evidence (cf. Chapter 1.2) that this just is not so; it is good
to have a model consistent with the reality of such an important
9aspect of market conduct.
These points suggest that a structure-performance link 
be best looked for at the level of individual enterprises, with 
a firm's profitability related both to its absolute size and 
its market share. This is not possible with the Census of 
Production data available for this Thesis, so that the
market share effect will have to be omitted, and absolute firm 
size proxied by average size in each industry.
In Chapter II. 3, the implications of market power for 
industrial price-setting were developed. It was found useful 
to distinguish between different orders of magnitude of the 
scale of transactions. Two trading partners involved in a deal 
that is for each of them a significant proportion of their total 
business will, it is suggested, find it worthwhile to maximize 
the gains from trade by tailoring any variable factors to suit 
their particular requirements, and will apportion these gains 
according to their respective market powers, in a process of 
'explicit bargaining', which may be qualified by the empathy 
between the traders, and their notions of fair play.
On the other hand, for a firm with market power 
selling to (or buying from) many separate traders in each 
segment of its market, the set-up costs of individually
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matching each transaction will be prohibitive relative to the 
value of business involved, and the firm will standardize its 
product and sell (or buy) at a take-it-or-leave-it price, 
determined only by its own market power (since the market 
powers of each of its small customers is insignificant unless 
aggregated by co-ordination), subject again to the constraints 
of empathy and morality.
It is proposed that this approach resolves the 
second and third problems treated in the industrial organization 
literature. The oligopoly situation can appear only at the 
borders between large firms, so that it is both a less pervasive 
and less troublesome to these concerned than is postulated in 
the orthodox, whole-market oligopoly models, and so can 
reasonably be assumed away in the optimal trade-off between 
simplicity and generality of analysis. The entry 'threat' as 
a factor influencing pricing is also not relevant. Firms 
offering a superior product or technolocy will enter anyway 
(at least, they will not be restrained by the pricing policies 
of existing firms), and their competitors will do best to make 
what money they can, in the time left to them. Firms with no 
innate superiority over existing operators (and these are 
assumed in all the entry-threat literature) will be unable to 
enter, without consent, the territory of the latter, since 
this is postulated to be, in general, owned by them. The 
dichotomy in the literature between oligopoly and entry-threat 
theorizing is thus resolved by arguing that both classes of
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problem are mis-conceived. When this is set right, the 
inconsistency becomes irrelevant. However, although larger 
firms are safe from territorial invasions, they compete 
always with the fringe of small firms, whose price is not 
determined by market power considerations.
Therefore, even if total industry demand is quite 
inelastic (as assumed in our simple formal models), the price 
charged by individual firms with market power and no problems 
of collusive co-ordination with other firms is still determinate.
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II.5 Defining Profitability
So far, in both the Critical Survey of Part I, and 
the model building of Part II, I have used terms such as 
'profitability' and 'margin of price over costs' for the 
dependent variable to be explained by structure-performance 
analysis, without specifying just what these concepts mean.
This omission is dealt with in the present chapter, which 
looks first into industrial organization received practices, 
finds them wanting, and goes on to attemptto resolve the found 
anomalies by developing a serviceable definition of profita­
bility to be used in Part III, in the empirical specification 
of the structure-performance relationship. The material in the 
chapter could thus have been divided between Parts I and II; 
but since the topic can be treated independently of other 
material, and because the chapter is rather short, I have 
preferred to maintain cohesiveness by presenting it together.
Not surprisingly, the two independent approaches 
of oligopoly- and entry threat-pricing imply two separate 
measures of profitability, both of which are found in the
empirical literature, though not usually with any recognition
10of the particular theoretical source.
In the oligopoly models, with their firm base in 
the traditional microeconomic framework of short-run market 
equilibrium, the appropriate dependent variable is the markup 
of price over marginal variable costs (see, for a clear
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statement, Cowling and Waterson, 1976). The divergence of 
price from marginal cost is Lerner's'degree of monopoly', 
bounded by perfect competition (divergence zero), and perfect 
monopoly (divergence such that marginal revenue equals marginal 
cost), and its level is determined by the oligopolists' success 
in co-ordinating their price-setting in their common interest.
There are problems with this measure, in practice and 
in theory. First, data on marginal costs have never been 
available for a sizeable sample of industries. Cowling and 
Waterson explicitly (and others implicitly) assume constant 
marginal costs, which therefore equal average costs, which can 
be easily measured by Census data on wage and salaries and 
material expenses.
This assumption has been supported by calling on the 
evidence from statistical cost studies of particular plants (e.g., 
Johnston, 1960) which typically seem to find L-shaped cost 
curves, flat in the relevant range, rather than the U-shaped 
curves drawn in microeconomic texts.
However, more direct evidence on the behaviour in 
the short term of labour productivity in UK manufacturing 
industries (Appendix A) reveals a quarter-to-quarter variations 
which are systematically related to fluctuations in output in a 
way that supports, in general, the U-shaped cost curve hypothesis, 
and that appears to uncover substantial differences between
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industries in the 'tightness' of the U. These results imply 
that the relationship between marginal and average costs 
differs across industries, so that, for example, two industries 
could be observed with the same average costs per unit but have 
quite different marginal costs -- the assumption that measured 
average costs are a close proxy for marginal costs is not valid.
A further check on the (im)plausibility of the 
variable cost markup as the proper profitability measure is 
the magnitude of the quarter-to-quarter fluctuations in labour 
productivity that are implied by the productivity functions 
for the sample in Appendix A, and which would imply, in the 
oligopoly model, quarter-to-quarter changes in price of one or 
two per cent. This does not seem plausible given Atkin and 
Skinner's finding that most firms never change prices by less 
than 3 per cent (1975, p. 86).
It might be argued in response to this that it is a 
rather longer-term, 'normal' notion of costs to which oligopolists 
adjust their prices. This is reasonable, but, if a longer term 
is to be used, the definition of variable costs must be extended 
to include capital plant and equipment, which are not fixed over 
a longer time horizon.
The general failure to allow for a return to capital 
in the oligopoly price-setting models burdens them with the quite 
unreasonable prediction that, for example, two industries with
1 2 1
the same market structure and the same short-term variable 
costs per unit of output would achieve the same price-variable 
cost markup, even if one of them had a capital stock costing 
ten times as much as the other's; implying that the latter 
industry would earn a rate of return on its capital ten times 
higher than the former, for no reason other than an accident 
of technology leading to different capital/labour ratios.
A similar problem with the use of markup on variable 
costs as the variable to be explained by industry structure is 
that it implies that an industry's position on the chain of 
production affects its profitability. Consider the case of 
two industries with identical market structures, labour forces 
and capital stocks, but differing in the value of materials 
they purchase. The oligopoly model predicts that each will 
achieve the same percentage markup on all variable costs; that 
is, that the industry further up the chain (processing more 
valuable materials) will make more profit. This property may 
result in empirical tests of the oligopoly model showing 
spuriously good fits, if, as was suggested in the previous 
chapter, industries of firms selling to final consumers 
generally are more profitable than of firms selling to firms, 
due to the former group of customers having less bargaining 
power than the latter.
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Some studies (e.g., McFetridge, 1973) use the markup 
on value added (net output) rather than on total value of 
sales. This, in fact, does avoid assigning an arbitrary 
importance to an industry's position on the chain of production 
(though the problem of industries with different cpaital stocks 
remains), which may cause it to 'fit' the data better. However, 
it has no grounding in any theory, as far as I am aware.
The use of a markup variable to be explained is in 
direct contradiction with the other common practice of empirical 
industrial organization work (at least in the US-data is a 
problem in the UK) of measuring as dependent variable profits as 
a ratio of the value of the industry's capital stock. The 
markup attributes nothing to capital; the ratio of profits to 
stock attributes everything to capital, and nothing to variable 
costs.
The profits/stock ratio is usually justified as the 
proper dependent variable implied by entry-threat models -- it 
is the rate of return on capital that supposedly attracts or 
repels potential competitors —  though in empirical work we 
typically find an unresolved mish-mash of 'barriers to entry' 
and 'ability to collude' explanatory variables. Only Cowling 
and Waterson (1976), as noted in Part I, have been bold enough 
to recognize the inconsistency and, working from an oligopoly 
model, to exlcude entry barrier variables from their regression 
equations.
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The natural definition of profitability that follows 
from the model developed in Chapters II.3 and II.4 is:
"The profits that can be earned by the resources 
of a firm, given its position in characteristic 
space {i.e., given its market power) relative to 
the opportunity cost of these factors,"
with the natural measurement of opportunity costs the return 
the factors would earn if stripped of their market power, 
namely the return they would earn if distributed in the fringe, 
or competitive,sector of the industry. This is consistent with 
our models in which market power determines a firm's price 
relative to the price charged at the fringe.
This definition would be equivalent, up to a 
multiplicative constant equal to the competitive rate of return 
on capital, to the profits/capital stock ratio measure if fixed 
capital were the only resource committed to production.
In general, however, this will not be so. First, 
inventories of materials, goods in process, and finished goods, 
have an opportunity cost equal to the funds tied up in them 
multiplied by the going rate of interest.
Secondly, we should allow returns to the managerial- 
entrepreneurial resources committed to firms by their owners 
and/or the managers who act on their behalf. It is not 
sufficient to simply purchase capital, materials and labour 
services in order to generate a profit-making operation: the 
factors of production must be organized and supervised if they
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are to produce output, and therefore the input required to 
achieve this earns a return. Vie will not have a direct 
measure of the quantity of managerial factors supplied, but 
it may be reasonable to suppose that they are proportional to 
the quantity of other factors —  capital, inventories, labour —  
that are committed to the production process. Certainly, it 
seems plausible that, of two industries with similar structure 
and capital stocks and labour forces of different sizes, the 
industry with more labour will produce more and will make larger 
profits.
Therefore, the measure of profitability used in the 
empirical work of this thesis will be defined as the ratio of 
the profits (excess of revenues over operating costs) actually 
earned to the profits that the resources committed to the 
industry would earn if deployed in the competitive fringe 
sector. I call this measure the surplus earned by an industry.
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Part III: The Model Tested and Compared
III.l Specifying the Model
In this chapter the theoretical model developed in 
Part II is specified for subsequent testing with data for the 
UK manufacturing sector. We are here looking for a 'short­
term' relationship; that is, a relationship at any point in 
time between structure and profitability. In the second 
chapter, the model is estimated, and in the third, our 
results are compared with those of other researchers.
Chapter III.2 also looks at the 'long-term' dynamics of the 
relationship, by which is meant the durability over time of 
the structure-performance link for particular industries. 
There are few previous results to compare with.
We may begin the specification procedure by writing 
equations (11.12) and (II.11)
„ _ ~ . f. (MS-m.) - 6f (M1)p^ = p + b l s
(6 + 1) ... (III.l),
when explicit bargaining sets price, and
Pi = P +  ^fb(Ms-rn) (III.2) ,
which holds when implicit bargaining is the rule.
To get from these equations to a model that could 
be tested on our industry-level data, we would have to 
aggregate three times -- first over all the customers in each 
market of each firm, then over all the markets of each firm, 
and finally over all the firms.
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To devote resources to such a tedious process would
be to misplace the concreteness of equations III.l and III.2 —  
they were developed only as illustrations, based on particularly 
simple assumptions, of the essentially verbal analysis of the 
previous chapters.
of the aggregation process. The dependent variable to be 
explained at the industry level is the ratio of the profits 
earned by the industry to the profits that the resources 
committed by the industry would earn in market-powerless, fringe 
activities. We can get to this as follows. Consider first just 
the aggregation of all customers in one market of one firm under 
explicit bargaining. Rewrite equation 1 as:
right hand side of (III.l) and c and c are the unit direct 
production costs of the firm and the fringe.
Denoting as x^ the firm's sales to buyer i, and summing over 
all sales;
In any case, we can anticipate the important features
c = p - c + (c-c) + Afl ... (III.3),
where Af1 is a summary notation for the second term on the
... (III.4).
Equation III.4 further rearranges to




—  the ratio of the firm's profits, to the profits, t k,
that would be earned by fringe firms selling the same output 
is determined by the cost advantage of the firm and by a 
weighted average of the market power functions, Af1 . We could 
carry on to aggregate over markets and firms, but will not do 
so —  Equation III.5 is intended to be illustrative only.
What is clear is that the result of full aggregation 
would be to find the industry/fringe profit ratio determined by 
market power, empathy, and cost differences in different markets 
and for different firms, weighted by the proportions of output 
being sold under conditions of explicit and implicit bargaining.
Such an aggregated function would no doubt be 
complicatedly nonlinear, and would differ for each industry. 
However, it is usually so in empirical work that, when there are 
firm relationships between variables that persist across 
industries, much of the variation in the data can be accounted 
for with a function containing just first, and some second order 
terms. Accordingly, the estimating equation to be specified 
here will be linear, with quadratic terms added for two of the 
most interesting variables. I could have been more energetic in 
testing different forms —  cubics, semi-log, double-log, for 
example —  and might, indeed, have slightly increased the 
ex post goodness of fit by so doing; however, I took the 
position that the dangers of 'data-mining' -- of choosing a 
specification that is twisted to best fit the particular error
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structure in the observed data, at the cost of being relatively 
poor at predicting over a new sample of data and errors —  are 
such that extensive specification trials are not advisable. ^
A strong hypothesis should so reveal itself no matter what the 
functional form imposed on it.
Selecting the explanatory variables to be inserted 
in the estimating equation again entails approximations to 
reality. In a case study approach, such as employed by the 
Monopolies Commission, factors determining market power, costs, 
even empathy, can be uncovered and measured directly. Many 
such factors will be peculiar to the particular industry being 
studied. In econometric cross-sectional study, however, we are 
limited by data availability, time, and degrees of freedom, to 
considering just a few variables which may be important across 
all industries.
Of course, the challenge being accepted in a work 
such as this is precisely to show that such generalizations 
are possible; that our theoretical model is useful in that the 
simplified relationships it proposes do have some general 
validity.
The variable found in all structure-performance 
studies, and the main focus of interest in most of them, is 
some measure of the size distribution of the firms within each 
industry, reflecting their difficulties in colluding on price.
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I have argued in this thesis that these difficulties are greatly 
exaggerated —  in the model proposed in Part II, large firms 
only need to collude where their territories abut, and should 
not generally there have much difficulty in doing this.
Therefore, I do not expect measures of size distribution to 
contribute significantly to the explanation of profitability, 
and will test this by including the five-firm concentration ratio 
(SCR) as an explanatory variable.
What does help determine profitability in the model 
here proposed is not the relationship between large firms, but 
between each large firm and the competitive fringe; in particular, 
the 'distance' between the firm and the fringe. An obvious factor 
affecting distance is the size of the market-power firms, which 
determines the amount of territory they own. In an industry for 
whose product there are no substitutes, a measure of size relative 
to total industry size, such as is given by the SCR, could be 
appropriate. However, I expect that the no-substitute assumption 
is much too extreme to be a reasonable simplification; in 
general, we should assume the presence,for each product, of other 
products with significant cross-price elasticities, extending 
the concepts of territory and distance beyond the boundaries of 
an industry's Census definition.
V7e don't have yet the own- and cross-price elasticity 
estimates for all UK manufacturing industries that might permit 
us to derive market area measures (by weighting the sizes of
wmvm -* mv'twtf mrnmmitnattmm'Wm i— i
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substitute goods industries by cross elasticities) against which 
to compare firm size to obtain an appropriate market power 
variable. Failing this, we can proxy the numerator of this 
ratio —  firm size —  by the Census data on the average net 
output per enterprise in each industry (NO/ENT), and hope that 
differences in this number are sufficiently independent of 
differences in market area for variations in the numerator to 
be significantly associated with variations in the true ratio, 
so that NO/ENT may be a useful explanatory variable.
An absolute size measure such as NO/ENT will be 
particularly relevant to the extent that the control of 
distribution and retailing outlets is an important ingredient 
in market power and that the costs of establishing such control 
do not vary much across different industries and products.
Differences in costs are another market power variable 
that we expected to affect profitability —  if one firm can 
produce more cheaply than another it may make more money. It 
will be able to do so for any length of time only if its cost 
advantage is durable; that is, if it is not accessible to fringe 
firms. This will be so either when the low costs are a rent- 
producing resource accruing from the particular skills or legal 
property rights (such as a favourable location) of some firms 
and entrepreneurs, or when the cost advantage is dependent on 
large scale production. The chances that these conditions are 
met may be proxied, in all three cases, by some measure of firm
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size. Vie could expect that skill advantages would be associated 
not just with higher per unit profit margins, but also with more 
units sold —  if some of the lower costs are passed on to 
customers, the firm's market will expand relative to higher cost 
competitors. The number of legal property rights owned may also, 
on average, be correlated with size, and the exploitation of 
economies of scale will obviously be linked to the rate of 
output.
The first two of these factors might again be well- 
proxied by NO/EUT. Economies of scale, however, may be more 
closely associated with the size of plants rather than firms -- 
of establishments rather than enterprises, in the UK Census 
terminology —  which will be measured here by the average net 
output per plant in each industry -- NO/EST. Both size 
variables will be tried out.
Two variables which may be associated with seller 
market power, and which appear quite often (especially the first) 
in structure-performance regressions, though with no record of 
uniform success, are market growth rate, and the degree of 
exposure to import competition. The rationale for including 
the first of these may be interpreted, within the theoretical 
framework of this thesis, as distance in time, analogously to 
distance in other dimensions of product space, in a growing 
market, between existing firms and new entrants, giving the 
former some added temporary market power' which they may exploit 
to increase their profits.
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The statistical significance of market growth may
be further, though spuriously, reinforced by the typical
practice of measuring it by the actual growth in revenues of
each industry, since any measurement errors in this number
will appear also in the figure for profits on the left hand
side of the regression equation. The proper measures of
market growth would be, for consumer and intermediate goods
industries, the change in personal disposable income weighted
by an independently estimated income elasticity, and for
capital goods industries, a function specifying investment
expenditures, but such data are not so far available at
anything like the level of disaggregation needed for a cross-
12section study of UK manufacturing.
In any case, as we shall see, market growth variables 
as measured sometimes show negative signs, and are usually 
insignificant. There are at least two reasons why this should 
occur; a) if market growth is anticipated, new capacity should 
be added to keep pace, with no particular tendency for a profits 
bonus to accrue to anyone, and b) unusually fast grov/ing 
industries may, in non-planned economies, attract an oversupply 
of eager entrepreneurs, resulting in price wars and bankruptcies. 
Two well-known examples of this are the colour television and 
electronic calculator industries.
Susceptibility to foreign competition is, in principle, 
an appealing variable.In Part II it was suggested that the 
ability to import from outside suppliers might be one of the
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instruments used by fringe operators that constrains 
the profitability of market power firms —  but, as with market 
growth, the available measured proxies are blunted by opposing 
influences which may cancel out. Tariff protection in some 
industries may provide a shield behind which unusually large 
profits can be earned, but, in others, may be imposed to save 
unusually high-cost domestic industries from extinction, and 
so may be observed along with lower than average profits.
The other widely available measure —  the share of 
imports on total domestic sales —  is also two-edged. A high 
import ratio may indeed reflect a keenly competitive market, 
but it may also be due to an industry's profitability being 
unusually attractive, or simply to differing comparative 
advantages.
A third 'theoretical' factor, which is less 
ambiguously measurable than the first two, and so has shown 
more success in empirical work, is the susceptibility of 
consumers to various efforts firms may make to persuade them 
to purchase their products. The typical proxy for this is 
the ratio of advertising expenditures to sales value.
There is a problem in principle with using a simple 
measure of promotional expenditures, connected with the 
distinction between purely intra-industry advertising, used by 
each firm as a market-share weapon, which may not increase total
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industry profits, and the externalities of advertising affecting 
total demand conditions for all firms in a market, which does 
affect profitability. In general, though, it should not be 
unreasonable to expect to find that industries which persistently 
advertise more do so because it pays off.
Some interesting and ingenious theoretical and 
empirical effort has gone into specifying the advertising- 
profits relationship (see the book by Cowling et. al., 1975) 
but I shall not here go further than simply including the ratio 
of advertising to sales as an explanatory variable, with a 
positive sign expected. I take this simple-minded approach 
because I rather doubt that the measured advertising/sales 
ratio is really up to supporting any sort of elaborate theoretical 
framework. Much, perhaps most, of promotional efforts are not 
captured in the measure of bought-in advertising services. The 
firm itself must typically devote resources to new product 
development, to its own market research, and to assisting in 
the choice of marketing strategy, before it gets to the stages 
of purchasing space and time in the media. A striking, though 
probably extreme (because of the high unit value of a sale) 
example of this is provided by the famous study of Fisher, 
Griliches, and Kaysen (1962) who found the costs of cosmetic 
model changes in the US car industry to be about $700 per car 
per year, compared with just $14 spent on advertising. Usually 
advertising will be complementary to the other unmeasured
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marketing inputs, and so be a useful statistical proxy, but, 
as such, cannot legitimately be used, for example, in tests 
for profit-maximizing behaviour through calculation of marginal 
value productivities.
This completes the listing of empirically accessible 
seller market power variables. We turn next to measures of 
power on the side of the buyers in the bargaining situation.
In the case of firms selling intermediate goods to 
other firms, where the terms of the transaction are set by 
explicit bargaining, the power of the buyer's no-trade threat 
is a function of the size of the transaction, since this affects 
the ease with which the seller can relocate his output. A large 
order may take time or price-discounting to place in alternative 
markets, both involving a loss of profitability to the seller.
A natural measure of buyer size is its importance in the 
industry in which it sells. Accordingly, to get a measure of 
the buyer, or countervailing power facing an industry selling 
intermediate goods, I aggregate the seller concentration ratios 
of all the purchasing industries, weighting each by the 
proportion they take of the selling industry's output. This, 
and all other variables are defined and sourced precisely in 
the data Appendix C.
The buyer concentration ratio (BCR) would measure 
just what it is supposed to if there were no substitutability 
between an industry's products sold in different markets. In
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general, then, we should weight further by estimates of cross­
elasticities of demand. These are not available; therefore we 
must hope that our rather blunt proxy for buyer power will yet 
be sensitive enough to pick up the relationship hypothesized.
Both BCR and its squared value will be included in 
the regression, to allow for any non-linearity. As we noted 
in Chapter II.2, we cannot predict a priori the signs of the 
buyer power coefficients, since countervailing power may be 
dominated by the 'piggyback' effect.
Output not sold as intermediate input goes to final 
users. The Input-Output tables allow us to distinguish four 
groups of these -- consumers, public authorities proportion of 
output sold to each of these final users (BUYC, P, K, E) as 
explanatory variables. Their coefficients will estimate the 
net effect of buyer power and empathy in the bargaining process 
in each of these markets. Of course, it may be rather much to 
assume that buyer conditions are the same within each group; 
again, it is to be settled empirically if our simplification 
is viable -- that is whether between-group variation is 
sufficiently larger than within-group so that the proportion- 
of-sales variables can show independent significance.13
Our theoretical framework suggests some a priori, 
predictions about the relative size of coefficients. The 
coefficient of the proportion sold to consumers, BUYC, should 
be relatively large, since most consumer sales take place under
... lit—  ar i w i T i i — M-ir  t —
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conditions of implicit bargaining, which, it was suggested in 
Part II, is more profitable than explicit bargaining —  the 
buyers' power is small and uncoordinated. The BUYE coefficient 
may also be large, if sellers are less constrained than in 
domestic markets by empathy considerations when they sell to 
foreigners. The coefficient on BUYK should be smaller than the 
others, since firms purchasing capital goods will be mostly in 
an explicit bargaining situation, with their buyer power often 
reinforced, compared to intermediate goods buyers, by the 
relative unimportance of time —  an intermediate purchaser 
who fails to close a deal with one firm may have to find an 
alternative supplier rather rapidly, or face costly production 
scheduling disruptions, whereas a capital goods buyer may quite 
easily be able to continue operating with its existing capacity, 
at no great cost.
About the coefficient on BUYP we should perhaps best 
be agnostic in a priori expectations. Public authorities may 
tend, on average, to purchase in greater bulk than the private 
sector, which would make selling to them less profitable —  
their buyer power would be greater. On the other hand, the 
public sector may not be so strenuous in obtaining the best 
possible deal as profit-motivated private sector buyers.
To complete the specification of the right hand 
side of the market power-profitability equation to be estimated 
we should note that a constant term will probably not show
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significance. To see this, write the profit rate r^^ earned 
by industry i from its sales to sector j
r. . = a . + bS . 13 D 1 (III.6),
b are vectors of seller market power and the associated 
coefficients. The observed rate of profit r^ is a weighted
their estimated coefficients —  that is, in a specification 
with just buyer proportions, no constant is needed, even if 
there is a common, or constant, element included in all the 
a/s. The specification used in the next chapter is not quite 
equivalent to (III.8), since intermediate good sales proportions 
are already weighted with concentration ratios, but we should 
probably not be surprised if this adulteration is insufficient 
to generate a need for an intercept term.
r. 1 (III.7) ,
Ea . 6. . + bS. i 1 H (III.8) .
Finally, we go to the left hand side of the equation
to put the profitability variable in a measurable form. In 
(III.5) the appropriate measure was defined as the ratio of
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profits actually earned by an industry to the profits that 
would have been earned by fringe firms selling the same 
physical output. Direct measurement of this would require 
data on actual fringe prices in each industry; data which, of 
course, we do not have. However, this does not create a problem, 
since we can make use of our theoretical framework, which 
suggested that the rate of return to fringe firms is determined 
by aggregate conditions in the supply and demand for small 
entrepreneurs which are exogenous to each industry —  that is, 
fringe prices are determined as markups on the resources 
committed which are the same (or, at least, tend to be the same - 
there will be some errors and adjustments due, for example, to 
differences in riskiness) in all industries.
Thus, we do not need to be told the actual fringe 
price p^ in each industry; we can calculate it, if we can 
measure a) the resources committed to each industry, and b) the 
average fringe rates of return earned per unit of each factor 
resource.
Economic factor input resources fall naturally into 
two classes —  tangible and intangible. First, there is the 
capital tied up in plant, machinery, and buildings, and in 
inventories of materials and finished goods. For some economies 
(the US, Canada) data are available that directly measure 
capital assets at a disaggregated level; for the UK we will need 
to devise proxies.
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Secondly, there is the intangible entrepreneurial/ 
managerial input that induces capital and labour to combine to 
produce useful output. Again, direct measurement is not 
possible, but it may be reasonable to propose that the size of 
organizational input required is a function of the quantity of 
resources -- capital and labour -- tied up in an industry, and 
so to proxy the return to this input that is expected in fringe 
firms as some markup on the quantity of tangible factors involved.
We will call these markups on the three measurable 
categories of inputs —  capital stock, inventories, workforce -- 
that are expected as normal in the fringe sector of manufacturing, 
NORMRK, NORMRI, NORMRL. We then calculate the normal profits or 
returns that fringe operators would expect to earn from the 
factors deployed in the ith industry, NRET,
NRETV = NORMRK»Capital Stocky + NORMRI»Inventory Stocky 
+ NORMRL »Wage Bil^ (III.9).
The profitability variable is then the ratio of actual profits 
earned in industry i, PROFITS^, to NRET^. This will be called 
the 'Rate of Surplus', or just 'Surplus', and denoted by the 
symbol r^ ;
ri = PROFITSi/NRETi (III.10).
The NORMR parameters will have to be estimated along 
with the right hand side coefficients -- we do not have any 
direct measures for them. NORMRK and RI will bear some relation
p n  K - * , - « * * * ,» • * «  MTafl ««MMUM«'1 '■ • K > A*U& "
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to observed interest rates, but will certainly not tend to 
equal them —  they incorporate, as well, the riskiness of 
tying up capital in a business, the psychic income of being 
an entrepreneur, and the returns to managerial effort. 
Riskiness will differ between RK and RI depending on the 
relative liquidity of capital and inventories. NORMRL takes 
into account the managerial resources required to keep a 
workforce working productively, which we assume is best taken 
as markup on the wage bill rather than numbers employed; the 
former giving a 'quality-adjusted' measure of labour resources 
committed.
Apart from their inherent differences, the NORMR 
numbers will vary to adjust for the time period chosen -- NRET 




III.2 Estimating the Model
The estimating equation suggested in the previous 
chapter can be written
surplus is determined as a linear function of m structural 
seller and buyer power variables in each of the n industries in
experiment with including the squared values of some of the 
more important variables. The equation cannot be estimated as
normal rates of return -- which themselves must be estimated:
All the unknown parameters in this equation could 
be estimated together by a suitable non-linear least squares 
algorithm. The 'algorithm'that I in fact have used is simply 
to search over a 'grid' of R-values. Of course, the grid over 
which I search is much coarser than the grid which would be
i = 1 . .. , n (III.11)
the sample. The only departure from linearity will be to
it stands, since the denominator of r^ contains parameters
NRET. = RK*KS + RI*IS + RL*Wi (III.12)
abbreviating (III.9).
Equations (III.11) and (III.12) can be rewritten as
PROFITS^ = (RK*KS + RI*IS + RL*W) (a^X^ + ...
(III.13)
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surveyed by a proper nonlinear least squares computer program. 
Setting up the latter would, on the other hand, involve a lot 
of computer time and programming resources. My justification 
for not incurring these costs was the conjecture that the 
benefits of the added precision w'ould not be worthwhile -- I 
expected the R‘-maximization hill to be rather flat at its 
summit, such that quite large changes in R values do not raise 
or lower much the goodness of fit. In this case, the added 
'precision* of a formal algorithm would not be very meaningful; 
indeed, the less pretentious one-digit precision of my grid 
search would convey a more appropriate impression of the 
significance of this aspect of the results.
Before this conjecture can be tested by estimating 
(III.13), one remaining obstacle must be cleared away. This is 
the problem set by the lack of data on capital stocks at the 
Minimum List Heading level of aggregation for UK manufacturing 
industries. The only available information for the sample 
period is on investment expenditures, and this only for census 
years. A fringe firm in a steady state, investing the same 
amount each year, would expect returns equal to (1 + RK) times 
the investment flow each year. I shall adopt this result to 
calculate a figure for normal returns, hoping, in so doing, 
that error due to firms not being in steady states is reduced 
to insignificance by using data averaged over five census years. 
Averaging should also reduce the effect on the data of any
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cyclical link between profits earned and investment 
expenditures in any particular year. To the extent that 
such a relation is not averaged out, the calculated significance 
of the coefficients (the a's) of the structural variables will 
be biased downwards by the simultaneity between PROFITS and by 
measure of RK*KS, (1+RK)GINV, where GINV stands for gross 
investment expenditures.
The database is extracted from the individual reports 
at the Minimum List Heading level of aggregation for each of 
the full census years 1954, 1958, 1963, 1968, and 1973. These 
data were aggregated, where necessary, to the level of the 1963 
Input-Output tables, so that the buyer power variables could be 
calculated. This gives a breakdown of the manufacturing sector 
into 57 industries. Six of these were dropped from the sample 
because price indices, which are needed for the analysis of 
Chapter IV.1, could not be calculated. No other grounds for 
exclusion were entertained, in contrast to several of the 
studies to be surveyed in the next chapter, in which some 
industries were omitted because they were 'outliers', or because 
their 'specialization' or 'exclusiveness' ratios were judged to 
be low. The latter justification for restricting the sample is, 
perhaps, consistent with oligopoly-based models, in which it is 
the price set in a particular mjrket which determines the 
dependent variable, price-cost margin, so that an industry with 
a low exclusiveness or specialization ratio, (i.e., one that
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operates in several markets) might show a rather blurred 
relationship between structure and the average margin, if 
there are any non-linearities involved in aggregation.
However, such a criterion is not valid within the 
framework being urged in this thesis, in which it is the rate 
of return to factor inputs which is to be explained, which is 
not expected to be particularly affected by orthodox classifi­
cations of census firms into 'markets'. In fact, the present 
model might as well be tested by any arbitrary aggregation of 
firms into industries —  I expect a non-market-based structural 
variable such as size of plant to be a more appropriate
explanatory variable than concentration ratios based on the
14Standard Industrial Classification.
Nevertheless, concentration measures will be given 
as good a chance as possible to show their importance —  the 
gaps in the published figures have been filled using information 
reported in the book of case-studies by Walshe (1974). Where 
aggregation was necessary, it was done by weighting the 
concentration ratios of constituent industries by the proportion 
of sales they accounted for in 1963 in their Input-Output 
industry group. Details on all the data are given in Appendix C.
As noted, the buyer power variables were calculated 
using the 1963 1-0 tables, and so are for that year. Concen­
tration and advertising data are widely available from two 
censuses —  1963 and 1968, and are calculated as averages for
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those years. Other variables, such as net output per 
establishment, and the dependent variables, are averaged over 
all five census years.
The estimation strategy followed was, first, to take 
the specification of structural variables that had apparently 
emerged as 'best' from a preliminary series of R-value 
comparisons, and to use this as the base for performing the 
quasi-nonlinear-least-squares algorithm; using power to explain 
total profits as the measure of goodness of fit. The set of 
R's giving the best fit is then retained for the second stage, 
in which some alternative combinations of structural variables 
are tried out. There is no particular justification, so far 
as I know, for preferring this strategy to others; it does have 
the property, relative to more exhaustive and exhausting 
procedures, of limiting the number of regressions to be run to 
a number that may preserve some of the degrees of freedom 
available from our sample. Of course, the best ex post 
justification for a limited specification search can be offered 
if the model being estimated proves to be rather robust, so 
that coefficients and their significance levels do not change 
much with marginal specification alterations.
Of interest will be a comparison of the performance 
of my surplus variable with that of the conventional gross 
price-cost margin measure. Since gross margin also has total
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profits as its numerator, we can compare goodness of fit by 
comparing ability to predict profits.
Table III.l shows the goodness of fit of predicted 
against actual profits for the initial specification (as 
in equation 1 in Table III.3) over a 'coarse' grid of R- 
parameters. To restrict the search to two dimensions, rates 
of normal returns to fixed capital and inventory stocks were 
assumed to be equal. The net effect of the differences in 
liquidity and perishability between fixed and circulating 
capital cannot be signed a priori; no do-bt it differs between 
industries, hopefully by less, in most cases, than the degree 
of precision which is reasonably attainable.
In assessing correlation coefficients, what is 
important is not their absolute levels, which are largely 
determined by the extent to which variables fluctuate relative 
to their means, but the relative sizes of the changes in
goodness of fit that result from changes in specification. We
2may see that the poorest-fitting R-set has an r of about 0.83,
n
and the best an r^ just above 0.90. The worst fit is given by 
the extreme hypothesis that all the R's are zero; that is, that 
the proper measure is simply the ratio of profits to the capital 
stock (as proxied by average investment flows). Softening this 
extreme case by allowing fringe firms to earn some return on 
either their inventories (row 1) or their management of a work­
force (column 1) results in relatively substantial improvements 
in explanatory power.
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TABLE III.l GOODNESS OF FIT (r‘) OF PREDICTED VERSUS ACTUAL 
PROFITS: COARSE GRID OF R-PARAMETERS
\  RK, RI 
R L \ 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50
0.00 0.8307 0.8750 0.8786 0.8750 0.8700 0.86
0.10 0.8630 0.8987 0.8999 0.8950 0.8889 0.88
0.20 0.8665 0.8982 0.9027 0.9004 0.8961 0.89
0.30 0.8594 0.8912 0.8990 0.8996 0.8974 0.89
0.40 0.8511 0.8826 0.8930 0.8961 0.8959 0.89
NOTES: Predicted values of profits are from the least squares regression of the AVSURP 
specification with independent variables as in regression (1), Table 3, and with 
NRET calculated using the RK, R I, RL values given above. The numbers are the 
squares of the simple correlation coefficient between predicted and actual profits.
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TABLE III.! GOODNESS OF FIT (r‘) OF PREDICTED VERSUS ACTUAL 
PROFITS: FINER GRID OF R-PARAMETERS
\  RK, RI 
RI. \ 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
0.10 0.8987 0.9007 0.8999 0.8978 0.8950
0.15 0.8999 0.9026 0.9026 0.9011 0.8989
0.20 0.8982 0.9019 0.9027 0.9020 0.9004
0.25 0.8951 0.8996 0.9013 0.9014 0.9005
0.30 0.8912 0.8965 0.8990 0.8999 0.8996
NOTES: As for Table 1.
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These results have two encouraging implications for 
the theoretical and empirical methodology of the thesis. First, 
they support the argument that the proper profitability ratio 
measures actual profits against 'normal' rates of return to all 
the resources that firms and their owners commit to the 
production process, not just to capital or just to variable inputs.
Second, they justify the decision made to not devote
resources to devising a full nonlinear least squares algorithm
2to estimate equation (III.13) -- the flatness of the r surface 
when the R's are varied, so long as all are taken to be non-zero, 
suggests that any attempts at further nrecision would be snurious.
Nevertheless, it seemed just worthwhile to fine down 
the grid somewhat around the anparentlv best-fitting choice, 
which assigned a value of 0.20 to all the R's. The results of 
so doing appear in Table III.2. The slight supremacy of the 
(0.20, 0.20, 0.20) set remains when the grid is fined down by 
a factor of two.
Therefore, the Surplus variable taken as dependent 
in all the following tests of different structural specifications
is calculated using these values of normal, or fringe, rates of
. 15returns.
An independent check of the reasonableness of these 
parameters, and of our whole hypothesis that Surplus, as defined 
here, is the proper dependent profitability variable, can be made
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by looking at the actual values so calculated. We would expect 
the variable to be generally greater than one, with this number 
being the lower limit to be observed, normally, only in industries 
made up entirely of competitive fringe firms —  industries with 
no market power firms at all. Indeed, it can be seen (Appendix C) 
that of the fifty-one industries in the sample, only two -- 
Industrial Engines, and Cotton, etc., Spinning and Weaving show 
surplus values (slightly) less than one. So few such observations 
could easily be accounted for by data errors, or by an industry 
experiencing unusually depressed trading conditions in the census 
years.
The results of limited experimentation wiLh the 
specification of market power variables are shown in Table III.3. 
In this, and Table III.4, the numbers shown are the coefficients 
estimated by ordinary least squares regressions, with t-ratios in 
parentheses. The means of the variables are also given, and 
reveal that some scaling was done, to roughly eliminate 
disparities in the number of significant digits to be tabulated.
The first specification (regression 1) is the one used 
in the R-parameter search. It includes eight explanatory 
variables, of which all but BUYP achieve statistical significance 
at conventionally accepted levels. As hypothesized, the average 
size of plant in an industry has a positive relationship with 
profitability, as does the other seller power variable, the 
proportion advertising expenditures are of total revenues.
TAbLL I I I . 3 P r o f i t a b i l i t y  R e g r e s s i o n s ;  A v e r a g e d  D ata
DependentVariable SCR 5 N0/EST (N0/E3T)2 A0VR ï DG2 BCRINT (BCRINT)2 BUYC Bl'VP
Variable Means 61.37 3.43 48.1 1.27 0.187 20.28 6.48 34.60 5.82
1. AVSURP 0.C227 0.192 0.0413 -0.0426 0.0145 -0.0090(3.2) (6.9) (5.0) (-2.5) (11.0) (-1.4)
2. AVSURP1 0.191 0.0411 -0.0412 0.0149 -0.0081(6.8) (4.8) (-2.4) (11.2) (-1.2)
3. AVSURP 0.00389 0.199 0.0415 -0.0487 0.0124 -0.0134(1.8) (6.7) (4.5) (-2.7) (7.0) (-1.9)
4. AVSURP -0.0001 0.0229 0.192 0.0414 -0.0426 0.0146 -0.0089(-0.0) (2.5) (6.8) (4.7) (-2.5) (7.8) (-1.3)
5. AVSURP 0.0216 0.185 0.360 0.0412 -0.0461 0.0142 -0.0113(3.1) (6.6) (1.3) (5.0) (-2.7) (10.7) (-1.7)
6. AVGMARG -0.00795 0.000287 0.0119 0.132 0.00561 -0.00728 0.00142 0.00063(-2.1) (2.7) (2.4) (2.7) (4.0) (-2.5) (5.9) (0.5)
7. AVGHARG -0.00690 0.000219 0.0119 0.138 0.00112 -0.00518 -0.00086 00.00080(-1.9) (2.1) (3.0) (2.6) (0.5) (-1.8) (-0.9) (-0.6)
8. AVGMARG -0.000813 0.00370 0.0155 0.00662 -0.00694 0.00169 0.00134(-1.7) (2.3) (3.0) (4.1) (-2.2) (5.5) . (1.1)
9. AVSURP 0.0205 0.192 0.0332 -0.0384 0.0106 -0.0112(2.7) (6.9) (2.3) (-2.1) (1.8) (-1.5)
10. AVXSURP 0.0174 0.274 0.0539 -0.0514 0.0200 0.0052(1.5) (6.1) (4.0) (-1.9) (9.3) (0.5)
11. AVSURP2 0.0211 0.176 0.610 0.0430 -0.0525 0.0138 -0.0113(3.1) (6.3) (2.3) ( 5.4) (-3. 2) (11-1) (-1.7)
12. AVSURP3 0.0167 0.179 0.517 0.0400 -0.0441 0.0136 -0.0058(2.7) (7.1) (2.1) (5.6) (-3.0) (12.2) (-0.9)
Regression with GO/ENT and GO/EST had R2,s of 0.641 and 0.624.
Sane as equation (5) except for agricultural machinery buyers have been reallocated from BUYK to BUYC 








0.0114(2.8) NO/ENT (mean = 7.05)
1.607 0.671 0.618 0.903
0.0119 0.006 0.662 0.607(2.6) (2.9) (3.0)
0.0069(1.9) 0.0095(2.1) 0.621 0.559
0.0085(2.9) -0.0115(2.6) 0.671 0.609
0.0059(1.5) 0.0123(3.0) 0.684 0.624 0.905
0.00100(1.5) 0.0Û245(3.5) Constant (mean = 1.0)
0.197 0. 372 0.234
-0.00109 -0.00021 0.228 0.445 0.307 0.863(-1.u) (-0.2) (2.3)
0.00201 0.00237 0.240 0.095(3.2) (3.0) Constant0.00991 0.00674 0.407 0.675 0.613(0.8) (0.9) (0.7)
0.0178 0.0164 2.333 0.544 0.47013.3) (2.5)
0.009 0.0132 0.699 0.641(0.2) (3.3)
0.0013 0.0135 1.606 0.733 0.679
l r>4
Buyer power in intermediate goods markets has a strongly, though 
diminishing, positive effect on Surplus, supporting the 'piggy­
back' postulate.
The BUY proportions should be considered relative to 
each other -- it is not the sign of the coefficients, but the 
distance between them that matters. Thus, a shift of one 
percentage point in output from public authority buyers to 
consumers would apparently be associated with an increase in 
surplus of about 0.024. Consumer markets appear to be the most 
profitable to sell in, followed by foreign buyers, capital 
purchasers, and public authorities. The relative position of 
the last group may be surprising to some.
There results are quite robust, in the sense that when 
one variable is tinkered with, or a new one added, the coefficients 
on the rest of the specification do not change much.
Regression 2 differs from 1 in including output per 
enterprise (firm) rather than per plant as the main seller power 
variable. The new variable does not do so well as NO/EST; nor 
did Gross Output per establishment or per plant (footnote 1).
These less successful variables are more appropriate to models 
based on market price-setting structure-performance links, which 
I criticized as probably unrealistic in Part I, than to the 
competitive fringe-constrained hypothesis that I have Dut forward 
in Part II, under which size of plants is a quite acceptable 
market power proxy.
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Regressions 3 and 4 show what happens when seller 
concentration is introduced; first by itself, then in 
competition with NO/EST. Alone (regression 3) seller 
concentration barely achieves significance, and this is wiped 
out completely when the two variables appear together, suggesting 
that SCR's significance by itself is just because it then acts as 
a proxy for size of plant (the simple correlation coefficient, 
between SCR and NO/ECT is 0.525). That is, these results give 
no support to the oligopoly theorists' main prediction that 
market concentration is the appropriate seller power structural 
variable.
Three variations on the specification of seller power 
were tried. Neither the square of the advertising ratio nor the 
proportion imports were (in 1963) of total domestic sales showed 
any significance at all, and the regressions are not listed here. 
The insignificance of import penetration is consistent with the 
results of other UK studies, as will be seen in the next chapter, 
and is consistent with much of importing being controlled by the 
same firms (themselves foreign owned, in many cases) who produce 
within the UK.
The third variable experimented with was the current 
price growth in sales between census periods (regression 5) . Vie 
have already noted a source of possible spurious correlation 
between this variable and profitability, in that, in a single 
period analysis both will include the same measurement errors; 
this, however, may not be a problem in the present study, in 
which both variables are averaged over four or five censuses.
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Therefore, the moderate contribution that sales growth
makes to the explanatory power of our structure-performance
2hypothesis (it slightly increases the corrected R from that 
of regression 1) is accepted as valid, and regression 5 is 
settled on as the final specification of the thesis; subject 
only to small changes in coverage and variable measurement to 
be discussed below. Adding a quadratic term did not 
improve explanatory power at all.
The prediction deduced above that a constant term 
should not be needed, since its role is usurped by the BUY 
ratios, is supported by the results of regression 9, in which 
the inclusion of an intercept adds nothing to explanatory D o w e r ,  
and disturbs the BUY coefficients.
Next, the Surplus variable was compared to the 
conventional Gross Margin measure of profitability, the best­
fitting specifications for which are shown here in regressions 
6 and 7 (the latter with a constant term). It may be noted a) 
that the standard errors of coefficients in the GMARG regressions 
are usually not as good as those found with SURP dependent, and 
b) that Gross Margin specifications do not predict variations in 
profits as well as those with Surplus. The hypothesis that it 
is the return-s to all productive factors that is the proper 
measure of profitability to be explained by market power factors 
is given empirical support.
157
Regression 10 introduces a variation, 'XSURP’, on 
the profitability measure. XSURP is defined as the ratio of 
profits plus salaries paid to a measure of net returns which 
excludes salaries from the wage bill on which the normal markup 
is calculated. This regression was run to test the 'managerial 
discretion' hypothesis (cf. Williamson, 1963) that, in large 
manager-controlled firms, the managers are able to divert some 
of the surplus into their own pockets, so that it is not declared 
as profits, and that will show un as a larger and/or better paid 
managerial class.
neither numerator nor denominator are the same as for 
the standard surplus measure, so that there is no way of 
comparing simply goodnesses of fit between the two, but as all 
but one of the estimated t-ratios are smaller in regression 10 
than in the comparable Surplus regression (1), it does not seem 
possible to assign any support from these results to the 
managerial discretion hypothesis. Of course, this may just be 
due to data inadequacies —  in the Census, employees are 
divided into wage and salary earners, but the latter group 
includes many secretaries, clerks, and low- and middle-level 
managers who may not be in positions of sufficient power to 
expropriate surplus on their own account.
Finally, in Table III.3 I relax somewhat the rule 
that the only exclusions permitted from the sample should be 
those imposed by data unavailability. Examining the residuals
158
from regression 5, I found that ten industries had errors 
(ratio of residual to actual Surolus) greater than 20 per 
cent. These industries were: Grain Milling, Sugar, Mineral 
Oil Refining, Paint, Iron and Steel, Agricultural Machinery, 
Industrial Engines, Radio and Telecommunications, Cotton, etc., 
Spinning and Weaving, and Paper Products. Without searching 
too hard, it seemed that there were plausible grounds for 
treating at least four of these outliers as special cases.
First, the Agricultural Machinery industry supplies 
fixed capital t6 the agricultural sector; consequently, the 
bulk of its domestic sales are classified in the Input-Output 
tables to Capital Formation, and show as BUYIC in my data. 
However, most agricultural machinery is still purchased by 
individual farmers, whose buyer market power may be less than 
that of the industrial capital purchasers who carry out the 
bulk of private fixed capital formation. Indeed, the power 
of individual farmers may be closer, on average, to that of 
private consumers than to industrial firms. Therefore I 
experimented with transferring the whole of the PBUY ratio 
for this industry to BUYC.
The result (regression 11) is a noticeable 
2improvement in R over regression 5, with little change in 
coefficients except that of BUYK, which is sharply lowered.
If the cx post rationalization is convincing, this change in
the data should be therefore accepted permanently.
1 !)9
The final regression, number 12, modifies the sample 
further by dropping three industries —  Sugar, Mineral Oil 
Refining, and Iron and Steel —  which are known to have had 
unusually disruptive dealings with the Public sector over the 
period; Sugar with a subsidy payment system, Refining with 
heavy indirect taxes, and Iron and Steel through nationalization
These deletions produce a further appreciable 
improvement in goodness of fit.^
We should note that the positive effect of buyer 
power does not imply that it is necessarily more profitable to 
sell to other firms than to final consumers. The BCRINT 
coefficients estimate the effect of a ceteris paribus change in 
this variable. Since the other variables held constant include 
all the BUY percentages, and therefore the proportion sold as 
intermediate goods as well (since this is just the residual 
from subtracting all the BUYS from 100), such a change can 
only come about through a change in the seller concentration 
ratios of the intermediate buyers, and this, through the 
'piggyback' effect, is positively related to profits.
Since BCRINT appears quadratically, and is, in general 
the weighted sum of a number of SCRs, there is no unique number 
than can be assigned to the effect of increasing BCRINT through 
the proportion sold to intermediate buyers, holding constant 
their SCRs. However, we can carry out an illustrative 
calculation. Suppose that an industry sells one-third of its
1 6 0
output to just one intermediate buying industry, of which the 
four-firm concentration ratio in its selling market is 60 per 
cent —  about average for our sample. Then BCRINT equals 
20 - about its average value in the sample -- and its squared 
value, divided by 100, is 4. The partial effect on profitability 
of increasing the proportion sold to the intermediate buyer by 
10 per cent is about
0.0400 * 2 - 0.0441 X 0.84 = 0.0430
2using the BCRINT and (BCRINT) coefficients of regression 12 in 
Table III.3
The net effect depends on where the increase in 
intermediate sales is taken from. Suppose that it is the 
proportion of sales to final consumers that falls by 3.3 percentage 
points, to accommodate the increase by this amount in the proportior 
sold as intermediate goods. The partial effect on profits of this 
equals
- 0.0136 X 3.3 = - 0.0449, 
so that the net effect on profitability —
0.0430 - 0.0449 = - 0.0019
- is small and negative. Similarly, one could calculate that 
the difference in Surplus between selling all one's output as 
intermediate goods to an industry with an SCR4 of 60, and 
selling it all to final consumers, is about
(2.400 - 1.584) + 1.360 = 0.544
161
greater for the consumer goods industry —  about one-third of 
the mean value of Surplus in the sample.
In comparison with previous work on structure- 
performance relationships within UK manufacturing, the model 
tested above seems to have achieved significantly better 
empirical results, on both criteria of individual coefficient 
significance and overall goodness of fit. Of course, this is 
as it should be -- there would be no point in retracing the 
ground covered by earlier researchers if their results could 
not be built on to achieve improvements in our understanding 
of the empirical regularities observable in the structure- 
performance relation.
The improvements can be attributed to three types 
of innovation. First, the theoretical framework advanced in 
this thesis lead to a more appropriate definition -- 
'Surplus' —  of the profitability variable to be explained.
Second, the framework also took us away from the 
orthodox concern with market concentration towards a variable, 
average size of plant, which, although crude, performs better 
empirically; and towards a concern to articulate fully buyer 
market power factors.
Third, the use here of data averaged over five census 
years may have eliminated much of the statistical 'noise', due 
to random and cyclical factors affecting the profitability of
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particular industries in particular years, that may be presumed 
to afflict the previous studies which used information from 
only one census year, usually 1963 or 1968.
The latter point is demonstrated in Table III.4, in 
which regressions 3 through 7 show the results of estimating 
the basic specification, shown in Table III as regression 1, 
separately for each for the five census years. Significance 
levels of all coefficients, most drastically for NO/EST, are 
reduced sharply from those achieved by the same observations 
when averaged, or when, as in regressions 1 and 2, the data 
for each year are stacked to give series of 255 (= 51x5) 
observations on each variable. As might be expected, the 
stacking process, since although it greatly increases the 
number of degrees of freedom of the regressions, also retains 
random and cyclical 'noise', gives lower overall explanatory 
power and a tendency to lower t-ratios than can be achieved 
by averaging the data.
An interesting implication that can be drawn both 
from the census-year dummies of regression 1 and from the 
intercepts of regressions 3 to 7, is that there seems, since 
1958, to have been an autonomous upward drift in the surplus 
that an industry extracts from a given set of market power 
factors. This result, which apparently conflicts with the 
claims, by Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972) and others, that the rate
16
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TABLE II 1.4 Profitability Regressions ; Stacked Data
Oe pendent Variable EstimatedPeriod NO/EST (NO/EST)2 ADVR BCRINT
Variable means 0.356 0.665 1.270 20.28
1 . SURP all five years 0.303(2.2) -0.058(-2.2) 0.198(8.5) 0.0455(6.3)
2 . MARG all five years 0.00976(0.6) -0.00346(-1.2) 0.0163(6.1) 0.00556(6.8)
3. SURP 1954 0.164(0.9) 0.177(5.9) 0.0341(3.8)
4. SURP 19S8 0.258(1.3) 0.183(6.0) 0.0226(2.3)
5. SURP 1963 0.0673(0.8) 0.237(7.2) 0.0445(4.5)
6. SURP 1968 0.0414(0.3) 0.153(1.6) 0.0822(2.9)
7. SURP 1973 -0.0383(-0.4) 0.235(4.4) 0.0621(3.9)
(BCRINT)2 BUYC BUYP BUYK BUYE OUI 5B
6.48 34.60 5.82 8.76 17.21 0.2
-0.0542(-3.8) 0.0120(8.6) -0.0134(-2.4) 0.0063(2.2) 0.0094(2.6) -0.125(-1.1)
-0.00715(-4.4) 0.000981(6.1) 0.000339(0.5) 0.00140(4.3) 0.00170(4.1) 0.00215(0.2)
-0.0303(-1.7) 0.0120(7.9) -0.0004(-0.6) 0.00709(2.0) 0.0130(2.7)
-0.0091(-0.5) 0.0129(7.8) -0.0084(-1.1) 0.0121(3.1) 0.0059(1.2)
-0.0497(-2.5) 0.0127(7.7) -0.0037(-0.5) 0.0083(2.1) 0.0111(2.2)
-0.1202(-2.1) 0.0152(3.2) -0.0241(-1.1) 0.0058(0.5) 0.0114(O.R)
-0.0680(-2.1) 0.0189(6.9) -0.0222(-1.8) 0.0072(1.1) 0.0141(1.7)
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DUM 63 DUM 68 DUM 73
Mean of Dependent Variable R2 R2 r2
0.2 0.2 0.2
0.1460.3) 0.272(2.4) 0.476(4.3) 1.607 0.388 0.358 0.880







of profit in the UK has been declining recently, might be worth 
further investigation. The explanation for the decrease "^ ay lie in 
a tendency for industries to invest less over time, if this 
tendency a) exists and b) has not (yet) been reflected in a 
decline in productivity, due perhaps to the long average life 
of capital equipment, so that industry is still earning 
profits on plant installed decades ago. This would reduce 
normal returns, as measured here, without correspondingly 
cutting back the numerator, profits, of the surplus variable.
Finally, we examine the durability of the relation­
ship between structure and performance. The results reported 
so far give quite solid support to the hypothesis that, in 
any time, there is a correlation between market power and 
profitability. However, the regression equations estimated 
explain by no means all of the variation in Surplus. The 
observed residuals could be due to measurement error, to 
crudities in specification, and to omission of significant 
market power variables.
As well, they could reflect a tendency in the market 
system for the profits earned by market power to be whittled 
away over time. If a given set of market structure parameters 
become less profitable the longer they are observed, my 
regression specification, which is not time dependent, will be
in error.
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That monopoly profits are transitory in this sense 
follows from both orthodox theoretical approaches to structure- 
performance modelling. In the oligopoly theories, emphasis is 
placed on the fragility of the collusive agreements that are 
supposed to be the source of above-normal profits. In the 
entry-threat models, it is just a question of time before 
'excess' profits are competed away by new competitors.
In contrast, the theory proposed in this thesis 
has profitability determined by durable market power property 
rights, which are, quite literally, 'owned' by firms. Therefore, 
it is important to try and examine directly the dynamics of the 
market power-profitability relationship.
There are surprisingly few, given its importance, 
precedents for such an investigation. Sullivan (1977) has 
shown, for the US, evidence that the returns to market power —  
i.e., the ability to earn revenues greater than the opportunity 
cost of the factors committed —  are fully capitalized into the 
stock market valuation of firms, but this just implies that it 
is the originators —  entrepreneurs, innovators, clever 
businessmen —  of firms' market power who capture the rewards 
therefrom, rather than the essentially passive participants in 
the market for shares of existing enterprises. It does not 
as Sullivan emphasizes, imply that the capital market i^  
'efficient' in the sense that it acts to break down excesses
of price over costs:
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"The data in this study suggest that capital is 
being allocated efficiently in the sense that 
investors receive expected returns sufficient 
to compensate for risk ... Nothing in the 
capital market forces the powerful firm to 
reduce its output price and increase the volume 
of its output" (p. Ill).
Another study, by Orr (1974), of Canadian manufacturing 
industries, attempts to explain average annual increases in the 
number of corporations operating in each industry over the period 
1964-67. Only variables measuring the scale of each industry 
are significant; in particular, past profit rates have no 
discernible effect. In any case, Orr's dependent variable tells 
nothing about what happens to profits after entry takes place.
One recent study, by Mueller (1977), of data on 472 US 
firms, reports measures of the proportion of firms remaining in 
each of eight profitability groups after twenty four years (from 
1949 to 1972) . The proportion keeping their place in the 
highest profitability group is 0.34, which is significantly 
higher than the proportion to be expected if all monopoly 
profits tended to be dissipated over the period so that the 
highest-profit firms were evenly redistributed over the eight 
groups by 1972.
However, it is not clear whether Mueller's bottle, so 
to speak, is 'half-empty' or 'half-full'. A commentator with 
laissez-faire tendencies might reasonably claim that the figure 
of 66 per cent of the highest-profit group losing their 
position indicates that market discipline has functioned rather
168
well. To settle the matter, we need a model which properly 
isolates the effects on levels and changes in profitability 
of market structure from cyclical and other sources of 
year-to-year variation.
One reason why more empirical attention has not been 
paid to this most important matter is probably the tendency of 
researchers to use just one, or at most two, census years of 
observations to test their hypotheses. The more extensive 
sample assembled here, however, does lend itself to direct 
testing of the durability of market power.
This is done by comparing average 1968-73 Surplus 
with the average for 1958-63. We do not use the 1954 data 
lest the difference in the definition of the output variables 
for this census is a dangerous source of inaccuracy to inter­
temporal comparisons. The result of Table III. 4 that 1954 is 
apparently out of line with the upward trend in Surplus does 
suggest that, despite my attempt to correct for it (see 
Appendix C), redefinition does affect systematically the data 
with which surplus is measured.
Even without the earliest observations, the distance 
between the midpoints of the two pairs of census observations 
is ten years, and a decade should be long enough for the 
effects of entry on competition to show themselves, if they do
exist.
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Averaging of pairs of census observations is done 
following our experience earlier in the chapter that averaging 
does tend to eliminate a significant amount of cyclical and 
other sources of 'noise' which tend to obscure the structure- 
performance relation.
In Table III.5 are shown first regressions of the 
Surplus-Structure specification for each of the two periods. 
These are given just as a check that the hypothesis appears 
valid for these sub-periods of our total sample. There are 
no major upsets —  muiticollinearity between NO/EST and its 
square does prevent either from showing significance in the 
earlier period (NO/EST by itself was comfortably significant), 
but the quadratic specification is retained to maintain exact 
comparability with the 1968-73 specification.
Next, we report an attempt to identify any process 
of erosion of monopoly profits over time. Believers in this 
process should predict that a given set of structure parameters 
would be associated with lower profits in the latter period 
the higher profits had been earlier, since higher profitability 
in the past would have encouraged entry of new competitors. We 
test this by adding to the standard 1968-73 Surplus regression 
specification a variable measured for each industry as the 
excess of 1958-63 profits over average normal returns in those 
years, with an expectation, if the competitive discipline is 
active, of a negative sign.
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TABLE I I I . 5 D u r a b i l i t y  o f  Monopoly P r o f i t s
bependentVariable NU/EST (NO/, EST)Z ADVR BCR1NT (BCRINT)2 B1IYC BUYP BUYK RllYE SIJRP-NPET,58-63
SUPP- 5URP*, 58-63 P2 P2
1. SURP 58-63 -0.160 0.144 0.0176 0.0329 -0.0271 0.0142 -0.0009 0.0072 0.0107 0.710 0.650(-0.6) (1.4) (7.3) (4.4) (-1.8) (11.7) (-0.1) (2.4) (2.9)
2. SURP 68-73 0.275 -0.0215 0.0215 0.0517 -0.0576 0.0144 -0.0017 0.0032 0.0129 0.627 0.551(1.7) (-1.2) (5.6) (4.9) (-2.7) (8.2) (-0.2) (.08) (2.5)
3. SURP 68-73 0.322 -0.0309 0.0053 0.0457 -0.0519 0.0110 0.0024 0.0031 0.0130 0.785 0.733 0.670(2.2) (-1.9) (1.0) (5.0) (-2.8) (6.3) (0.3) (0.9) (2.9) (3.9)
4. SURP 68-73 0.295 -0.0237 0.0210 0.0519 -0.0581 0.0144 -0.0014 0.0031 0.0129 0.886 0.775 0.72?(2.3) (-1.6) (6.9) (6.3) (-3.4) (10.4) (-0.2) (0.9) (3.2) (5.0)
NOTES 1) For SURP 58-63 regression, NO/EST is 1958-63 average, ADVR is 1963; for SURP 68-73 reoressions, these variables are for 1968-73 and 1968,respectively.
2) Coverage same as for regression 12, Table III.3
I
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The result is shown as regression 3 in Table III.5.
The added variable in fact is positive, and has a comfortably 
significant coefficient, which gives no support at all to 
the competitive discipline hypothesis.
This sign must itself be explained. I expect that 
it is due to the omitted structural variables, measurement 
error, or whatever, that were the source of the unexplained 
residuals in the 1958-63 regression, persisting over time, to 
help generate the residuals over the latter period. A direct 
test of this is made by adding the first period's residuals to 
the 1968-73 regression, as in regression 4 in the table. This 
variable is even more significant than the excess of Surplus 
over normal returns, suggesting that the latter was just acting 
as a proxy for the residuals, with which it is correlated.
Of course, it could be true that the gross residual 
carry-over effect is greater than the coefficient in regression 4 
would imply, with the difference made up by a competitive 
discipline process. However, the coefficient is not significantly 
different from one, which value it would take if carryover were 
complete.
Even if the coefficient is indeed 0.886, as estimated, 
and if all the difference between this figure and one is due to 
the competitive process, the numbers imply that only about 8 per 
cent of an excess of Surplus is eliminated in a decade, which 
suggests that the date when even half of the profits are competed
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away is very much in Keynes' long run. Even then, the evidence 
of these regressions is that the rate of profitability being 
approached is the rate, including market-power profits, which 
is suggested by the Surplus-Market Power hypothesis, not the 
'normal' rate of return earned by fringe firms.
The hypothesis that the gains from market power are 
durable seems to be strongly supported by these results.
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III.3 A Survey of Previous Empirical Work on UI<
Structure Profitability Relations
In this chapter, we look at the seven previous 
studies of the structure-profitability relationship across 
UK manufacturing industries that use census of production 
data, and one (Cowling and Kelly, 1975) using data on 
individual firms in the UK food processing and distribution 
sector.
With the exception of the V7arwick work, these studies 
exemplify all too well the casual approach towards the 
theoretical underpinnings of the specified regression models 
that seems endemic to the field of Industrial Organization. It 
is worth demonstrating this with passages from each of the five 
non-Warwick articles:
"This relationship [between market power and price- 
cost margins] may be regarded as merely reflecting 
the deeper relation between market power and rates 
of return on investment" (Shepherd, 1972, p. 47).
"The anticipated relations ... [signs of the 
partial derivatives of profitability with respect 
to concentration, entry barriers, market demand] 
require no explanation" (Phillips, 1972, p. 178).
"The hypotheses to be tested cannot be derived from 
economic theory without making many unacceptably 
restrictive assumptions ... Nevertheless, they are 
all intuitively reasonable and there is nothing in 
economic theory to suggest that they are false" 
(Holtermann, 1973, p. 121).
"Traditional theory suggests that monopolies and 
oligopolies tend to have higher profits and prices 
than competitive industries, ceteris paribus"
(Hart and Morgan, 1977, p. 177).
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Such vague and passing acknowledgement to 'theory' con trasts 
with the procedure in most other areas of empirical economic 
research -- for example, on consumption functions, investment 
functions, the demand for money -- in which models are 
specified a priori in a reasonably tight fashion by explicit 
theoretical reasoning.
The industrial organization practice would be 
defensible if the existence of a well formulated and 
uncontroversial theoretical framework made restatement in 
every empirical study superfluous. This, of course, is not 
the case. In Part I of this thesis, I did uncover two 
distinct, and quite sophisticated strands of theoretical 
modelling of the determinants of differences in profitability, 
but argued a) that each class of models suffers from immanent 
inadequacies, and b) the two purport to explain the same 
phenomenon and so should be at least mutually consistent, but 
in fact are not so.
(a) Five Orthodox Structure-Performance Regression Analyses
Looking at the results of the eight studies 
summarized in Table III.61/ we may find revealed the costs 
associated with undertaking empirical econometric work without 
a sound theoretical base. We shall leave aside for the moment 
the three 'Warwick' studies associated with Cowling, Kelly, and 
Waterson, and consider the five articles from which passages 
were quoted above. All of the latter group have in common that
17
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Table I I I . 6: UK STRUCTURE--PROFITABILITY STUDIES: TABULATION OF RESULTS
Shepherd Phillips Holtermann Khaliltade fi- Sh i rati Hart and Morgan Cowling and Kelly Cowling & Waters on Waterson
Coverage 3-digit 71 3-digit 113 MLH 60 MLH . industries 113 MLH 88 food 94 MLHs 51 input-(22 smallindustriesexcluded)
(availability of CRs limits coverage)
industries industries companies (changes in MLHdescriptions limits coverage /
output level industries2
Dependent gross price gross margin. gross margin. gross margin, net margin, gross rati o 1973-68 as for Cowlingvariable cost margin. 1951(on gross 1963(on 1963(on 1968(on margin (on gross margins and Waterson1958-63average output) sales) sales) net output) sales) 5 year average 1964-69
(on sales) l%8-73
Concentration SCR5, 1958- 1963 average, adjusted for imports
SCR3, 1951 SCR5, 1963 SCR5, 1963 (dropped as insignifi­cant)
SCR4, 1963 ratio 1963- 1958 employ­mentHerfindahls
ratio 1968-63employmentHerfindahls
(+1.6) (+2.2) (-1.1) (+0.3) * (cf fn 4) (+2.9) (+3.4)
Entry Barriers sales,average1958-63
average employment site of plant 1951
average employment site of largest plant




(+2) (+2.2) (-1.0) (+3-9) (-1.5) (+0.1) - -
Sales Growth X change in sales, 1958- 63 current prices
X change in gross output 1948-54
X change in sales, ms- es current prices
X change in sales, w e ­es current prices
X change in sales, 1963- 68, current prices '
m
'
(+2.0) (-1.5) (+3.6) (+1.5) (+0.9) - - -
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Shepherd Phillips Holtermann Khalilzadeh Shirazi Hart and Morgan Cowling and Kel ly Cowling l Waterson Waterson
Advertising - advertising/ sales. 1948 advertising/ sales, 1963 advertisingdummy3 advertising/ sales, 1968 advertising/ sales, average 1965-69
- -
- (+2.8) (+5.9) (+3.0) (+4.1) (+3.1) - -
Buyer Power " “ - exports/ total output 1963
* * ratio 1968-73 constructed buyer Herfindahl
“ - - (+2.1) - - - (+2.5)
Capital Intensity average 1958-63 capi tal expendi ture/ output
asset value/ gross output average 1969-70 net assets/ sales
capi tal expendi ture/ emp 1oymen t 1968
“ - “




SCR * adver- tising/sales
(+1.5)




imports/ domestic sales, 1968
(+0.2)
additional advertising variables: total adv. exp. 1965-69 (t*+2.5) and the square of this (t*-1.8)
durable good dummy
(+0.6)





R2 (R2) (0.114) 0.260 0.454 0.544 (0.462) 0.342 (0.096) (0.267)
FOOTNOTES TO TABLE 111.6
(Numbers in brackets are the t-ratios of the estimated coefficients.)
1. Excluded from the 119 industry MLH sample
a) milk, sugar (non-comparable price-cost margins)
b) industries with concentration ratios published for less 
than 80 percent of the ir principal products
c) industries with specialization index less than 80 percent
d) margarine and compound fats (an 'ou t l ie r ')
2. a) includes mining, construction
b) excludes seven industries (MLHs 211, 331, 390 , 334, 338, 342
and 349, 362) with 'out of line' specialization and exclusiveness 
ratios. When not excluded 'results remain s ign ificant in many 
cases but the explanatory power is poorer' (1975, p. 13).
3. Advertising dummy = 1 when advertising is  one percent or more of
sales, zero otherwise.
4. Concentration included quadratically. Linear and squared coefficients
had t-ratios of +3.1 and -2.8, respectively.
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they attempt to explain variations in some measure of price-cost 
margins over a sample of UK manufacturing industries, using 
Census of Production data at the Minimum List Heading level of 
aggregation. The following points may be made:
1) All studies blandly include variables for both 
concentration and entry barriers even though 
the oligopoly models underlying the concentra­
tion-profits hypothesis ignore outside firms, 
and the entry threat literature assumes away 
oligopoly problems by considering only mono­
polistic, or quasi-monopolistic (price 
leadership), conditions within the industry -- 
the implications for specifying profitability 
of integrating the two approaches have not, to 
my knowledge, been uncovered. Nor, of course, 
do I believe that resources should be devoted 
to 'generalizing' the existing theoretical 
modelling efforts; rather, I have argued for a 
different framework, which downplays oligopo­
listic co-ordination difficulties, and 
re-specifies the entry threat in terms of small 
fringe firms.
2) Another problem generated by the dichotomy in 
received theory is the choice of dependent 
variable. As we pointed out in Part I, 
oligopoly models work with the price-cost
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margin, whereas entry threat is determined by 
the return on resources. Four of the five 
studies being looked at now use the gross price- 
cost margin, and one (Hart and Morgan) the net 
margin (profits as a ratio of net output or 
value added); only one writer (Shepherd, in the 
passage quoted above) even recognizes any sort 
of difficulty with this.
3) A rather striking feature of the results is that 
concentration is not a generally significant 
variable in multivariate regressions, though 
when left to itself it does show a correlation 
with margins (Hart and Morgan). Only in 
Phillip's equation, and then marginally, does 
the seller concentration ratio have a 
statistically significant coefficient. This is 
in line with my own results of the previous 
chapter, and is consistent with concentration 
only showing significance in regressions when
it is acting as a proxy for other, omitted, 
variables.
4) A variety of entry-barrier proxies are used; 
only Khalilzadeh-Shirazi's shows any substantial 
significance. The generally poor showing 
contrasts with the results of this thesis, that
a rather crude measure (net output/establishment)
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is strongly related to profitability; the 
differences are probably due to the more 
appropriate dependent variable that I use, 
and to the beneficial (noise-reducing) 
effects of averaging data over five census 
years. Four of the five studies explain one 
year's margins, and one (Shepherd) averages 
over two.
5) All the studies include a current-price sales 
growth variable. The reservations expressed 
in Chapter III.l about the use of such a 
variable seem to be borrj out by the generally 
poor results.
6) In contrast to the dismal picture of mediocre 
significance of supposedly important factors 
seen so far, all four studies which include 
an advertising variable find it to be quite 
strongly significant. (It would be interesting 
to know just how much of the explanatory power 
in each of these structure-performance 
regression was contributed by this variable, 
which most researchers would probably expect
to be of second order importance compared with 
concentration and entry barriers).
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7) Only Khalilzadeh-Lhirazi of the five includes a 
variable (exports/total output) which, within 
our framework, could be interpreted as a buyer 
power factor. He finds moderate significance.
8) In four cases, (three successfully) a measure 
of capital intensity appears as an 'explanatory' 
variable. This requires careful interpretation. 
The rationale appears to be the realization that 
price-cost margins relate profits only to 
variable costs, and that this is not sufficient —  
fixed capital earns its return, too. This is a 
position with which, of course, I am wholly in 
agreement, but it is important to realize that 
what the capital intensity variable is doing in 
these studies is simply correcting the profit­
ability variable, so that its statistical 
significance should be netted out of the 
measured goodness of fit to get a true picture
of the explanatory power of the market 
structure-profitability hypothesis that is being 
tested. Since none of these studies do this, 
the R^'s they report are over-estimates of the 
power of their hypotheses. It is easy, but 
spurious, to 'explain' variations in a variable 
by first measuring it incorrectly, then including 
a correction factor as a regressor.
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9) Two other factors may have contributed to the
significance of the capital intensity measures. 
First, in two cases (Holtermann, Khalilzadeh- 
Shirazi) output, or sales, appears as the 
denominator of the variable. Since output is 
also the denominator in the dependent variable, 
a source of spurious significance is thereby 
introduced (which may also have exaggerated the 
t-statistics of the advertising sales coefficients) .
Second, there may be an upward simultaneity bias 
to calculated significance when current capital expenditure 
is the numerator (Holtermann, Hart, and Morgan), due to the 
accelerator relationship leading from profits to investment, 
so that an industry which earned unusually (because of 
cyclical fluctuations) high or low profits in the sample year 
would show unusually high or low capital expenditure in that 
year.
These observations may explain the contrast between 
the often quite high apparent significance in three of the 
studies with the failure of Shepherd's expenditure/output 
variable, since in the latter study the variables are averaged 
over two census years, which may be sufficient to eliminate 
both sources of spurious significance noted above.
1 8 2
10) Neither Khalilzadeh nor Hart and Morgan had 
any more success than did I in discerning a 
significant relationship between profitability 
and the share of imports in the domestic market.
11) In summary, we will look at the results as a 
whole of the five studies. We may do this 
because each attempts to explain a similar 
measure of profitability over a similar sample 
(UK manufacturing) with data taken from post-war 
Censuses of Production -- a period over which, 
according to my own results, a quite stable 
relationship between market structure and 
profitability does appear to exist. The lack of 
stability of coefficients across these studies 
rather suggests, then, that differences are the 
outcome of extensive mining of the data that has 
churned out large numbers of regression equations, 
of which the five shown are just the choicest 
examples.
Therefore, the only defensible way of drawing any 
conclusions from these studies is to treat them as drawings 
from the same population, and consider only the 'mean' of the 
results. Thus, if we find a similarly-defined explanatory 
variable achieving 'significance' in only one or two of the
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five regressions, we should conclude, if anything, that the 
variable is not a determinant of profitability.
The results of applying this procedure to the 
variables in common are:
a) market concentration is not an important 
determinant of profitability;
b) entry barriers are probably important;
c) sales growth may be important (caveat 
measurement error bias);
d) advertising is important.
These conclusions are consistent with my own findings.
12) As a whole, the results are poor. Despite the
data-mining, both t-statistics (excepting for
2advertising) and R 's are low. Further, the 
measured goodness-of-fit is biased upwards by 
a) the use of capital intensity (a correction 
factor) , b) the presence of the same variables 
on both sides of equations, and c) simultaneity, 
in two studies, from the use of current capital 
expenditure as an explanatory variable.
(b) The Warwick Studies
Wc now look, in turn, at the three market structure- 
profitability studies by Cowling and Kelly (1975), Cowling and 
Waterson (1976), and VTaterson (1975, 1976), which have recently
184
surfaced from the work being done at the Department of 
Economics and the Centre for Industrial, Economic, and Business 
Research at the University of Warwick.
Cowling and Kelly's article differs from the others 
in that it uses data on individual companies, and is restricted 
to the food industry. The results are good. The problem of 
cyclical 'noise' is dealt with by averaging data over the five 
year period 1965-69. The study is one of series focusing on 
the economics of advertising, and particular attention was paid 
to the specification of this factor, including the use of a 
concept of advertising as an investment in generating a 'stock' 
of goodwill, which is semi-durable.
Cowling and Kelly find concentration to be significant, 
while an absolute size measure (net assets of each firm) is not. 
This seems to conflict with my own findings. However, a firm-by­
firm measure of size does, I expect, vary a great deal more than 
the average industry plant size variable that I have made use of, 
due to historical factors of firms being of different ages, and 
to differences in the number of markets in which a firm 
operates —  factors which will not particularly affect 
profitability, and which will thus be 'noise' obscuring the 
market power relationship between size and profits. If so, 
then concentration (an industry measure) may be a better proxy
than total firm assets.
- 1 R 5  -
As well, two sources of differences in profitability 
between industries which play an important role in my model -- 
degree of exposure to fringe firms, and buyer market power -- 
may not surface in a study limited to explaining profits 
within the food sector, since the high cross-elasticities of 
demand linking food products will tend to equalize the threat 
from small operators, and since food is sold almost entirely 
to one group -- consumers -- through the same retail outlets.
It would be most interesting to see a structure- 
profitability study that uses a sample of individual company 
data drawn from all UK manufacturing industries.
The work of Cowling and Waterson has already been 
discussed, in Part I, as the only example of an attempt to 
specify a structure-performance model explicitly from theory. 
Their's is an oligopoly model, and their equation, it will be 
recalled, has the profit margin as the dependent variable:
tt/R = “ (1 + X) (III.14) ,
where tt/R is the ratio of (gross) profits to revenues, H is 
the Herfindahl concentration index, n the price elasticity of 
demand, and X the 'conjectural variations' parameter -- the 
response of all other firms to a unit change in one firm's
output.
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The problem with estimating (III.14) is that data are 
not available on the last two variables. Cowling and Waterson 
get around this by explaining changes in profitability, and 
assuming g and X to be constant over time, so that their 
estimating equation has just the ratio of tt/R, 1968-63, 
determined by the 1963-58 ratio of Herfindahl's (the five-year 
lag to allow for slowness in adjustment of performance to 
changes in structure, and to eliminate any problem of identifying 
causality (p. 269).
I find their assumption dangerous, albeit empirically 
necessary -- it seems quite likely that n and X too change over 
time, and that they may do so, indeed, as a result of changes 
in concentration. If so, we cannot expect the estimated 
coefficient on the Herfindahl to be an unbiased estimate of 
this variable's series ceteris paribus influence on profits.
In any case, Cowling and Waterson estimate their 
change-in-ir/R equation, and find a comfortably significant 
coefficient for the Herfindahl ratio. This is consistent 
with findings that there is a simple correlation between 
levels of concentration and profitability (Cowling and 
Waterson's analysis is essentially bivariate -- two 
additional variables are included ad hoc, but without much 
significance), but does not, of course, rule out concentration 
just being a proxy for omitted factors, in particular the 
distance from fringe firms of the market power firms in an 
industry, which dominate when all are included in a regression,
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as I find in this thesis. Cowling and Waterson do not include 
any change-in-entry-barriers variable because of data 
unavailability (p. 269) , but in later work (the joint paper 
first appeared as Warwick Economic Discussion Paper No. 44 in 
April 1974) Waterson goes onto the offensive, armed with the 
results of Spence (1974) that the entry threat is independent 
of the pricing decision, and argues (1976, p. 92) that entry 
variables should not, even if available, be included in the 
structure-performance model. This is certainly consistent 
with the oligopoly assumptions, and avoids the unresolved 
messiness of the earlier studies surveyed, which include both 
concentration and entry barrier variables in an ad hoc fashion, 
but it is also misleading, since it results in regressions being 
run which appear to give some support to the oligopoly model; 
support which seems to disappear in multivariate analysis when 
other factors are included.
Hart and Morgan have questioned the robustness of 
Cowling and Waterson's result. They find that, when 18 
'noncomparable1 industries are excluded (industries for which 
sales reported for 1963 under the 1968 SIC differed by more 
than 5 per cent from the 1958 SIC figure for the same year) 
the relationship loses its significance (p. 187, footnote 2). 
This does not seem very fair, since, as Hart and Morgan admit, 
it is precisely those industries in which drastic change has 
forced a major SIC revision which will show the changes in
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structure that Cowling and Waterson need to test their 
hypothesis. 'Noncomparability' will introduce a source of 
noise into the empirical relation, but Hart and Morgan give 
no reason, and nor can I think of any, why it should also 
introduce a bias towards making a Type 1 error.
Waterson has extended his joint work with Cowling 
to allow for the effects on profitability of buyer, or 
'bilateral', power (1975, 1976). Again, the original model 
is Cournot's, generalized by Waterson to the many-firm, many- 
market case. As I write, I do not have available Waterson's 
1976 thesis (though I have read this), so I will use as my 
reference his earlier Discussion Paper.
The Cournot bilateral oligopoly model may be called 
a 'piggyback' model (cf. Chapter II. 3) -- selling firms ride 
on the market power of their customers in the latters' selling 
markets —  monopoly profits in final goods markets are shared 
out down the production chain, according to the market power 
of the firms at each stage. Thus intermediate buyer power is 
supposed to increase seller profitability. In my own model,
I did not rule out a possibility that the stronger effect of 
buyer power would show as its use to force down the price paid 
to suppliers, but found the piggyback effect to predominate.
Waterson's assumptions imply a specific and rather 
complicated estimating equation (equation (28), p. 10) which 
includes the price elasticity of both seller and his customers.
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He gets rid of the former as in the earlier joint work, by 
taking ratios over time and assuming the elasticity to stay 
constant, but the customer elasticities are inextricably 
imbedded in the expression (HBUY) representing the effect of 
buyer power. Waterson therefore assumes these to be all equal 
as well as unchanging, and tries out three values (2.0, 1.5, 
1.0). The smallest elasticity value gives the best results, 
and is used in the results reported in Table III.6. (It would 
be interesting to know if goodness of fit continue improving 
if elasticity were further reduced into the realistic range of 
inelastic demand).
Waterson's buyer power variable has a positive sign, 
consistent with the piggyback effect and my own results. There 
are problems, though. His formula requires him to assign, 
a priori, Herfindahl numbers to consumer and nationalized 
industry customers. Consumers are given a Herfindahl of zero. 
This is a mistake. If consumers were really firms, themselves 
reselling, their lack of concentration would mean that they 
would have little market power, and so would earn low profits, 
so that their suppliers would not get much either. But, of 
course, consumers do consume the product, not resell it, and 
the price that can be squeezed out of them (and other final 
buyers) is the source of the monopoly profits that are then 
distributed back down the production chain, a lack of 
organization on the part of final buyers allows higher, not 
lower, prices to be charged by sellers.
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One might expect, given the strongly positive sign 
of the coefficient for proportion sold to consumers found in 
my own regressions, that the mistake in Waterson's formula 
would prevent his HBUY variable from showing much significance. 
That it does have a quite high t-statistic suggests that we 
look for a source of possible spurious significance. Such is 
not hard to find. The variable used is the change between 
1963 and 1968 of the constructed buyer Herfindahl, which is 
basically an index number of the proportions of output sold to 
each industry weighted by that industry's own seller Herfindahl. 
Nearly all these Herfindahls are small-for consumers zero, for 
49 of the 51 producing selling industries less than 0.1 -- 
compared with the Herfindahl assigned a priori to nationalized 
industries and, presumably, public authority buyers, of 0.9.
This suggests that a) for the bulk of industries selling a 
small and/or constant fraction of output to the public sector, 
there will be very little change in buyer Herfindahls, simply 
because index numbers tend not to change much when weights 
don't differ a lot; b) there may be a few outliers, dominating 
the rest, in industries which did happen to alter appreciably 
the proportion of sales to the public sector. These outliers 
will be responsible for the size and significance of the 
observed coefficient on HBUY, which thus contains no 
information on the importance of consumer or intermediate 
purchaser buyer power.
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These conjectures appear to be supported by Waterson's 
Table A1 (1976, p. 231), giving his data. Thirty-four of the 
fifty-one Bilateral Power Indices changed by less than 5 per 
cent, and nineteen of these by less than 1 per cent. All the 
fifteen industries which one might classify as consumer goods 
industries (say, at least 40 per cent of sales to consumers) 
had indices which changed by less than 5 per cent; twelve of 
these less than 1 per cent. A few industries -- Other mining, 
Coke Ovens, Engineers' Small Tools —  showed changes of thirty 
or forty per cent, and it is these industries which were almost 
certainly responsible for the 'significance' of the buyer power 
coefficient.
To summarize this survey of the Warwick work: the 
study by Cowling and Kelly was a success. The data were 
averaged over a five-year period to remove cyclical noise, 
particular attention was paid to the specification of the 
effects of advertising on profits, and a new data source was 
used to provide data for individual companies. These were all 
in the food industry, and there are reasons why the results 
achieved looking at this sector alone may not generalize across 
all manufacturing. A study using a broader cross-section of 
company data would be of great interest.
The studies by Cowling and Waterson and by Waterson 
represent a considerable methodological advance on the five 
papers surveyed in this first section of this chapter.
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Regression equations are developed explicitly from a tight 
theoretical model. However, in neither case (given the 
probable spuriousness of Waterson's buyer power coefficient) 
does the regression testing amount to much more than a simple 
correlation between changes in margins and changes in 
concentration, which cannot be regarded as conclusive, given 
my own and others' finding that this correlation disappears 
when other variables, consistent with other models, are added.
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IV. Extensions and Implications
IV. 1 The Dimensions of Industrial Performance 
in the Long Run; Salter Extended
Thus far, the analysis of the Thesis has been 
static —  we have looked for, and apparently found, a 
statistically stable relationship between the level of 
profitability and the level of variables measuring market 
power for the sample of fifty-one industries observed from 
1954 to 1973.
The ability of the data to establish such a 
relationship is perhaps all the more impresssive when we note 
that the stability of the structure-profits link holds 
alongside a pattern of marked changes in the distribution 
between the sample industries of output, employment, product­
ivity, and relative prices and wages. Table IV.1 shows the 
mean, standard deviation, and other statistics of the ratios, 
industry by industry, of the 1973 to the 1958 values taken by 
these variables. (We will not use 1954 as a starting year for 
the dynamic analysis because of the possibility that our 
adjustment to the different treatment in the 1954 Census of 
Merchanted Goods is not very accurate. While errors in this 
should not have mattered too much to the structure-performance 
regressions, in which the 1954 numbers were averaged with four 
other years, they could affect calculations of rates of change 
using data for just two years).
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Table IV.1
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
Ratio 1973/1958 of Mean S.D. S .D/Mean
Real Gross Output 2.02 1.02 0.51
Total Employment 1.03 0.31 0.30
Real Gross Output/Total Employment 1.92 0.56 0.29
Earnings/Employee 3.01 0.24 0.08
Earnings/Real Gross Output 1.66 0.37 0.22
Materials/Real Gross Output 1.59 0.37 0.23
(Earnings + Materials)/Real 
Gross Output 1.48 0.28 0.19
Unit Price 1.70 0.32 0.19
The table shows that, on average, all these variables 
grew between 1958 and 1973, and that there v/as a good deal of 
variation in the rates of change for individual industries.
Real output doubled, on average, over the fifteen years, and 
did so with almost no assistance from increased labour input. 
Labour productivity, thus, about doubled, too. Earnings per 
employee showed by far the biggest tendency to increase of all 
the variables in the table, and did so at the most uniform 
rate —  the ratio of dispersion (measured by the standard 
deviation of the 1973-58 ratios) to mean is much smaller than 
for any of the other variables. Unit labour and material 
costs, and their sum, unit variable costs, showed quite 
similar means and standard deviations, and their growth was
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more than matched, on average, by growth in unit prices, as 
measured here. Data and precise definitions of all variables 
are given in Appendix C.
Patterns of industrial growth are of a great deal 
of interest and importance. To study them, in this chapter,
I will, in essence, follow the analysis of Salter (1966). 
Salter's book, Productivity and Technical Change, is thought 
of as a 'classic', but, as is often the case with classics, 
the profession, having awarded the honour, seems thereby to 
feel itself absolved from the duty of actually reading the 
work. At any rate, Salter's results are not widely known, 
and his methodology of examining movements in cross-sections 
of individual industries remains 'unfashionable' (p. 2) as it 
was when he wrote in 1959 -- the great bulk of what we think 
we know about inflation, employment, and growth still comes 
from the analysis of time-series of aggregated data.
This is a pity. The results of applying Salter's 
method are striking, both in themselves, and in the conflicts 
they often reveal with the results from orthodox time-series 
models. I will not, in this Thesis, attempt to resolve all 
these conflicts, and, indeed, as an advocate of the Salterian 
approach, do not feel that the onus is on me to do so. Cross- 
sections of rates of change, with their substantial variance 
as shown in Table IV.1, forma sturdier foundation for 
statistical inference than do quarterly or annual time series 
of economic aggregates, riddled as these data are with problems
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of serial correlation, multicollinearity, measurement error, 
and fewness of observations. If so, then surely the duty 
falls on those who put up with these statistical pitfalls to 
explain away the discrepancies. If, as I expect, the 
conflicts cannot be resolved in favour of the traditional 
approach, then this should be modified. A useful synthesis 
may be found in the method of pooling of time-series and 
cross-sections of data. I have made an attempt to apply a 
pooling methodology in specifying employment functions for a 
cross-section of Canadian Food and Beverage manufacturing 
industries (1973b).
Salter correlated interindustry rates of change 
with a sample of 29 UK industries over the period 1928-50.
He was able to replicate his results for a sample of US 
industries, as was Reddaway, in an Addendum to the 1966 
edition which analysed post-war (1954-63) data. There is 
thus some overlap between Reddaway's sample and the 1958-73 
data made use of here. Our results should still be of 
interest, however, since, as well as lengthening the period 
of study by another decade, we extend the Salter method in 
the following directions:
1) Towards more complete coverage. Given data on 
the value of output, we can calculate real 
output if we know price, or vice versa.
Price series were not available to Salter, so 
he made use of the real output indices from
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the Census of Production. Availability of 
these output indices was largely responsible 
(cf. p. 104, fnl) for limiting his sample to 
29 industries covering 'approximately 30 per 
cent of the industrial Sector' (p. 188) . By 
using, instead, the wholesale price indices 
(and so calculating real output as value 
deflated by price) available for the post-war 
period, I was able to include 51 of the 57 
manufacturing industries (as disaggregated in 
the 1963 Input-Output tables) in the sample.
Of course, it would be best to have both price 
and quantity measured independently, since there 
are statistical problems, noted below, that can 
arise with the use of constructed variables.
This is not possible for a wide coverage of UK 
industries.
2) By extending the regression analysis; in 
particular by running multivariate regressions. 
Probably because of the primitive computing 
facilities available to him, Salter restricted 
himself to simple correlations and regressions 
with just one explanatory variable.
3) By asking if market structure can explain any 
of the variation in cross-sectional ratesof
change.
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4) We introduce capital as a factor of production 
in the analysis.
The results can be divided under three headings; 
those pertaining to the product market, to the labour market, 
and to productivity and growth. lie consider these in turn, 
then examine the sensitivity of the conclusions to splitting 
up the 1958-73 period into three five-year sub-periods.
1. Product Market (Pricing)
a framework for the analysis of Salter's results and of our 
own data. Suppose that price, P^, per unit of the ith
expenditure on input j in industry i, and is the quantity 
of i's output. That is,
P. = f.(C../X., C ./X., ...) (IV
1 1 11 1 4-1 1
On the basis of the results in earlier chapters, we expect f^  
to itself be a function of market structure variables as well 
as, perhaps, product demand conditions. To get something that 
can easily be estimated, we will restrict (IV.1) to be linear:
We will first establish a model of price changes as
industry's output is a function, f^, 
factor input j per unit of output.
of the cost C../X. of each ji i
Thus C .. is the totalji
(IV.2),
where the a_.^  are multiplicative markups applied to each 
input. Differentiating with respect to time, t;
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It will be assumed that the a., do not chancre over time. ThisHi-
should not be too unreasonable, given the stability found 
earlier in the parameters of the structure profitability 
relationship over the sample period. (IV.3) then simplifies 
to
dPi/dt = ali.d(Cli/X.)/dt + a2i.d(C2i/Xi)/dt
+ ... (IV.4)
To get rates of change, we divide through by P^;
(dPi/dt)/P. = (ali.d(Cli/X.)/dt)/P.
+ (a-..d(C„./X.)/dt)/P. + ... (IV.5)J. 1 1 1 1
or,
p . = a. .a. . (c, . - x .) li li li l a_ . a,,. (c_ . 2 1 2 1 2 1 V (IV.6),
where, for simplicity, we use lower case letters for rates 
of change, and where o..^  is the proportion unit costs of 
input j are of the unit price (i.e., = (C ^ ^ /X^)/P^) .
If we know the quantity, x^, of an input j, we can expand 
(IV.6) using
31 - x. = (c ..l ji - v + (x . . 31 - V (IV.7)
This is only possible for the labour input, for which we 
have a reasonable proxy in the level of employment 
(differences in hours per worker will not count for much 
compared with changes in the number employed over the long
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periods here considered). For labour, then, we can separate 
the change in unit labour costs into the change in the wage 
per employee and the change in the number of employees per 
unit of output.
Looked at within the framework of equation (IV.6), 
Salter's empirical procedure of calculating simple correlations 
or regressions between pairs of variables seems rather crude.
It risks (and, indeed, suffers from-cf. pp. 119-120) omitted 
variable bias of the coefficient of the included variable, 
assumes that the coefficient of this variable is the same 
across industries, and introduces a source of error by leaving 
out the weighting parameter a. Despite all this, Salter's 
correlation analysis (p. 110) yields some striking results 
which we can replicate for the 1958-73 sample, and which will 
turn out to be robust when more sophisticated specifications 
are tested. The full set of correlations for 1958-73 rates 
of change across the 51 industries is shown in Table IV.2
The variables correlated in Table IV.2 are the 
rates of change of real output (x), employment (e), real 
output per employee (x-e), wage per employee (w-e), wage per 
unit of output, or unit labour cost (w-x), unit materials 
cost (m-x), unit labour + materials cost (c -x), unit capital 
cost (k-x) , unit total (labour + materials + capital) costs 
(ct~x), and price (p). Values, definitions, and sources of
2 0 1
all variables are given in Appendix C. Significant values 
for the first order correlation coefficient, r, are - 0.275 
the 95 per cent level, and ~ 0.233 at the 90 per cent level.
Table IV.2
Correlation Coefficients between 1958-73 Rates of Change
-----?----
e x - e w - e w  - X m -  x c - X V k -  x Ct ' X P
X
i
0.751 0.876 0.065 -0.732 -0.482 -0.590 -0.503 -0.628 -0.623
e 0.276 -0.179 -0.329 -0.156 -0.236 o
a01 -0.244 -0.294
x -  e 0.221 -0.857 -0.550 -0.672 -0.538 -0.717 -0.677
w -  e 0.181 -0.161 -0.088 0.094 -0.081 -0.072
w - x 0.437 0.625 0.575 0.656 0.612
m -  x 0.950 0.390 0.932 0.903
c - XV 0.477 0.977 0.938




In this section we are interested in the correlations 
between price changes, p, and the other variables. We can note 
two observations:
1. There is no correlation between price and wage 
rate changes;
2. There is a strong correlation between price 
changes and changes in each of the unit cost
variables
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These findings are similar to Salter's . The lack 
of correlation between prices and wages might be taken to 
contradict the pervasive notion of a 'wage-price spiral' 
whereby changes in an industry's wage rates cause it to put 
up its prices. However, it could be true that, although 
prices are increased when wages increase, the rate of wage 
increase is so similar across industries that, statistically, 
this variable has no power to explain differences in price 
performance. In support of this, recall that in Table IV.1 
the dispersion of w is less than that of all the other 
variables, including prices. Still, there is some dispersion 
in rates of wage rate changes, and it may therefore be 
surprising, if one did believe in wage-markup pricing at the 
industry level, to find absolutely no evidence of positive 
correlation. The evidence certainly must be interpreted as 
giving no support to the hypothesis that industry-level labour 
market conditions have anything to do with price inflation.
In particular, the 'structuralist' interpretation of the 
Phillip's curve, originating with Lipsey (1960), and featured 
since in much of the time-series analysis of inflation, which 
postulates that, in the presence of downward money wage 
rigidity, uneven dispersion of the demand for labour leads to 
increases in wages and then in prices, is inconsistent with 
the independence of industry wage and price variations. We 
will have more to say on this in the section on the Labour
18
Market.
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The correlations between price changes and unit 
costs reveal the expected association between factor product­
ivity and product price. Physical labour productivity does 
about as well as unit labour costs, which is not surprising, 
since the difference between them (cf. equation IV.7) is just 
the wage rate, which we have found to be uncorrelated with 
prices. Unit materials costs and prices are even more 
strongly related statistically -- we do not have the materials 
price data that would enable us to distinguish between the 
price and physical productivity components of materials costs, 
and discover whether materials prices (which surely varied 
much more industry by industry than did the wage rate) have an 
independent effect, in contrast to the price of labour. The 
two input costs added together show the closest correlation of 
all with price.
Thus, we are easily able to replicate Salter's finding 
that price changes are quite closely matched with unit cost 
changes, along with his qualification that, for labour at 
least, it is the physical productivity rather than the price 
of the input that matters. The next interesting question 
concerns the magnitude of the price-unit cost relationship.
To answer this, we run a number of regression specifications 
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The first of these regressions reaffirms the absence 
of correlation between p and (w-e). Weighting wage rate 
changes with labour share in total output, as required by 
equation IV.6, does not alter the result. Regression 3 
illustrates the correlation between price and labour 
productivity change. In regressions 4 and 5, we go beyond 
Salter's limit of one independent variable and pair changes 
in unit materials costs first with labour productivity, then 
with unit labour costs. All variables are comfortably 
statistically significant. The fit is improved further when 
each input is weighted by its share a in total value, in 
regression 6. With this specification we have estimates of 
two of the markup parameters a ^  of equation IV.6. Although 
the markup on materials is close to one, the wage markup is 
not. The difference is significant enough to cause the 
corrected goodness of fit to fall a few points when equal 
markups are imposed by regressing price change on the change 
in total variable costs (regression 7). However, these 
coefficients may be biased by the omission of the third 
factor of production -- capital. When the rate of change 
of fixed plus inventory capital multiplied by the 'normal 
returns' factor settled on in Chapter III.2 (cf. Appendix C 
for a full definition) is added to the specification, its 
coefficient, and that on variable costs, are both insignific­
antly different from one (regression 8). Again, though, the
-2 . . . .R falls slightly when equality of coefficients is imposed
(regression 9).
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The size of the coefficient on the capital variable
gives an independent check on the validity of the normal
returns concept of Part III —  the significance and closeness
to one of this coefficient are therefore encouraging, since
we would expect that if measured normal returns are indeed as
they were defined in principle -- the opportunity cost of
capital committed to production -- a change in the quantity
of capital committed, weighted by the normal rate of return,
19should be matched by a similar change in revenues earned.
In regression 10, we look for an effect of the rate 
of growth of sales revenue on price change. There seems to be 
none, which is not surprising, since (as was noted in Part III) , 
a change in sales must be due to a shift in the demand curve 
that is not matched by a shift in the supply schedule if it is 
to affect price (and thus profits), and such a disequilibrium 
situation is hardly likely to persist, in even the most sluggish 
of industries, for fifteen years. More evidence that the change 
in actual sales, over the long run considered here, is dominated 
by supply conditions, is given in the much greater variability 
shown in Table IV.1 by changes in real output compared to 
changes in price. This is further discussed below in the 
section on productivity and growth.
Next, a variable for the level of market power, 
measured by the profitability predicted for each industry by 
specification number 12 in Table IV.3, according to its market 
structure characteristics, is added and fails to show any
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significance (regression 11). Finally, in regression 12,
sales growth and market power are introduced multiplicatively.
This is theoretically tidier, since it is equivalent to making
the a.. in IV.6 functions of these variables, which makes more Di
sense than having them included in an ad hoc fashion in a linear 
regression. Despite this, sales growth and market power retain 
their statistical insianificance.
The absence of a market power effect on the rate of 
change of prices implies that none of the market power- 
profitability relationship can be attributed to a widening of 
price-cost margins in the more powerful industries relative to 
the others over the 1958-73 period. Although this result means 
that we are unable, in this long-term analysis, to throw any 
light on the inflation mechanism, it also provides a test of 
the likely stability, outside the observation period, of the 
power-profits relation —  since a positive relationship between 
the level of market power and the rate of change of price 
relative to cost cannot persist indefinitely (or else all 
profits would eventually accrue to just one firm —  the most 
powerful), we would, had we found such a relation, have had to 
interpret it as a special feature of the 1958-73 data 
generating some monopoly profits which could not be expected 
to persist outside the period, and, indeed, might even be 
compensated for by a following period of especially low returns 
to market power.
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In all the regressions of Table IV.3, the constant 
term is significant. This is worrying, since there is no 
intercept in equation IV.6. This constant may be summarizing 
the effect on price changes of variables omitted from the 
regression specifications -- possibilities are that the markup 
parameters have increased over the sample period, and that 
labour, materials and capital are not the only relevant 
productive inputs. Another plausible explanation is that the 
constant term is generated by an index number problem. Our 
price variable is a Laspeyre index number; it measures the 
change in the value of the base-period bundle of commodity 
output in each industry. Such an index is an upwardly-biased 
measure of price change so long as there is some substitutability 
possible between the components of the industry's output bundle 
of goods, since it weights too heavily those commodities whose 
price has increased the most, by ruling out substitution for 
them of relatively lower priced commodities. Salter (pp. 151-52) 
demonstrates, for productivity change indices, the magnitude of 
index number bias when rates of change are taken over a long 
period of time; in view of his figures, it may even be 
reasonable to attribute all of the 18 per cent or so upward 
drift in the price cost margin implied by the regression 
equations in Table IV.3 to this source of measurement error.
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In summary, the results of replicating and extending 
Salter's analysis of price changes to a 1958-73 sample are 
1) industry wage rates have no effect on prices, 2) physical 
labour productivity and unit materials and capital costs 
explain most of the variation in relative price changes, and 
imply constant price-cost markups, 3) there is no evidence 
that demand disequilibrium can persist over the fifteen-year 
period, 4) there is no evidence that the level of market 
power affects the rate of change of price-cost margins, 5) 
there remains a significant autonomous upward shift in the 
price-cost margin, which may be due to omitted variables, and/or 
to the index number problem.
2. The Labour Market (Employment, Pages, and Inflation)
Of of the most interesting of Salter's results is 
the absence of any significant statistical correlation between 
changes in earnings per employee and output per employee -- 
productivity. This holds for both his UK and US samples 
(pp. 110, 166, 167, footnote 2), and for Reddaway's extension 
to post-war UK data (p. 202).
For the 1958-73 sample of this Thesis, we find a 
correlation (Table IV.2) coefficient r = 0.107, which is not 
significant at the 95 per cent probability level (the critical 
value for a sample of 51 observations is r = 0.276).
Salter was 'heartened'(p. 157) by his failure to 
find a correlation for two reasons. First, it suggested that 
there is no 'tendency for productivity gains to be appropriated
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at their source by strong trade unions' so that the lucky 
workers receive a pay differential that is not matched by 
intrinsic differences in labour effort or ability (p. 157) . 
Secondly, if some of productivity gains were captured in 
higher wage rates, 'the interindustry structure of costs and 
prices would be less responsive to unequal productivity 
movements. This would seriously inhibit the structural changes 
which make such an important contribution to increases in 
aggregate productivity' (ibid.). That is, monopoly power in 
labour markets would reduce the economy's rate of growth.
Salter's remarks seem still pertinent to the 1958-73 experience.
A second correlation coefficient in Table IV.2 that 
is relevant to the labour market is between changes in earnings 
per employee and in the level of employment. The r-value is 
negative and not significant. For Salter's 1924-50 sample, 
the equivalent correlation coefficient is -0.270 (not shown 
by Salter, but calculable from his data as presented in Table 14, 
p. 107). The negative sign could be spurious, due to the 
appearance of employment in the numerator of one variable and 
the denominator of the other; the interesting point, though, is 
that there is no trace of a positive correlation -- that is, 
for relatively large increases in employment to be associated 
with relatively high rates of earnings increase. Reddaway 
(1959), looking at 1951-56 changes, found evidence of positive 
correlation between, but not within II-digit industry groups.
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These results imply (at least if industries tend to 
draw their labour force from the same 'pool' as do other 
industries within the same II-digit Order) that expanding 
industries do not need to bid up their relative wage in order 
to attract labour away from other industries. The very 
considerable amount of employment redistribution that went on 
over the 1958-73 period (cf. Table IV.1) bore no observable 
relationship to changes in the wage structure (which, as we 
have already noted, are relatively small in magnitude, on 
average).
Thus, the 'structuralist' rationalization for the 
Phillips curve is dealt another blow -- whether or not there 
is downward money-wage rigidity, the re-allocation of the 
labour force appears to be accomplished without the use of 
relative wage changes (presumably through such instruments 
as advertising and by simply accepting a larger proportion of 
the flow of job applicants that firms receive whether or not 
they notify vacancies).
This finding, and our finding in Section 1 that 
industry wage and price changes are not related, appear to 
thoroughly discredit the model -- one might almost say the 
'paradigm' given the pervasiveness of the doctrine -- that 
has sought to link aggregate demand with inflation by means 
of a detour through the labour market -- an increase in demand 
in product markets translates to an increase in the demand for 
labour, which cannot be effected without an increase in wage
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rates, which, in turn, forces firms to put up their prices.
Two of the three links in this chain of reasoning do not exist, 
according to the correlations of Table IV.2
I conjecture that the key to constructing a valid 
theory of price inflation nay be found by questioning, too, the 
first of the links in the traditional model. Increased demand 
by customers for goods may not be passed on, undiluted, into 
increased demand by firms for factor inputs, such as labour 
(that is, the desire to increase real purchases may not be 
perfectly matched by sellers' willingness to increase real 
output). Rational firms will prefer to translate growth in 
nominal demand into an increase in price, not output, since 
by so doing they will make higher profits. Their ability and 
willingness to do this will depend on their expectations of 
future market conditions, and of the reactions to the situation 
of other firms. These expectations may well depend, inter alia, 
on market structure.
Recent time series studies of US aggregates (Gordon, 
1975, Maccini, 1978) have found evidence of product market 
demand and expectations factors determining changes in prices. 
The failure of many earlier studies to find such a link may 
simply be attributable to a lack of the will to succeed -- it 
is easy enough to mis-specify a relationship, and to readily 
accept the resulting negative results, if one's heart is not in
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the job, because one does not believe the underlying hypothesis 
to be true. Possible sources of mis-specification suggested 
by Maccini are failure to model properly the lag structure 
(which may be very important in models using quarterly data) 
and the use of poor proxies for demand variables. For example, 
the well-known study by Godley and Nordhaus (1972) , of UI< 
manufacturing price changes, tests one hundred alternative 
specifications of models purporting to include 'demand' factors, 
finds almost no evidence of statistical significance, and so 
concludes that demand does not affect price. Since, however, 
none of their proxies necessarily measures demand pressure 
(cf. Appendix A of this Thesis), the absence of significance of 
these variables does not at all contradict the hypothesis they 
claim to test (rather, it gives some support to my arguments 
above that the relationship between demand and prices does not 
go through the labour market). Indeed, the failure of their 
own 'normal cost pricing' model to explain much more than a 
third of the variation in price changes (p. 869) hardly 
justifies Godley and Nordhaus' conclusion, tentative though it 
is, that the 'normal' price hypothesis is correct (p. 873).
The question of the relationship, if any, between 
market structure and price changes has been at issue since 
Means introduced the concept of 'administered prices' in the 
1930s (cf. Sherer, 1970, Chapter 17). Even the recent evidence 
does not lead to a consensus position on this. Domberger (1977),
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using quarterly data on twenty-one UK manufacturing industries, 
found that more concentrated industries were relatively quicker 
to pass on unit cost increases. On the other hand, Ripley and 
Segal (1973), who used a database of 1959-69 rates of change of 
prices and other variables for 395 US manufacturing industries, 
discovered that 'high' concentration industries had passed on 
relatively less of the change in their unit labour costs, though
there was no difference in their response to materials costs,
20compared with less concentrated industries. Given the 
difficulties, noted above in the discussion of the absence of 
a significant market power effect in the regressions of 
Table IV.3, of interpreting an equation in which the level of 
one variable has a permanent effect on the rate of change of 
another, and given the assymetry of their results (concentration 
affecting price only through labour costs), I do not think that 
Ripley and Segal's finding can be taken very seriously as other 
than a peculiar correlation holding over their particular sample 
period. Since price adjustments take place in the short run of 
years or quarters, they should be analysed using yearly or 
quarterly data. The interesting question is what determines 
the split of short run changes in nominal demand for goods and 
services into changes in real output and changes in prices.
Thus, we recommend Domberger's methodology of 
comparing the coefficients estimated for a number of industries 
by separate time-series regressions, or, better still, the 
explicit combination of time-series and cross-sectional hypotheses
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in a 'pooled' database (e.g., Hazledine, 1978a; for an application 
to employment functions).
The model here suggested, in which inflation is a 
product market phenomenon, would include two 'spin-off' equations 
to explain employment and wage changes. Levels of employment 
are determined through an employment function by real output 
(cf. Hazledine, 1978c, for employment functions for UK manufact­
uring industries at the II-digit level), and wage changes follow 
changes in actual and expected prices through cost-of-living 
adjustments in the wage-bargaining process. Thus wages and 
employment are determined by the same product market factors, 
so that we should not be surprised to find a statistical 
correlation between them, as in the many Phillips curve 
regression studies. However, this association may change when 
conditions in product markets change, so we should also not be
surprised at the notorious instability of estimated Phillips 
21curves, and, of course, even in periods of stability, we 
should not interpret the correlation as evidence for a causal 
relationship running from (un)employment to wage inflation.
3. Productivity and Growth
In the long run, what determines the physical well­
being of an economy is the efficiency with which it utilizes its 
primary factors —  labour and natural resources. Although goods 
are produced with the aid of capital and intermediate materials 
as well as labour and natural resources, capital goods and
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materials are themselves produced -- ultimately the value of 
all output can be accounted for by the present and past labour 
and natural resources embodied in it.
Therefore, it is of interest to examine and attempt to 
explain the variations in changes in labour productivity between 
industries over a long time period (we have no data that would 
allow us to also study natural resource-use productivity). Salter 
correlated differences between industry in labour productivity 
(real gross output per employee) growth and a number of other 
variables, and used the results to evaluate four possible 
explanations for these differences:
(i) Salter rejected the hypothesis that differential 
increases in labour productivity can be explained 
by differential increases in the personal 
efficiency (skill, effort, intelligence) of labour, 
on the grounds a) that the magnitude of the 
differences is too great to plausibly be attributed 
to efficiency change differences, b) that one would 
expect increases in personal efficiency to be 
rewarded by increases in earnings, so that, if the 
hypothesis were true, earnings growth and product­
ivity growth should be correlated, but in fact were 
not so in Salter's sample, and c) that 'there is no 
reason of substance' (p. 129) to expect unit 
materials costs to be affected by changes in
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personal efficiency to the extent implied by the 
high correlation between changes in material 
costs and in labour productivity.
For our 1958-73 sample, the variations in changes
in labour productivity (Table IV.1) do seem too large to be 
attributed all to changes in personal efficiency, especially
since we find no correlation between productivity and earnings
changes, which might be expected to accompany changes in
personal efficiency.
I do not find particularly convincing Salter's third
objection to the personal efficiency hypothesis. It seems guite 
plausible to me for a good deal of the productivity improvements 
that would follow an upgrading of the skill level of a workforce 
to be realized through greater efficiency in the use of material
inputs.
(ii) Salter considered the 'classical prescription' 
(p. 130) for increased labour productivity —  
capital-labour substitution. Since factor 
substitution involves the substitution of one 
expense for another we v/ould not thereby 
expect much change in total costs, and, thus, 
in price, when factor proportions alter. 
However, in both Salter's samples, and for 
the 1958-73 data, there is a highly significant 
negative correlation between changes in labour 
productivity and changes in product price. Of
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course, this does not entirely rule out 
differences in factor substitution contributing 
to differences in productivity changes, but we 
can probably agree with Salter that the results 
'give little support to the idea that increases 
in labour productivity are largely attributable 
to factor substitution' (p. 132). The corre­
lation coefficient between changes in unit 
labour and unit capital costs (Table IV.2) over 
1958-73 is actually positive -- industries with 
the best labour cost performance tended also to 
do better with capital expenses, whereas a 
negative association would be expected if savings 
in one factor were paid for by more intensive use 
of the other.
Of course, across the manufacturing sector as a whole 
there has been capital-labour substitution, in the sense that 
the capital/labour ratio has risen -- while total employment in 
manufacturing grew by only 3 per cent over the fifteen years, 
the real capital stock nearly doubled. What our correlations 
imply, however, is that differences across industries in the 
rate of capital accumulation do not explain the observed 
differences in labour productivity. This is probably because 
industries have faced roughly similar changes in relative 
factor prices -- Table IV.1 showed the relatively small
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dispersion in changes in earnings, and it seems reasonable to 
expect that changes in interest rates and other ingredients of 
the cost of capital move together across industries -- so that 
their responses in terms of factor substitution have also 
tended not to differ.
Therefore, the evidence for the 1958-73 period, which 
augments Salter's empirical analysis by including a measure of 
the change in the capital stock, appears to support his 
conclusion that:
"Speaking loosely, the increases in labour 
productivity appear to have been costless; 
they have not been achieved by bribing 
labour to greater effort, nor by saving 
labour at the expense of using more of 
other factors. This suggests that any 
satisfactory explanation must be one 
where savings in labour and labour costs 
are part of a wider process that extends 
to all factors of production. Two causes 
of increased productivity meet this 
requirement: economies of scale and
improved techniques arising out of 
increasing knowledge" (pp. 132-33).
We look next at each of these two suggested explanations.
(iii) Economies of Scale
One of the strongest correlations, in all 
the samples, is between the growth of 
productivity and of total output. For 
1958-73, the correlation is 0.826. What 
is the reason for this close association?
One possibility is that causation runs from
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output growth to productivity growth through 
the phenomenon of economies of scale -- 
increased scale of production leads, ipso facto, 
to lower costs. The many possible sources of 
scale economies are well-surveyed by Pratten 
1971, Chapters 2 and 3), and are, a priori, 
plausible enough, but it must be doubted whether 
they can bear all the burden of explaining the 
output productivity correlation. A simple 
regression of output growth on productivity 
growth gives
(x - e) = 0.455 + 0.454x, R2 = 0.676 (IV.8)
(7.12) (10.26)
(The rate of change of productivity is calculated 
directly from X/E's computed for 1958 and 1973, rather than by 
simply subtracting the rate of growth of employment from that 
of output, to reduce the risk of spurious correlation). 
Regression (IV.8) implies that a one hundred per cent increase 
(i.e., a doubling) in an industry's output has been associated 
with nearly a fifty per cent increase in the productivity of 
its labour force. This seems too high an elasticity to be 
attributed all to economies of scale. For the twenty-one of 
our industries for which Pratten computes the number, the 
average decrease in unit costs yielded by a doubling of plant 
size to 'minimum efficient scale' from half that volume of
•1
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output is about ll per cent. There are problems with this2 "
comparison -- the capital/labour ratio may have increased 
with output and so accounted for some of the productivity 
increase, and Pratten’s estimates are for the growth in
satisfactory direct test by regressing the change in total 
unit costs on the change in plant size (net output per 
establishment):
Regression (IV.9) implies that a doubling in plant size has 
been associated with a 20 per cent fall in unit costs —  a 
substantial figure, but probably not big enough to account for 
all the increase of 50 per cent in per capita output.
economies is to estimate a production function. I calculated 
the average for each industry, for the four census years 1958, 
1963, 1968, 1973, real net output per establishment, total 
employment per establishment, and the capital proxy, real gross 
fixed capital formation per establishment, and estimated a 
Cobb-Douglas specification.
individual plant, not industry, scale.z2 We can make a more
ct x 0.825 - 0.204 %ARNO/EST,(15.51) (-6.44) R2 = 0.447
(IV.9)
Another interesting test of the nature of scale
log(RNO/EST) = 1.444 + 0.5751og(EMP/EST)
(12.63) (7.26) (IV.10)




This regression is successful statistically -- t-values and 
overall goodness of fit are all high. Its most striking 
feature is that the sum of the employment and capital 
coefficients just about exactly equals one -- there is no 
suggestion of interindustry economies of scale. That is, 
industries with bigger plants, on average, do not get more 
output from a given bundle of inputs.
Of course, this finding does not rule out intra­
industry scale economies of the sort implied by regressing 
productivity growth on output growth, but strongly suggests 
that, if such relationships do exist, they are not stable 
across industries. That is, even if it is true for each of 
two industries, one with small, the other with large 
establishments, that they would lower unit costs by increasing 
the size of their plants, it is not, in general, true, 
according to (IV.10), that the industry with smaller plants 
will have higher unit costs than the other.
This has implications for the structure-performance
model estimated in Chapter III.2, wherein it was found that
plant size has a positive influence on profitability. In that
chapter it was left open whether this association was due to
plant size being a market power proxy or because of economies
of scale. We see now that the evidence does not support the
24economies of scale interpretation.
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(iv) If economies of scale are unable to account for 
all of the correlation between productivity and 
output growth, it may be that there is some 
causation running in the other direction, from 
costs to output, through the process of 
technical change. That is, inventions, 
innovations, and development lower unit costs, 
which, as we know from the analysis of pricing 
in section (1), leads to lower prices, which, in 
turn, encourages sales, over the long run.
To fit this hypothesis, we would replace (IV.8)
with
x = -0.360 + 1.504(x-e),
(-2.28) (10.26)
R‘ = 0.676 (IV.11)
the regression of output on productivity growth. Using our 
earlier result that cost changes are fully passed on in price 
changes, (IV.11) implies a long-run price elasticity of 
about 1.5, on average, which is a reasonable sort of number. 25
Salter finds a rank correlation coefficient of 0.83
between movements of labour productivity in eleven comparable
US and UK industries (1966, p. 165), which he takes to support
the hypothesis that differences in productivity change within
an economy arc due to interindustry differences in the rate of
technical advance, which 'might reasonably be expected to
2 6appear in both countries' (p. 166). However, it could also 
be true that differential rates of growth in demand could be
2 2 4
correlated across the two countries, so that economies of scale 
could be responsible for Salter's correlation.
Thus, we should probably restrict ourselves to 
Salter's earlier (Chapter 10) agnostic conclusion that both 
economies of scale and technical change may matter, and that 
their effects cannot be neatly unravelled with the data at 
hand. This is a pity, since the two hypotheses differ both in 
the direction of causation they imply in the relationship 
between output and cost changes, and in what they take as 
exogenous —  demand shifts and/or propensity to scale economies 
in one, and susceptibility to technical improvements in the 
other. Sorting them out might best be done through the case- 
study approach, using data collected on cost curves (such as 
Pratten's), elasticities , and technical innovations for 
individual industries.
Such studies might indeed find that scale economies 
and technical change are related. There may often be 'bias' 
to technical change -- the search for new techniques may be 
concentrated in areas where their shadow price is highest.
In particular, it may be true that 'a great deal of process 
improvement goes towards increasing the optimal size of 
machinery' (Nordhaus, 1969, p. 19; cf. also Levin, 1977).
That is, that research and development is biased towards 
generating economies of scale. The economic rationale for 
this could be that although firms v/ish to grow for market
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power reasons (to charge higher prices) , the rewards from so 
doing can be dissipated by loss of control over costs when 
the number of plants owned by a firm increases. Thus, 
expanding firms will wish to 'rationalize' their production 
into larger-scale plants, and will guide the search for 
techniques towards this end.
To introduce the possibility of technical change 
being directed towards certain problems is to imply that 
there is a choice problem —  that the resources that produce 
technical advances have alternative uses, so that these 
advances are not 'costless' as Salter thought. (If there 
were no opportunity costs, there would be no need to 'direct' 
technical change -- it could proceed in all directions at once).
If there are costs to achieving lower unit costs, 
we would expect relatively more such activity to be found, in 
industries in which either the returns to research and 
development are highest, or in which the availability of 
funds to undertake R and D is greatest. These may explain the 
following regression result:
(c -x) = 1.053 - 0.301SURP* „ (IV.12)
t (5.66) (-2.67), Rz = 0.116
the industries with the most market power tended to reduce 
their total unit costs compared with the others, possibly 
because the market power of firms in these industries either
a) allowed them more opportunity to enjoy the fruits of
■1
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technical advance (to prevent competitors from free-loading) or
b) generated the profits needed to finance R and D programs.
Finally in this chapter, we will look quickly at
the results of performing the correlation analysis for each
of the three five-year sub-periods available from the Censuses
2 7of production from 1958 to 1 9 7 3 . Reddaway noted that:
"On the whole, if the theory suggests a fairly 
high value of a correlation coefficient, then 
a rather lower value is to be expected over [a 
shorter rather than longer period] , because 
chance and trade-cycle factors are more likely 
to 'spoil' the correlation. On the other hand, 
where theory suggests an absence of correlation 
(as with the movements in earnings per operative 
and output per operative) chance might produce a 
small correlation over a short period" (Salter, 
Addendum, p. 201).
In Tables IV.4, IV.5, and IV.6, we find that the important 
correlations that were found to be significant with the 1958-73 
data —  between x and (x-e), x and p, p and (x-e), p and (c-x) —  
are slightly smaller, on the whole, over the five-year period.
The signs of all the correlations do not change; nor do any 
lose their significance.
The two correlations —  between p and (w-e), and 
e and (w-e)-for which it was of interest that no significance 
turned up over the fifteen-year period,show no tendency in 
particular to increase their apparent degree of association 
over the shorter periods. However, the possibility of chance 
correlations over shorter periods noted by Reddaway did appear
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to be realized when the price change regressions (cf. Table IV. 3) 
for the 1958-73 specifications) were estimated for the five- 
yearly rate of change data. I do not show these regressions, 
since they take up space without being of any particular 
interest in themselves, but can report that, although the main 
feature of the long-period result -- namely; that unit cost 
changes were passed on in prices with no significant tendency 
for the percentage markup to alter -- also shows itself in each 
sub-period —  over the 1958-63 period the rate of change of 
sales shov/ed a 'significant' association with price change, as 
did the market power variable (wdth a negative sign) for price 
changes between 1963 and 1968. Since neither of these variables 
showed any significance in the other periods, nor over the 
full fifteen years, it seems reasonable to conclude that their 
'significance', where found, was spurious, due to chance 
patterns in the movements of the variables.
Thus, the analysis for the sub-periods, even though 
these cover a length of time —  five years —  which is long by 
the standards of quarterly and annual time series econometrics, 
suggests that it is in general worthwhile to make use of the 
widest temporal spread that one's database will permit, when 
estimating the coefficients of economic models.
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T a b l e  I V . 4
C o r r e l a t i o n  C o e f f i c i e n t s  b e t w e e n  1 9 5 8 - 6 3  R a t e s  o f  C h a n g e
e x  -  e w -  e w -  x m - x c -  x P
X 0.663 0.725 -0.008 -0.746 -0.377 -0.555 -0.380
e -0.032 -0.327 -0.144 -0.030 -0.054 0.044
x  -  e 0.272 -0.875 -0.464 -0.685 -0.539
w -  e 0.199 -0.232 -0.104 -0.069
W -  X 0.338 0.640 0.525
m - x 0.914 0.791
c -  X 0.853
T a b l e  I V . 5
C o r r e l a t i o n  C o e f f i c i e n t s  b e t w e e n  1 9 6 3 - 6 8  R a t e s  o f  C h a n g e
e x  -  e w -  e w  - X m -  x c -  x P
X 0.835 0.538 0.114 -0.523 -0.118 -0.165 -0.321
e -0.004 -0.128 -0.034 0.027 0.011 -0.059
x  -  e 0.330 -0.936 -0.225 -0.296 -0.470
w -  e -0.016 0.085 0.103 -0.005
W -  X 0.283 0.371 0.521
m -  x 0.985 0.887
c -  X 0.895
T a b l e  I V . 6
C o r r e l a t i o n  C o e f f i c i e n t s  b e t w e e n  1 9 6 8 - 7 3  R a t e s  o f  C h a n g e
e x - e w - e w  -  X m - x c - x P
X 0.799 0.778 0.029 -0.686 -0.328 -0.423 -0.501
e 0.252 -0.039 -0.243 -0.261 -0.295 -0.297
x - e 0.107 -0.856 -0.277 -0.393 -0.513
w - e 0.410 0.105 0.165 -0.006
W  - X 0.281 0.423 0.450
m - x 0.977 0.575
c - X 0.606
.
IV.2 Some Implications for Policy and Welfare
In this final chapter of the Thesis, I will attempt 
to sketch out some implications for economic policy and 
welfare of my results. I will not here fully develop and 
document my proposals, since to do so properly would probably 
require at least another monograph. We will consider, in 
turn, implications for policy-making towards monopoly profits, 
changes in relative prices, inflation, unemployment, and 
productivity, and for welfare.
1. Monopoly Profits
The results of Chapter III.2 do allow us to set 
aside as untrue and mischievous the laissez-faire proposition 
that no action against monopoly profits is needed because 
these are transitory phenomena, which are efficiently dealt 
with by unaided market forces. For the United Kingdom, at 
least, monopoly profits persist.
In the model in Part II, monopoly profits depend 
on the power of traders to impose on each other costs of not 
trading. One source of differences in this power is 
differences in the personal luck, ability, and energy of 
individual entrepreneurs and managers. To the extent that 
government considers the resulting distribution of income to 
be too extreme it may wish to implement some redistributory 
policy. Such a policy should work through the system of the 
personal income and wealth taxation, rather than through
industrial policy, since the latter discriminates between 
income earned in industry and in other activities.
In any case, my industry level data do not allow us 
to estimate the extent of variations in profitability due to 
inter-firm differences. What the empirical work of Part IV 
does do is support the proposition that a good deal of the 
interindustry differences in market power are generated by 
differences in the size of establishments, and in the 
structure of their customers' markets -- because size 
measures the amount of 'territory' a firm owns, and customers' 
market structure affects, in the case of intermediate buyers, 
the money they can make on reselling the good after further 
processing, and in the case of final buyers, the extent to 
which they can organize effectively in the bargaining process 
that determines price.
Since this sort of monopoly power has no moral 
justification, and since costs may be incurred (e.g., 
managerial diseconomies of scale, reduced product variety) to 
achieve it, which have, therefore, no compensating social 
return, industrial policy may, and has, been directed against 
it. In considering the different policies, we will follow the 
traditional structure-conduct-performance paradigm of 
industrial economics. Our examples of British policies come 
from Scherer (1970), and Pickering (1974) , and so do not 
reflect the most recent developments.
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(i) Structural Policies
A form that action against monopolies can take 
is to break them up. In 1948 the UK Monopolies Commission 
was established to investigate industries in which one firm 
controls a third or more of output, and in 1965, under the 
'Monopolies and Mergers Act' was given the responsibility to 
review changes in structure, due to mergers, which would 
involve a third or more of industry output. (Note that, in 
focusing on firms' market share, the policy-makers were a 
step ahead of the oligopoly theorists, to whom only industry 
market structure is relevant). There are a number of 
problems with the structuralist approach:
1) A large market share does not necessarily imply 
abuse of monopoly power. As we noted above,
large sales and profits can be won by excellence -- 
by producing a better product than one's 
competitors. To break up a firm which has 
succeeded through superior performance could be 
both unfair and inefficient; the latter because 
to take away the fruits of excellence would be 
to destroy the socially beneficial incentive to 
achieve it.
2) In some cases, a large market share may be necessary 
if economies of scale are to be fully exploited. 
Indeed, in 1966 the British government set up the 
'Industrial Reorganization Corporation' to
•1
encourage mergers towards this end. The 
conflicts in purpose of the IRC and the 
Monopolies Commission were apparently 
resolved by political decision, usually in 
favour of letting a proposed merger proceed. 
The IRC has some notable failures to its 
debit (in particular, British Leyland); nor 
can it be said that the post-war merger boom 
was, on the whole, successful in realizing 
economies of scale (cf. Pickering, 1974, 
pp. 127-33).
3) By undertaking a detailed and competent
inquiry, the Monopolies Commission can weigh
up the costs and benefits, such as those
mentioned above, to determine whether a
particular level of, or change in, market
structure is in the public interest, under
its terms of reference. However, the
resources needed to do this properly are such
that the Commission can investigate a rather
2 8small number of individual cases, whereas 
our results are that there are thousands of 
firms who earn a surplus over the 'normal' or 
competitive rate of return on the inputs they 
commit to production.
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4) There is no guarantee that to control structure 
is to control conduct. Firms that have been 
prevented from gaining monopoly power by merger 
may find other ways of co-ordinating their 
actions.
An area in which our model and results imply that 
structural policy would be an effective instrument against 
the exercise of market power is in the encouragement of the 
small-firm sector. In the model of Part II, market power is 
measured by the 'distance' of a large firm from the fringe of 
small businesses with whom it ultimately competes. If that 
'distance' could be reduced, by policies encouraging the 
variety and viability of the small business sector, then so 
too would be monopoly profits. (We need not fear that policies 
to increase the number of small firms would also increase each 
one's profitability, since the latter is controlled by the ease 
of entry and exit into the sector). I am not proposing 
programs with a social cost to them, such as subsidies for 
otherwise unprofitable small business ventures (though these 
may, of course, be appropriate means of achieving other ends, 
such as reducing regional inequality), but rather institutional 
changes which would, for example, make it easier for small 
business to borrow, or to have access to new technology, at 
the expense of larger firms. The orthodoxy in Great Britain 
might not too unfairly be expressed as 'small firms are good 
to the extent that some of them grow into large firms' (cf. the
Bolton Committee Report on Small Firms, reviewed by 
B. S. Yamey, 1972) whereas, in my opinion, the small business 
sector is valuable not only as a distributive system within 
which all monopoly profits are quickly competed away, but 
also as a control on the power of large firms to set prices 
that generate monopoly profits.
Another form of structural policy that may be 
effective, often through its effect on the viability of small 
firms, may be laws which discourage vertical integration. 
Whereas it is often possible to argue that horizontal mergers 
or large market shares may bring benefits in lower costs to 
set against any increase in market power, it seems to be much 
more difficult to find efficiency rationalizations for the 
forward or backward integration of firms, whereas the market 
power implications may be substantial. A good example of 
harmful vertical integration can be found in the UK Brewing 
industry. By gaining control of Public Houses the big brewers 
have increased their market power both by cutting out the 
retail outlets of local or 'fringe' brewers and by reducing 
the size of the market area where they compete with each other, 
by eliminating the 'Free House' system.
(ii) Conduct Policies
The other main thrust of traditional industrial 
policy has been aimed at the conduct of firms; in particular 
at collusive agreements between them on price and market 
sharing, and at 'unfair' competitive practices. In the UK, 
these come under the 'Restrictive Trade Practices Act' of
-  2 1 f> -
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1956. As I have noted in Chapter 1.2 and elsewhere in this 
Thesis, acts of overt collusion are probably not the mainstay 
of monopoly power, so that, although the authorities may be 
successful in isolated cases, even the most diligent and 
thorough application of the Trade Practices Act will not 
eliminate more than a small proportion of the monopoly profits 
that we observe in the UK manufacturing sector. Like the 
structural policies, conduct regulation is aimed at individual 
firms, each of whose case must be decided on its merits, with 
a great deal of expense and bother, which further limits the 
scope of the policy. Because of this, too, both orthodox 
structural and conduct policies are likely to be unfair in 
their application, which can hardly encompass all the cases 
falling directly under the Acts, and leave unscathed the great 
majority of firms who are fortunate enough to be able to 
exercise monopoly power without becoming ostentatiously large 
or needing to form explicit alliances with their competitors.
(iii) Performance Policies
The traditional approach attempts to affect industry 
structure and conduct. It does not do so because dominant 
firms or cartels are judged to be Bad Things in themselves. 
Rather, these are supposed, according to the orthodoxy of 
industrial economics, to determine industrial performance -- 
in this case monopoly profit (too-high prices) —  which is 
important per se. I have argued that the policies are
inadeguate because a) they cover only a small subset of
2 38
monopolistic price-setting, and b) even where directed they may 
be circumvented or counterproductive. The lessons that I
think can be learned from this are:
a) we should not design policies that have to be 
applied to individual firms (with the possible 
exception of extreme cases, such as British 
Steel). There are just too many of them, each 
knowing a lot more about its business than 
government can or, perhaps, should know, so 
that the public authorities are always at a 
disadvantage when dealing in this ,way with the 
private sector.
b) we (economists) should not be so naive as to 
assume that structure-conduct-performance 
relationships are invariant to public policy­
making. The existence of a close-fitting 
relationship between, say, concentration and 
profits in a laissez-faire period may mean just 
that increased concentration is one effective 
way of increasing profitability. It may not be 
the only effective instrument available to 
firms, who therefore, if forced to abandon it 
by the application of structural policies, will 
turn to other means of achieving market power --
a forced reduction in concentration will then not
•1
have an effect symmetric to that associated with 
increases in concentration in the no-policy period.
To summarize, dealing with the behaviour of 
individual firms is too big and too difficult a game for 
government to play effectively.
These considerations suggest that we look for a 
policy tool which would a) operate at a more general level of 
aggregation than of the firm, b) circumvent the vagueness and 
fickleness of our structure-conduct-performance models 
(including my own) by working directly on performance.
So far as I know, the only policy that would meet 
both these criteria is a system of direct controls over prices 
charged for final consumption goods, at the level of the 
industry, or product. Such a system would have the following 
features:
a) By acting only on final (retail) prices, the 
policy would keep the amount of variety to be 
handled down to manageable level. Of course,
I have tried to stress in this Thesis the 
general heterogeneity of transactions, even 
within a given industry. However, heterogeneity 
is undoubtedly less at the retail level, when 
the one-many relationship between seller and 
customers forces a good deal of standardization 
into the terms of transactions (in contrast to 
exchange of intermediate goods between firms,
- 239 -
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which is mediated by explicit bargaining processes, 
in all their variety).
b) In any case, it would not be necessary to set
prices for all retail commodities and services.
At Agriculture Canada we found that, from the 
total set of about five thousand food commodities 
sold in supermarkets, we could extract a subset 
of fifty items which took about half of the total 
expenditure on food, whose objective characteristics 
could be quite closely specified, and which included 
good substitutes for each of nearly all the other 
thousands of food products. Control over these 
fifty items, therefore, would act, through their 
importance and high cross-elasticities, to control 
all food commodity prices. Food takes up about one 
quarter of consumer expenditure, so we might expect 
to have to control two or three hundred items in 
total; a large but probably not infeasible number. 
The job of monitoring prices would be considerably 
simplified if the controlled price set overlapped 
substantially the set of prices monitored at present 
for the consumer price index (indeed, the two sets, 
in principle, should be the same).
•1
c) Further, it would not be necessary, or even 
desirable, to attempt to specifiy all the 
relevant characteristics of the controlled 
goods and services. With price and a number 
of the important physical dimensions of a 
product standardized, consumers could shift 
their attention to the less tangible aspects 
of product quality. As a result of this 
focusing of interest they would become more 
expert in evaluating the uncontrolled 
dimensions of quality, thus increasing the 
elasticity of demand with respect to these, and 
so inducing firms to compete on quality, since 
the returns in higher sales to achieving a 
quality edge over competitors would be higher 
than it is at present.
d) A qualification to this is that it would probably 
be desirable to make the controlled price a ceiling, 
so that the most efficient firms could increase 
their profits by competing on price, too.
e) Retail price controls would be a policy instrument 
capable of dealing directly with one of the most 
important dimensions of market performance; namely, 
the effects of market power on the distribution of 
income between private business and the consumer.
But what of the distribution of income within the
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business sector? Would not a system of final- 
goods price controls be unfair to sellers in 
final goods markets, in that it would affect 
them, but not their suppliers of materials 
and intermediate goods? I expect not. We found, 
in Chapter III. 2, evidence of a 'piggyback 
effect' -- of a tendency for monopoly profits 
earned in final goods markets to be shared back 
to suppliers in intermediate industries. It 
seems reasonable, then, to expect that a squeeze 
on profits, through prices, at the final sales 
level would also be distributed back through the 
Input-Output system. Final goods sellers might 
still be unequally affected, but such an effect 
may well be in the direction of a more fair 
interindustry distribution of income, since we 
also found a significant tendency for industries 
selling to private consumers to make more Surplus 
than others.
f) As a redistributionary instrument, price controls 
would be operated as follows: first, 'Normal 
Returns', Profits, and, thus, Surplus, would be 
calculated for each industry (as I have calculated 
them in this Thesis, but with better data, 
especially on capital, allowance for factors 
affecting normal returns such as riskiness, and any 
other improvements that come to mind). Then, the
J B 'U W Î  ■ aâÊm ^m ^Êm Êtm m ÈÊÊÊÊSSm m Ê^m m m am ^m m m rn^
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Input-Output tables would be used to calculate 
the rate of Surplus embodied in each commodity, 
by summing the Surpluses of each input weighted 
by the proportion of the input in a unit of 
output of the commodity (having first corrected 
the published Input-Output coefficients, which 
at present differ because of differences in 
Surplus, as well as differences in physical 
production requirements). Next, the price 
controllers would begin by squeezing the retail 
prices of those commodities with the highest 
rate of embodied Surplus. How far they should 
go in lowering the general level of prices I do 
not at present know. I suspect that the Surplus 
numbers calculated in this Thesis are too high, 
perhaps because of the omission of some important 
factor(s) from the computation of Normal Returns.
2. Relative Prices
An implication of the considerable interindustry 
variation in Surplus that we have measured in this Thesis is 
that the price structure is not particularly closely related 
to the cost structure -- that prices do not reflect the 
opportunity costs of the primary inputs embodied in output.
A benefit of the price control system would be that, by 
reducing the variability of Surplus, it would move the 
economy towards to a price structure more closely reflecting
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opportunity costs, with a consequent improvement in the 
allocation of scarce resources.
However, in contrast to the scatter of price-cost 
relationships found across industries, we found, in the 
previous chapter, a rather impressive tendency for all 
industries to respond fully to changes in input costs over 
time. It should be ensured, then, that a price control system 
would not interfere with this desirable property. That is, the 
price controllers should lower prices as technical advances 
and other sources of productivity improvement allow, and raise 
or lower them according to changes in the prices of those 
materials inputs that are purchased at world prices, which may 
be taken to be exogenous to the domestic economy. To do so, 
they would need to keep abreast of developments in best 
practice technology, and in world market conditions, as do the 
officials of the firms producing the output. Price changes 
would not need to be calculated and implemented very often.
80 per cent of the respondents in Atkin and Skinner's sample 
(1975, p. 86) never change their price by less than 3 per cent. 
About two-thirds of the fifty-one industries in my sample 
showed a change, up or down, in price relative to the mean, 
of 15 per cent, or less, over the fifteen-year period from 
1958 to 1973. These two numbers imply a typical frequency 
of price changes of only one every three years. Although this 
is almost certainly an underestimate (we have not allowed for 
inflation, nor for the intra-industry variation in prices
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that is probably ironed out in the industry indices), it does
perhaps allow us to expect that the price controllers would not 
be overwhelmed by the need to continually revise their price 
ceilings.
The price controllers could serve a useful function 
by filling the gap left by the absence, from almost all real- 
world industrial and commercial markets, of the 'auctioneer' 
of competitive theory. By setting ceiling prices, and making 
public forecasts of future price trends, the controllers could 
assist firms, especially smaller ones with fewer planners and 
forecasters of their own, to predict the cost levels they 
should aim for to remain viably in business, and aid them in 
planning their investment decisions, especially if the 
controllers co-operated with trade associations in 
disseminating information about new technological developments, 
and on the innovation and investment decisions of other firms.
However, we should not make too much of the role of 
price as a 'signal' to investors (and so nor of the need to 
get prices 'just right' at all times). Our 1958-73 data 
revealed no association between changes in nominal sales and 
in prices, whereas we would expect a positive relationship if 
shifts in the demand curve signaled producers to change supply 
through changes in prices. In a generally Keynesian (demand- 
constrained) world, quantity signals, such as changes in 
inventory stocks, or in the rate of new orders, are probably 
quite adequate to induce the required output response from 
producers.
-«HUrt-T urn— iinrtfiii i
245 -
mil l  ■ i M in M iT liT iiM M M H Iiin O T i^ n ---------
246 -
3. Inflation
By controlling retail prices, government would, of 
course, have a direct instrument to apply tc the rate of inflation, 
which is just the rate of change of retail prices. Now, it is 
generally thought that inflation is due to the relationship 
between prices and wages, with causation running in both 
directions, and that these variables must be controlled 
together or not at all. I suggest that this is not so, that 
there is no need to control inflation other than by acting 
directly on prices. In Chapter IV.1 it was found that there is 
no relationship between differences in price and wage changes 
in individual industries; that is, that there is no evidence of 
individual groups in the labour force, through strong unions or 
whatever, being able to exert independent pressure on prices in 
particular industries, so that a general price control system 
would not break down into a conflict with particular sections of 
the workforce and their unions. The absence of a price-and-wage 
change correlation also implies, in the other direction, that 
industries which, due to an increase in market power had 
succeeded in raising their relative prices, did not share the 
spoils with their employees, so that the latter would have no 
reason to resist the program of equalizing of Surplus advocated 
in section (1) above.
Nor is it likely that there is some other factor 
or factors, omitted from the analysis of the previous chapter, 
that would explain the interindustry pattern of wage changes, 
since, as can be seen from Table IV.1, there just is not very
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much interindustry variation to be explained. Our conclusion 
was that wage changes move, in the long run, in a rather 
uniform pattern, across all industries. Of course, economy­
wide increases in wages must affect prices in each individual 
industry, but the wage changes themselves are determined by 
changes in consumer prices, and expectations of future changes 
(if there are costs to renegotiating rates frequently). Were 
there a firm and permanent (that is, a believable) program of 
retail price controls in operation, the pressure to achieve 
rates of earnings increase above the overall rate of productivity 
growth would be dissipated. The wage-price spiral would be 
broken, and it would be redundant -- indeed, counterproductive, 
given the resentment typically thereby caused —  to attempt to 
fix wages as well.
This proposal should be sharply distinguished from 
the so-called 'price' (actually profit margin) controls that 
many of the industrial economies have recently resorted to, in 
company with attempts to directly fix wage rates. Margin 
controls, in common with all other extant anti-inflation 
policies, do not actually act directly on prices. In fact, 
they provide no more than a formula standardizing the rate at 
which cost changes can be passed on in higher prices. They 
are imposed at the level of individual firms, and so encourage 
diversion of resources towards special pleading and wasteful 
accounting practices, penalize honest firms, and remove from 
all firms some of their incentive to reduce costs through
1
r
improvements in productivity. The resulting effect on the 
rate of growth of per capita real output will actually 
increase inflationary pressure, to the extent that labour 
expects wage changes to incorporate an allowance for a certain 
increase in real incomes.
4. Unemployment
As well as a complete lack of correlation between
price and wage changes across industries, we found no
relationship, in Chapter IV.1, between wage and employment
changes, so that there is no evidence that movements in
relative wage rates serve to reallocate labour between industries
when patterns of demand shift. This implies that a pool of
unemployed labour cannot be justified as assisting non-
inflationary structural adjustment -- whatever 'Phillips Curve'-
type correlation may have been observed over the period was not
due to larger changes in relative (and thus absolute, given
downward money wage rigidity) wages being needed to facilitate
the reallocation of resources in periods when unemployment was
relatively low. To put it baldly, unemployment serves no 
29useful purpose . If inflation is really, as I have suggested, 
a product market phenomenon best dealt with by product market 
price controls, then it should be possible, by means of 
consumer demand-expansionary policies coupled with price 
controls, to expand real output levels up to and beyond what 
we have become resigned to accepting as 'full' employment, 
and to maintain such high levels of activity permanently, 
with cyclical fluctuations manifesting themselves in variations
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in the stocks of inventories and unfilled orders, rather than 
in the'queue' of unemployed workers and the margin of unused 
capacity.
Further, the increased profitability that would be 
associated with high and stable rates of capacity utilization, 
with lower-risk capital formation, and with less resistance 
to labour-saving innovations and structural change, would 
perhaps at least compensate business for having imposed on it, 
on equity and efficiency grounds, the general lowering and 
evening out of rates of Surplus proposed in section (1) above.
5. Productivity
Apart from the maintenance of a full and steady level 
of economic activity, what else might government policy 
contribute to the economy's rate of growth of productivity?
In the previous chapter we found evidence that, ex post, 
increases in plant size had been associated with improvements 
in unit costs over the 1958-73 period. Perception of such a 
correlation may have contributed to the 'big is better' 
sentiments activated by the Labour Governemnt of the day in 
setting up the Industrial Reorganization Corporation in 1966. 
This organization did much of its work in secret, which makes 
difficult,evaluation of its effectiveness. Pickering's 
conclusion is tentative but gloomy: 'The danger ... is that 
excessive enthusiasm for the promotion of mergers may have 
been achieved at the cost of detriments which the IRC had not 
considered' (p. 151). As he noted earlier: 'Many estimates 
of the proportion of successful mergers indicate that well
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under 50 per cent fall into that category' (p. 127). This is 
a rather surprisingly low success rate for transactions 
supposedly entered into willingly by the parties concerned.
One explanation may be that managers' interests are generally 
well-served by mergers (better chances of promotions and salary 
increases in a bigger bureaucracy), and that this class has 
been able to bamboozle the usually ill-informed shareholders 
into approving the deal, aided and abetted, in some cases, by 
government,through the IRC.
It is certainly tempting to generalize the ex post 
correlation between changes in plant size and unit costs into 
a normative proposition for policy-making, but our other 
relevant evidence suggests that such a generalization is 
invalid -- in Chapter IV.1 I found no evidence of inter industry 
economies of scale. That is, although the relatively large 
increases in plant size that were actually undertaken in 
particular industries were profitable, a general increase in 
size of this magnitude across all industries would not have 
yielded general economies of scale -- we cannot say there there 
is an observable tendency for industries with bigger plants to 
have lower costs.
In the previous chapter we also found a positive 
correlation between unit cost performance and market power -- 
industries with more market power tended to show a relatively 
lower rate of increase of total costs (i.e., including capital 
costs) per unit of output (equation IV.12). Again, we should
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beware of invalid generalization of an ex post correlation 
into a normative policy position, such that market power should 
be left alone since it 'delivers the goods' of superior 
productivity growth rates. In an economy in which there are 
differences in market structure, it could be that control over 
the production and diffusion of technical progress tends to be 
one of the property rights that make up market power. As well, 
the higher profits generated by greater market power, and, 
possibly, market power-related capital market imperfections, 
may make it relatively more difficult for more competitive 
industries to attract financing of cost-reducing research and 
development activities.
That is, we should not infer from equation (IV.12) 
that the aggregate rate of growth of productivity would be 
raised by allowing, or encouraging, the general degree of 
monopoly power in the economy to increase. A relevant snippet 
of evidence is that the percentage of industrial employment in 
'small' (fewer than 500 workers) firms is 67 per cent in Italy,
62 per cent in Holland, 57 per cent in Belgium, 52 per cent in 
West Germany, 49 per cent in France, and only 32 per cent in 
Britain (The Economist, February 25, 1978, p. 46).
However, neither can we infer that a more monopolistic 
economy would not show a better productivity performance.
6. Welfare and Market Power
In the textbook microeconomic (static, partial) approach,
monopoly reduces total welfare by 'restricting output' —  by
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raising price above the competitive level where it equals 
marginal cost, the monopolist drives away some customers
Figure IV.Is jhe- Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Monopoly 
Welfare Loss
to whom the good is not worth the higher price, but who still 
received utility from the good that was greater than the cost 
of producing it. This loss of 'consumer surplus' is given by 
the triangle ABC in Figure IV.1, for the simplest, and most 
commonly analysed situation of a linear demand curve and 
constant marginal costs. Of course, the customers who remain 
loyal to the good also suffer a welfare loss equal to the 
rectangle PmABPc since they are charged more; but this is just 
handed over to the monopolist. The resulting effect on total 









on whether a redistribution of income from consumers to
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monopolist is judged to be a good or a bad thing. Economists 
usually feel only able to chalk up the consumer surplus 
triangle ABC as a definite welfare cost of monopoly, and, 
beginning with Harberger (1954), have made a number of attempts 
to estimate its magnitude. The usual approach has been to 
infer the divergence, Ap, between actual monopoly prices and 
marginal costs by observed rates of return on capital, to 
assume a value of price elasticity, n and thus to calculate 
the restriction in output, AQ and then the welfare loss, AW, 
from the formula
The resulting numbers have always been rather small fractions 
of total output. To illustrate, let us, quite typically, 
suppose a value for the proportion monopoly profits are of 
price of 0.1, and an elasticity of 1. Then monopoly welfare
value of output.
Cowling and Mueller (1976) have criticized this 
methodology by pointing out, quite correctly, that it is 
inconsistent with profit-maximizing behaviour by monopolists, 
under which price and elasticity are not independent numbers, 
being linked by the profit-maximizing formula (cf. Chapter 1.2).
(IV.13)
P
2losses are just (0.1) = 0.01, or 1 per cent, of the total
_ p - marginal cost _ 1 (IV.14)P P n
(IV.14) can be substituted into (IV.13) to eliminate price 
elasticity, h
i  i £**
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so that the welfare loss becomes simply one half of observed 
monopoly profits. If these are, as in the previous example,
10 per cent of revenue, then welfare loss will be 5 per cent - 
a rather larger fraction than that arrived at through the 
incorrect method. Cowling and Mueller's work is valuable in 
exposing the slipshod analysis of the Harberger school, but, 
from the view of the economy put forward in this Thesis, their 
own methodology is open to criticisms:
1) The values of n implied by actual profit rates 
are unrealistically large, at least for their 
U.S. data. For Cowling and Mueller's samples 
of U.S. and UK large firms, the ratios of the 
difference between mean and competitive rates 
of return to the mean rate is about 0.2 for 
the US and 0.6 for the UK, (cf. Cowling and 
Mueller, p. 29, footnote 13), implying 
elasticities of 5 and 1.66. While the UK 
number is not implausible, that for the US 
is well above the range of elasticities 
generally found in demand function studies 
(cf. Chapter 1.2). Even in the UK, there 
would be firms earning a return less than 
the mean rate, for whom the implied price 
elasticity would be out of line with the 
empirical estimates.
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In my chapter 1.2, I suggested that this sort of 
inconsistency with other evidence forces an examination of 
the validity of the assumptions that underpin the orthodox 
market demand curve-based model, and in Chapter II.3, I 
proposed a bargaining model as an alternative, in which 
observed (ex post) price elasticities that are less than one 
in absolute value are quite consistent with rational behaviour. 
In such a model, the allocative consequences of monopoly 
pricing are not expected to be substantial; indeed, the sort 
of numbers arrived at by Harberger and company may well be 
good approximations, though for the wrong reason.
2) The formula (IV.14) implies that monopoly output 
is always half competitive output, no matter what 
the elasticity. I do not find believable the 
magnitude (or the constancy) of this restriction 
of output attributed to market power, and suggest 
that it reveals another misleading implication of 
the parametric demand curve assumption underlying 
the orthodox model. I suggest that it is more 
likely, in a Keynesian (demand constrained) world, 
that when an industry becomes monopolized, it uses 
some of its market power to expand sales, by 
pushing out its demand curve. That is, the 
elasticities wc observe from price and quantity 
change for given market structures, cannot be 
applied to a situation when the price change
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follows a change in market structure. As an 
example, we found in Chapter III.2 that some 
monopoly profits can be accounted for by 
higher advertising/sales ratios. Since 
advertising shifts outwards the demand curve, 
the associated monopoly profits, in this case, 
go along with an expansion, not a restriction, 
of output.
Cowling and Mueller also make a pioneering attempt 
to account for, in their measures of monopoly welfare loss, 
the ingenious suggestion of Tullock (1967) and Posner (1975) 
that monopoly profits will be dissipated by the costs 
incurred in a competitive struggle to capture them; that 
'obtaining a monopoly is itself a competitive activity' 
(Posner, p. 807). This seems to suggest that we should never 
in fact actually observe any profits above competitive levels, 
which is, of course, not in accordance with reality. Cowling 
and Mueller try to get around this by supposing that there are 
winners and losers in the struggle for monopoly rents, and 
assume that the costs incurred by the losers equal, in sum, 
the observed monopoly profits, which were the winners' reward. 
However, if this hypothesis were correct, we would expect to 
find evidence of these costs incurred by the losers, who would 
be firms earning sub-competitive rates of return. In fact, 
over the sample of forty firms shown in Cowling and Mueller's 
tables 2 and 4, only four of the UR, and none of the UK 
firms earned less than the competitive return on their capital
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No doubt it is reasonable to assume that a firm 
will be willing to pay a price to achieve some market power, 
up to the expected value, in higher trading profits, of 
that power. However, to the extent that market power is 
distributed as freely-negotiable property rights, what are 
costs to the purchasing firm are just transfers of assets 
from society's point of view, not necessarily using up any 
resources above the transaction costs. Thus, for example, 
bribery to obtain a government licence is just a transfer of 
income, and may, indeed, be quite efficient, to the extent 
that the bribe system works like an informal auction market, 
in which the winning bidder is the one to whom the licence 
is worth the most.
As another example in the terminology of the model 
of Part II, one firm may take over another in order to 
increase its product 'territory1, and do so in a transaction 
that is beneficial to both parties and incurs no social costs.
However, when market power can be 'produced', as by 
the expenditure of money on advertising, and when existing 
property rights cannot be transferred costlessly, as when two 
firms combine to increase their market territory, but in so 
doing incur some diseconomies of scale, there will indeed 
be welfare losses generated by monopolies. It is difficult 
to see, however, how these true social costs can be separated 
out from the transfer payments, and from the continual flow 
of new non-'produced * , or rent-earning property rights
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generated by the discovery of new sources of natural resources, 
by the birth of new ideas and inventions, by the debuts of new 
entrepreneurs, and so on.
In the model of Part II, market power was actually 
defined in terms of the real costs each party to a transaction 
can impose on the other by not trading. However, in this 
model, these threats served just to determine the distribution 
of the gains from trade, and were hardly ever supposed to be 
actually carried out. One exception occurs in the case of a 
firm with market power selling a product to customers between 
whom it is unable to discriminate on the price charged. Then, 
some customers near the border of the firm's territory would 
find it worthwhile to incur some costs by 'travelling' to the 
border to purchase from fringe firms at their lower price. 
However, depending on the relationship between market power 
and price, such customers may actually eventually become a 
smaller proportion of all customers as market territory 
increases, and the fringe recedes in importance.
We have so far discussed only the short-term, or 
static,welfare implications of market power. We have little 
evidence on questions of the long-term effects of monopoly —  
on its influence on the rates of growth of employment and 
output. In Chapter IV.1, I did report a correlation between 
market power and the rate of change of unit costs, but, as I 
warned in the previous section, such a correlation does not
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tell us whether a generally competitive economy would show 
inferior cost performance to an economy that was monopolistic. 
Surely, these are questions which would be most fruitful for
future Industrial Economics research.
F o o t n o t e s
1 (p. 14) cf. for example, the quotations beginning 
Chapter III.3.
2 (p. 21) For 33 Canadian industries, for which I have 
product-market Herfindahl and seller Concentration data, 
a regression between the two variables showed that an 
SCR value of 60 (about the mean value for the UK sample) 
would be associated with a Herfindahl index of about 0.11.
3 (p. 21) More problematic may be the tendency of formula 
(1.1) to predict too large a spread of profit/sales ratios. 
The values taken by SCR one standard deviation above and 
below its mean are 83 and 39, respectively. Using the 
formula estimated from the Canadian data suggests that the 
associated Herfindahls are about 0.027 and 0.031, which,
in (1.1) imply profit margins of 0.621 and 0.093. This 
variation is probably too big to be reasonable, since the 
+ and - one-standard-deviation-from-the-mean values of the 
profit/sales ratio in the UK sample are 0.259 and 0.140.
4 (p. 26) More accurately, efforts to increase market shares 
will have a positive effect on profits if there are some 
spillovers to total industry sales. Against this, the 
various marketing expenses are themselves costs, of course, 
and so subtract from profits. The net effect may be in 
either direction. There can be no doubt, however, of the 
effect of price-cutting on profits when demand is inelastic.
5 (p. 28) And since these boundary situations occur between 
products with the highest substitutability, they may often 
involve just two or three of the firms in an 'industry', 
so that price-co-ordination becomes a series of more-or- 
less independent small group decision problems, rather than 
the more difficult matter of finding a single 'price' that 
is acceptable to all firms.
6 (p. 36) Some respondents used more than one pricing 
procedure, so that the sum of the percentages is greater 
than one.
7 (p. 37) A possible exception (cf. Silberston, p. 49) is 
Early's (1956) study of 110 'excellently managed companies' 
in the US, who were found to make extensive use of 
marginalist principles in their pricing, marketing, and 
new product policies. What one would like to know is 
whether these principles were as well-ensconced amongst 
all the less excellently managed firms.
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8 (p. 95) The quality of an economy's stock of entrepreneurial 
resources is, of course, extremely important —  more so,
no doubt, than the industrial structure factors being 
examined here -- in determining the level of economic 
well-being achieved by a society. However, it is probably 
legitimate to take entrepreneurial capacity as given to 
our present analysis, since the political, cultural, and 
legal factors that account for it are surely outside the 
scope of this Thesis.
9 (p. 115) It is true that unique price does not necessarily 
imply equal rates of profit between firms -- costs could 
differ with scale, for example. However, erroneously 
attributing all profit differences to cost differences leads 
to unjustified laissez-faire policy conclusions, as in 
Demsetz (1973).
10 (p. 118) Examples are the two studies, published together, 
of the structure-performance relationship in Canadian 
manufacturing (Jones et. al., McFetridge, 1973). Each uses 
a different profitability variable; neither justifies their 
choice or recognizes that any problem may exist.
11 (p. 128) Cf. Freund and Debertin (1975) for a demonstration 
of the dangers of data mining.
12 (p. 132) In work on the Canadian food and beverages 
processing industry (Hazledine, 1978b), in which I pooled 
cross sections of annual time series data, I was able to 
use an elasticity-weighted income growth variable, and 
found it to be significant in explaining year-to-year 
fluctuations in profitability.
13 (p. 136) Of course manufacturing industries selling 
products classified into 'Final Consumption' in the Input- 
Output tables normally make use of wholesalers and retailers.
To the extent that there are interindustry differences in 
the buyer power of these operators, our simplification will 
be blurred.
14 (p. 145) Concern about the proper classification of firms 
into 'markets' has lead some (e.g., Khalilzadeh-Shirazi,
1974 , Hart and Morgan, 1977, VJaterson, 1976) to omit from 
their sample MLHs for which the 'specialization' or 
'exclusiveness' ratios are less than some arbitrary number 
such as 0.8, on the grounds that these industries do not
form a homogeneous market in the sense defined. Unfortunately, 
the excluded industries arc, as one would expect, predominantly 
in the capital goods sector, so that their omission reduces 
the generality of the results by weakening the representation 
of capital goods industries in the sample.
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15 (p. 150) It is probably not correct to assume that normal
rates of return have stayed constant over the twenty-year 
sample period. Changes in real wage rates, in risk, and 
in the rate of interest, may have had a net effect of 
changing the R's by a few percentage points. However, 
given the insensitivity of the r^'s to changes in the R's, 
it is probably so that any estimate of differences in 
normal rates, census-to-census, would be statistically 
spurious.
16 (p. 159) Three industries —  Sugar, Tobacco, and Man-made
Fibres -- have particularly large plants, measured by their 
Net Output per Establishment (cf. Appendix C). If the 
second and third of these are also removed from the sample 
(Sugar is already out) of specification 12, the regression 
equation becomes
AVSURP = 0.008NO/EST + 0.180ADVR
(0.30) (6.97)











—  the significance of the NO/EST variable disappears, 
suggesting that, at least so far as our imperfect industry- 
average data can discern, it is only for very large plant 
sizes that the variable influences profits. Removal of 
the outliers has no disruptive effect on the magnitude or 
significance of any of the other coefficients.
17 (p. 174) In this table I report the results of what seemed 
to be the most successful regression specification in each 
paper, following Hart and Morgan's survey.
18 (p. 202) Except that Salter did not include a measure of 
unit capital costs in his analysis. As well, he did not 
show the correlation between price and wage rate changes. 
This, however, can be calculated from the data in his 
Table 14 (p. 107). The correlation, r, between the two 
variables is 0.044.
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(p. 150) It is probably not correct to assume that normal 
rates of return have stayed constant over the twenty-year 
sample period. Changes in real wage rates, in risk, and 
in the rate of interest, may have had a net effect of 
changing the R's by a few percentage points. However, 
given the insensitivity of the r*'s to changes in the R's, 
it is probably so that any estimate of differences in 
normal rates, census-to-census, would be statistically 
spurious.
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(Sugar is already out) of specification 12, the regression 
equation becomes
AVSURP = 0.008NO/EST + 0.180ADVR
(0.30) (6.97)











—  the significance of the NO/'EST variable disappears, 
suggesting that, at least so far as our imperfect industry- 
average data can discern, it is only for very large plant 
sizes that the variable influences profits. Removal of 
the outliers has no disruptive effect on the magnitude or 
significance of any of the other coefficients.
(p. 174) In this table I report the results of what seemed 
to be the most successful regression specification in each 
paper, following Hart and Morgan's survey.
(p. 202) Except that Salter did not include a measure of 
unit capital costs in his analysis. As well, he did not 
show the correlation between price and wage rate changes. 
This, however, can be calculated from the data in his 
Table 14 (p. 107). The correlation, r, between the two 
variables is 0.044.
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19 (p. 206) In a study of quarterly time-series data for 
five UI< manufacturing industries over time periods quite 
similar to the 1958-73 coverage of this Thesis, Sherif 
(1977), finds a significant relationship between capital 
costs and prices. He also finds that changes in wage 
rates or earnings are determinants of price changes.
Note that this does not contradict our finding that 
interindustry differences in price changes over the 
period are not related to earnings changes. The 
interpretation to be placed on the two sets of results 
is that, although a wage rate change in a given industry 
is associated with a change in that industry's price, 
actual wage changes have been so similar across industries 
that they cannot explain any of the differences between 
industry's price performance.
20 (p. 214) Ripley and Segal do find (p. 267) that wage rate 
(compensation per man-hour) changes are significantly 
related to price changes, in contrast to the UK findings. 
Further work is needed to examine this apparent major 
behavioural difference between the US and UK economies.
21 (p. 215) In a recent simulation study with the three
macroeconometric models of the UK economy, Laury et. al. 
write: "It should be stressed ... that there is little
faith in the existence of a stable Phillips Curve for 
the UK and these [Phillips curve] equations are not used 
in actual forecasting (1978, p. 55, footnote 1).
22 (p. 221) Calculated from the tables at the end of each of 
Pratten's chapters on individual industries. Of course, if 
industries tended in 1958, to have plants of less than 
half the'minimum efficient scale', doubling size of their 
plants would, on average, reduce costs by more than l\ per 
cent. On the other hand, industries in which doubling 
took them past minimum efficient scale would tend to show
a smaller cost reduction.
23 (p. 221) Real Net Output per Establishment and Real Net 
Output did grow at quite similar rates, on average, between 
1958 and 1973, but with by no means an identical pattern 
across industries. The regression relationship is
%ARNO/EST = 0.561 + 0.523%ARNO, R2 = 0.459
(3.57) (6.59)
so there was a good deal of industry growth not associated 
with plant size growth, and vice versa.
24 (p. 22.'1) Indeed, since NO/EST is biased upwards as a measure 
of real output by the higher prices associated with large- 
plant industries, regression (IV.10) could be interpreted
to show that there are diseconomies of scale, across 
industries.
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25 (p. 223) Cf. Lambin's evidence (1976), p. 103) cited above 
in Chapter 1.2.
26 (p. 223) Although eleven industries do not make up a large 
sample, they are better than just one. Kaldor (1957) 
demonstrates the dangers of too-casual empiricism by 
claiming that the fact that in the UI< and German automobile 
industries productivity grew at different rates whereas they 
might be presumed to have access to similar technology, 
implies that economies of scale, not technical advance 
explain differences in productivity growth.
27 (p. 226) I did not correlate rates of change for unit 
'capital' costs, since the proxy for capital —  investment 
expenditure —  is probably too affected by cyclical 'noise' 
to give reliable five-yearly comparisons.
28 (p. 234) Pickering (p. 146) reports that only 'about 3 per 
cent of all qualifying mergers' were the 'subject of a 
reference to the Commission' over the 1965-73 period.
29 (p. 248) A recent twist, from the so-called 'new micro­
economists', is to justify all unemployment as voluntary 
job search behaviour. For this to be plausible, search 
from unemployment must be more profitable to the worker 
than on-the-job search (in fact, it must be considerably 
more profitable, in terms of higher wage eventually 
captured, since on-the-job search has the advantage that 
the searcher is being paid while he/she looks for another 
job) . There is no evidence that this is generally so.
30 (p. 257) The typically rather low realized profitability 
of merger activity in the UK referred to in the previous 
section may be due to the generation of costs —  
diseconomies of scale, in particular —  incurred in order 
to win some additional product market power.
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APPENDIX A : Productivity Fluctuations in the Short-term
(For reasons of space, this Appendix has not been included in the 
text of the Thesis. It has been published in the Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, Volume 39, Number 4, November 1977, under the title 
'Short-term Production Functions and Economic Measures of Capacity for UK 
Manufacturing Industries', with Ian Watts as co-author. A reprint will be 
supplied on request.)
Appendix B: Price Setting with Some Demand Elasticity
In this appendix, I attempt to generalize the 
price-setting models of Chapter II.3 to allow some price 
elasticity of demand. It will be assumed that:
1. buyers are evenly distributed along a line, at unit 
distance apart;
2. the cost to a buyer of moving a unit distance along 
the line is constant, d;
3. each buyer has the same log-linear demand curve for 
the product.
We will also begin by allowing non-zero, but constant, unit 
costs of production, c, but we will find that this prevents 
us from reaching analytically tractable expressions for price.
Two cases will be examined: unique and discriminating 
price-setting.
1. Unique Price
The demand curve is:
q = p a , a > 0 (1)
for each buyer, where q is the quantity purchased, and p 
is the price.
-  B 2
0 m M
Each buyer is some distance m from the centre of the seller's 
territory, the border of which is at M. A buyer will purchase 
from the firm rather than from the fringe firms at M so long as
(M-m) d >, p - p (-) •
where p is the price charged by fringe firms. Call the
ith buyer the one distanced (M-nu) from the fringe who is just
indifferent about from whom he buys. For this buyer, then
(M-m^)d = p - p (3)
We will assume that the ith buyer, as well as all buyers 
further from the fringe deals with the firm being examined so 
that there are itk buyers. This firm's problem is to maximise 
profits, tt,
n = (p - c) qriK (4) ,
such that (3) holds
Rearranging (3) and substituting into (4) gives
tt = (p1 a - cp a) (M - p-p)
d
= - jP2“a + (M + | + j)p1_a - C(M + |)p"a (5)
Differentiating with respect to the decision variable, p;
g  - -  P1' “ * * §  * f> P '“
+ ctc(M + j) pa 1 ( 6 )
R3
Equating to zero, (6) gives
(2-a)pz - (1-a)(Md+p+c)p - ac(Md+p) = 0 (7)
Unfortunately, the roots of (7) are very complicated 
functions of the parameters. To get something tractable, I 
will assume zero costs (following in a tradition beginning 
with Hotelling, (19/9) , in the spatial competition literature) . 
Then (7) simplifies to
p = (I^a)(Md+p) (8)




(1-ot) (2-n) - a 
d" ’ F a (1-a) (M+E)p_a_1
We look at three possible ranges of values for a:
(9)
(i) 0 < a < 1
This is the inelastic demand case. (9) is negative 
for all positive values of p, including the extremum, which 
is therefore a maximum. Note that p in (8) is an increasing 
function of p, M, and d, and a decreasing function of a, as 
we would expect.
(ii) 1 < a < 2
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In this, elastic demand, case, p in (8) is negative, 
dir/dp (6) is negative, too, so that it would seem to pay to 
reduce price without limit. However, price in this case will 
then be set equal to p, since any firm, always has the option 
of selling whatever quantity it wishes in the fringe 
(competitive) market at this price, and so would not change 
anything less.
(iii) 2 < a
When demand is still more elastic, p in (8) becomes
2positive, but the sign of d‘7r/dp~ can be shown to also be 
positive, so that (8) gives a profit-minimizing price. This 
suggests that either the competitive price, p, or some very 
high price will be changed. The latter is a puzzling property 
of the particular model used here.
However, since a measures the industry price 
elasticity, and since the evidence cited in Chapter 1.2 points 
overwhelmingly towards industry price elasticities being less 
than 2 ( in absolute value), if not less than one, cases (i) 
and (ii) are the relevant ones.
2. Discriminating Prices
We next consider the case where the seller takes 
advantage of the property that the 'travelling' costs that 
distance buyers from the fringe also distance them from each 
other —  the ith buyer incurs costs of d in travelling to
B5
the (i+l)th -- so that price discrimination is possible. We 
look at two situations when nc explicit bargaining takes place 
and when it does.
(a) Price Discrimination Without Bargaining
This situation is plausible when there are actually 
a large number of similar customers at each distance in from 
the fringe, as when, for example, a consumer good is sold in 
different towns.
The seller's problem is to maximize
"i = <Pi " C*I±
Subject to
Pj^ $ P + (M-mi)d 
for each group i
If demand is inelastic (0<n<l in (1)),
( 10)
( I D
The seller will simply set the highest price he can get away 
with without driving the customers to the fringe -  that is, 
the prive given by (11) when the strict equality holds:
p^ = p + (M-rm)d (12)
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The difference in prices charged to different groups equals 
the travelling costs between them, so there is no incentive 
for buyers to disrupt the discriminatory price structure by 
reselling.
If demand is elastic, the seller may not choose to 
price up to p + (M-nK)d. The value of p^ that maximizes (10) 
is
Pi = JTT (13)
For small (M-nu)d —  customers close to the fringe -- the 
constraint (11) may be active, and price will be given by 
(12). However, for customers well inside the firm's territory, 
(12) may be higher than (13) -- it will pay the firm not to use 
all its market power, since to do so w’ould reduce sales 
unprofitably. Then, (13) gives the profit-maximizing price.
(b) Price Discrimination with Explicit Bargaining
If there is only one buyer at each distance (M-m) 
from the fringe, a discriminating seller is setting a different 
price for each transaction. Under these circumstances, as I 
suggested in Chapter II.3, an explicit bargaining situation 
will probably develop -- the seller's no-sale threat to the 
buyer will be countered with the buyer's threat to take his 
custom elsewhere. In the terminology of Chapter II.3, we wish 
to measure the 'realized market power' of seller, Fg and 
buyer F^ —  the costs one party can impose on another by not 
trading at any given price. We have
•; U w tH glU f K ' à i d » * . * »
f
- D 7
f = ;p p-adps p r r 
where p = p + (M-m)d
Fg equals the money costs of buying at the higher real (i.e., 
including transport costs) fringe price p, plus the consumer 
surplus loss at the lower level of consumption.
The buyer's penalty costs are
Fb = (p " c)p (16)
-- the loss in profits to the seller if the deal does not 
go through. Suppose (as in equation II.5) that the realized 
gains from trade are distributed according to
F = 0F, s b (17)
where 6 is any positive number. Substituting (14) and (16) 
into (17) gives, eventually,
1 ,-1-a l-a. n. 1-a -a,(p - p ) = 0(p - cp )l-a (18)
which is not, in general, analytically solvable. To get 




P = [0(l-a) +1) P (19)
-- the proportion p is of p depends on 0 and a.
If we assumed a linear demand function, the 
equivalent expression to (18) would be a quadratic function,
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for which we could find the roots, even with non-zero costs. 
Other assumptions would lead to different expressions. The 
point of this Appendix was just to work through some simple 
examples to show ways in which market structure can be 
related to demand and price, rather than to emerge with 
generally applicable formulae. Given the tendency for the 
analysis to become intractable with even quite modest attempts 
at generalization, I do not expect that such formulae are 
attainable.
The models do illustrate that the presence of fringe 
sellers constrains the price of a profit-maximizing firm when 
this is inelastic, but in a way that depends systematically 
on the market power of the firm. They also show how the demand 
curve facing a firm is not in general invariant with respect to 
that firm's market power.
Appendix C: Data and Variables
1 Coverage
The data are at the level of aggregation used for 
the 1963 Input-Output Tables. All manufacturing industries 
in the 1-0 tables (1-0 numbers 5-61) are included, with the 
exception of numbers
14 —  (Coke Ovens)
38 -- (Office Machinery)
39 -- (Ships)
41 —  (Aircraft)
42 —  (Other Vehicles)
47 -- (Textile Finishing)
for which no price data were available. Thus there are 51 
industries in the full sample.
2. Sources
Data on the proportion of output going to different 
end-users are from the 1963 Input-Output Tables, and are for 
that year.
Data on Gross Output, Met Output, Wage and Salaries, 
Number of Employees, End-year Stocks, Capital Expenditures, 
Concentration Ratios, Expenditures on Advertising, and Numbers 
of Enterprises and Establishments arc from various issues of 
the Report on the Census of Production. Data for 1973 are 
'provisional'. These data are presented at the 'Minimum List 
Heading' (1ILH) level, and so were aggregated, where necessary,
m
I W i k ’i i d f t * « . ]
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to the level of the Input-Output tables. The coverage of the 
published Concentration Ratio data has been augmented by 
information contained in Walshe (1974).
Data on wholesale Price Indices are from various 
issues of the Department of Trade and Industry's publication 
Trade and Industry.
3. Manipulation of 1954 Data
1. The 1954 Census asked respondents to exclude 
'merchanted and factored' goods. Merchanting and factoring 
were included in 1958 and subsequent Censuses. Therefore, I 
attempted to adjust the 1954 data to include merchanting and 
factoring, as follows. The 1958 Census does break-down Gross 
Output, but not net Output, Wage and Salaries, and Employment, 
into Merchanting and Manufacturing activity. Therefore, I 
calculated Gross Output (GO) for 1954 by assuming that the 
ratio of merchanting to manufacturing gross output observed 
in 1958 also held in 1954. Thus
G054 = NMG054 *(G058 + MERC58) G058
where 'NM' means 'not-merchanted', and MERC58 is the gross 
output of merchanted and factored goods. (For simplicity, I 
use equality signs throughout this Appendix, though all the 
relationships are identities.
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To get numbers for Net Output (NO) and Employment of 
'Operatives' (FOP) and 'Others' (EOT), I assumed that the 
ratios of Net Output to Gross Output and of Employment to 
Gross Output observed in the industry classified as 
'Distribution' under the Standard Industrial Classification 
would hold for merchanting and factoring* (which is essentially 
a service activity), and be the same for Operatives and Others. 
These ratios were 0.23 and 0.22, respectively. Thus, using 
the already calculated value of gross output in 1954:
NO54 = NMN054 + 0.23(G05<1 - NMG054)
EOP54 = NMEOP54 + 0.22(G054 = NMG054)
EOT54 = NMEOT54 + 0.22(G054 - NMG054)
Wages and Salaries of Operatives (WSOP) and Others (WSOT) were 
then calculated by assuming that they were the same for 
manufacturing and merchanting employees:
F O P  5  4WSOP = NMWSOP54 *
NMEOP54 
EOT 5 4WSOT 5 4 = NMWSOT54
4. Change in Standard Industrial Classification
During the sample period there was a change from the 
1958 to the 1968 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC). In 
the 1963 Report on the Census of Production, data were given 
for the 1958 SIC. In the 1968 Report, data were under the 
new SIC, and were given thus for 1968 and 1963. In the 
Structure-Performance regressions of Part III, the 1963 data
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from the 1968 Report are used, but no attempt was made to 
adjust the 1954 and 1958 data to allow for changes caused by 
the change in classification. In the five-yearly rates-of- 
change correlations reported in the last section of Chapter IV. 1 
the earlier (1958 SIC) data are used for 1958-63 rates of 
change, and the 1968 SIC for the 1963-68 analysis.
5. Tables
There are 89 variables in the primary database, 
which, for reasons of space, I do not show in this Thesis. A 
printout of the database can be supplied on request. In 
Table C.l are shown the computed variables used in the 
Structure-Performance regressions of Part III.
Table C.2 gives the rates of change, cost shares, 
and market power data computed for the analysis of Chapter IV.1. 
The 'rates of change' are not in fact presented as such, but as 
the ratio of 1973 to 1958 values of each variable, to make their 
magnitudes easier to perceive visually.
6. Definitions of Variables Computed for Structure- 
Performance Regressions
WAGES = WSOP + WSOT (Wage Bill)
EMP = EOF + EOT (Employment)
INSTK = Sum of end-year stocks of materials, fuel, 
finished goods, and work in progress 
(Inventory Stock)




PROFITS = NO-NAGES (Net Output less the Wage Bill)
GMARG = PROFITS/GO (Profit Margin on Gross Output)




| 'Normal' rates of return to capital 
0.2 ¡'stock, inventories, and management.
RL = 0.2
SURP = PROFITS/NRET (Rate of Surplus earned)
XSURP = (PROFITS + WAGES)/(NRET - RL*WAGES) 
(adjusted Surplus)
The above variables are calculated for each of the 
51 industries and for each of the sample years 1954, 1958, 1963, 
1968, and 1973. For the regressions of Table III.4, the data 
are 'stacked' giving series with 255 observations for each 
variable. For the regressions of Table III.3, the data are 
simply averaged across the five sample years. Averaged values 
of SURP, XSURP, and GMARG are prefixed by the letters 'AV'.
NO/EST = Net Output/(Numbers of Establishments)
GO/EST = Gross Output/(Numbers of Establishments)
NO/ENT = Net Output/(Numbers of Enterprises)
GO/ENT = Gross Output/(Numbers of Enterprises)
These variables could be measured only for three years —  1958, 
1963, and 1968. They were stacked according to the formula
/Xi,1958, 1 ' 1554.1958
X. =4 Xi, 1963 , t = 1963 l, t /
Xi , 1968 , t = 1968,1973
C 6
where i is the industry subscript, and are simply averaged 
for the Table III. 3 runs.
SCR = (Sum of the sales of the five largest firms 
in each MLH industry included in the 1-0
industry for which the information was 
available)/ (total sales of the available MLH 
industries)
(so SCR is a weighted average concentration ratio) 
ADVR = (Expenditure on Advertising Services)/GO 
SCR and ADVR could be calculated only for 1963 and 
1968, and were stacked according to
X. .irt X. 1QC, t = 1954, 1958, 1963 1 1 1 y c j /
Xi,1968, = 1968' 1973
and averaged for Table III.3 regressions.
%DGO n ^CjG073-G068 . . „ G058-G054G068 G05T
(average inter-census rate of change in Gross Output. Used 
only in Table III.3 regressions)




DCRINT = Sum of (SCR of each manufacturing industry 
buying more than 1 per cent of the total 
output of the selling industry) * (proportion 
of the total output bought by that buyer), 
plus (total proportion of total output bought 
by all buyers purchasing less than 1 per cent 
of the total output)* 64.1, 1963.
Notes
1. BCRINT is thus a weighted average of the 
SCRs of manufacturing buyers of intermediate 
goods from the selling industries.
2. 64.1 is the average SCR for the sample. 
Industries buying less than one per cent 
were lumped together for computational 
simplicity.
3. Sales to final users (see below) accounting 
for less than 1 per cent of an industry’s 
output are also included in BCRINT.
BUYC = Sum of proportion of sales to Agriculture,
Forestry and Fishing, Construction, Consumers, 
Distributive trades and (Proportion of Sales to 
Private Consumption).
BUYP = Sum of proportion of sales to Coal mining,
Other Mining and Quarrying, Gas, Electricity 
and Water, and All Transport and Communications. 
(Proportion of Sales to Public consumption).
BUYK = Proportion of Sales to Fixed Capital Formation.
BUYE = Proportion of Sales to Exports.
IMP/GO = Ratio of Imports to Gross Domestic Output.
IJMRftiJ
- C8 -
Note: Sales are measured as Gross Output 
minus the difference between end-year and 
beginning-year Inventories over the 
census year. BUY ratios are for 1963.
7. Definitions of Variables Computed for Chapter IV.1
P == Wholesale Price Index, 1963 = 1,000
RGO =- GO/P (Real Gross Output)
RNO == NO/P (Real Net Output)
UMATC = (GO-NOS/RGO (Unit Materials Cost)
UWAGC = WAGES/RGO (Unit Wage Cost)
UVCOST = UMATC + UWAGC (Unit Variable Cost)
RGINV1958 '= GINVig58* 1.080
RGINV1963 == gInv1963* 1.000
RGINV1968 '= GINV1968* 0.830
rginv1973 = GINV1973* 0.587
URGINV =
(Real Gross Capital Expenditures. The 
deflator is the deflator used in Economic 
Trends (HMSO) to deflate total manufacturing 
capital expenditures. There was little 
difference between this deflator and the 
deflator that is available for Industry 
'Orders' at the II-diqit level)
 RGINV/RGO (Unit Capital Cost)
UTCOST = URGINV + UVCOST (Unit Total Cost)
X/E = RGO/EMP (Labour Productivity)
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W/E = WAGES/F.MP (Earnings per Employee)
Rates of change of these variables and Peal Net Output per 
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PVC = PWAGE + PMAT 
PTC = PK + PVC
Z = Rate of Surplus predicted by Regression 1 
of Table III. 3 ('Market Power').
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